CAPITVLO PRIMERO.

CONOCIMIENTO ESPECIFICO DE ESTA ARTE, y què argumentos vſa

CHAPTER ONE.

SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE OF THIS ART, and what arguments it uses

Definio el Philoſopho, que Arte es habito de obrar con razon lo verdadero. Y al contrario, tabien es Arte obrar lo falſo con razon (aunque aparente) _cerca de aquello en que cabe coſa diverſa. Exemplo en eſte Arte de regir la Eſpada, que es habito de obrar lo verdadero con razon cierta; y tambien es habito de obrar lo falſo con razon aparente, qual ſe demueſtra en eſte Libro.

The Philosopher defines that Art is the habit of acting with reason on the truth. And conversely, art is also to act on the false with reason (though apparent) concerning that in which a diverse thing is possible. An example in this Art of wielding the Sword, which is the habit of acting on the truth with certain reason; and it is also a habit of acting on the false with apparent reason, as demonstrated in this Book.

De que reſulta, que el habito y la determinacion en qualquiera Arte, es por la coleccion de ſus preceptos, como ſinitò Pedro Gregorio. Si bien los rpeceptos, y reglas, las mas vezes ſe conſideran vniverſales, mas que individuales; como en la Medicina, donde no ſe diſputa del ſugeto nominado Juan ò Pedro, ſino del cuerpo humano, porque de todos los particulares en particular, no ſe dà Sciencia, à cauſa de que no puede hazer principio la ſingularidad, ſegun el Philoſopho: y por eſſo Arte es conocimiento en razon de vniverſales, y la experiencia lo es de particulares, como enſeño el miſmo Philoſopho: añadiendio, que todas Artes, y Sciencias, no ſolo quanto à las partes, ſino quanto à los generos, exiſten en algo perfecto, en que baſta conſiderar lo que conviene al genero; porque en Artes, y Sciencias ſingulares, ay ciertos principios, y preceptos generales, que ſegun la ſujeta materia, exactamente ſe diſtribuyen (como por calculo) en las partes: y los ſugetos ſon limites en que ſe tranſciende de vna Arte, ò Sciencia, en otra Sciencia, ò Arte; como de la Arithmetica, cuyo ſugeto es numero, ſe tranſciende al Cielo, por las conſideraciones Aſtrologicas, y de las paſsiones de la Geometira, à las magnitudes corporeas. Para eſta Arte admitenſe en ella, como ſubalternas, la Geometria, y la Arithmetica, que ſon baſis à la inteligencia de la cantidad continua, y diſcreta, coligiendo preceptos para entender, y demonſtrar el regimen de la Eſpada, en defenſa, y ofenſa, valiendoſe eſta Arte de tranſcender en otras, y otras en ella. Porque como dixo el Philoſopho: Todas las Artes en comun, tienen entre sì cierto vinculo, y correſpondencia, en que participan vnas de otras.

From this, it follows that the habit and determination in any Art is due to the collection of its precepts, as defined by Pedro Gregorio. Although the precepts and rules are often considered universal rather than individual, as in Medicine, where the subject named Juan or Pedro is not debated, but the human body, because science does not apply to all particulars individually, as individuality cannot be the principle, according to the Philosopher. Therefore, Art is knowledge based on universals, and experience is of particulars, as taught by the same Philosopher. Adding that all Arts and Sciences, not only in terms of parts but also in terms of genres, exist in something perfect, where what pertains to the genre is sufficient; because in individual Arts and Sciences there are certain principles and general precepts that, according to the subject matter, are precisely distributed (like a calculation) into parts. And subjects are limits in which one transcends from one Art or Science into another Science or Art, like from Arithmetic, whose subject is number, one transcends to the Heavens due to Astrological considerations, and from the passions of Geometry to bodily magnitudes. For this Art, Geometry and Arithmetic are accepted as subordinate, which are the basis for understanding continuous and discrete quantity, deriving precepts to understand and demonstrate the regime of the Sword, in defense and offense, using this Art to transcend into others, and others into it. Because, as the Philosopher said: All Arts in common have among them a certain bond and correspondence, in which they participate from one another.

Ciceron advirtiò al miſmo intento ſer eſto cauſa vnica, vertida por la naturaleza en todos los hombres: pues los mas ruſticos, ſi ſe les propone qualquiera dificultad, aunque ſe de Arte, que no conocen, ocurre luego la mente en buſca de la razon, por los principios de la nocion comun, que neceſsita à raciocinar, aunque ſe en confuſo; y mas en el rudo, falto de conocimiento, y principios de Arte, y Sciencia: y con todo eſſo, por la exercitacion del animo en la experiencia (aunque ſin orden) diſpone à ſu modo el entendimiento, para aprender concepto en que halle quietud, y haſta que la conſigue, no repoſa; y de tal origen ſe han producido las Artes, no tanto por la mera raciocinacion, quanto por la ordinacion en reglas, y preceptos.

Cicero noted to the same end that this is a unique cause, turned by nature in all men: for the most rustic, if any difficulty is proposed, even if it is of an Art they do not know, the mind immediately seeks reason through the principles of common knowledge, necessary for reasoning, even if confused; and more so in the rough, lacking knowledge and principles of Art and Science. And yet, through the exercise of the spirit in experience (though without order), it prepares the understanding in its own way to learn a concept in which it finds peace, and until it achieves it, it does not rest; and from such origins, Arts have been produced, not so much by mere reasoning, but by the ordering into rules and precepts.

Pedro Gregorio formò el exemplo en el oro, que ſe depura, y ſaca de entre las malezas minerales, adquiriendo ſu pureza, y eſplendor por medio de los artificios, que le reducen à ſu fineza; que ſi bien en la eſſencia nada le añaden, à lo menos por la compurgacion artificioſa, paſſa à lucir terſo, y reſplandeciente. El entendimiento humano, que ofuſcado de la ignorancia, ſi de ella ſe compurga, y limpia, por medio de Sciencias, y Artes acquiſitas, buelve à quedar en aquellas luzes, que le concediò ſu Criador, reduciendoſe à la intelectual pureza, que cultivada por preceptos, y reglas (que conſtituyen Arte) ſe perfeccion para el regimen de aquel inſtrumento, que ſe dedica à la defenſa propria, y en lo forzoſo liciamente à la ofenſa del contrario.

Pedro Gregorio used the example of gold, which is purified and extracted from mineral impurities, acquiring its purity and splendor through the techniques that refine it to its finest form; even if these techniques do not add to its essence, at least through artistic purification, it becomes smooth and radiant. The human understanding, clouded by ignorance, if it is cleansed and purified through acquired Sciences and Arts, returns to the lights granted to it by its Creator, being reduced to the intellectual purity that, cultivated by precepts and rules (which constitute Art), is perfected for the management of that instrument dedicated to one’s own defense and, when necessary, lawfully to the offense of the opponent.

La razon deduceſe de la que conſiderò el Philoſopho, advirtiendo, que todas las Sciencias y Artes, tienen determinado genero de Ente, principios, y cauſas de el ſugeto: como la Medicina de la ſalud: la Geometria los principios de la magnitud, Punto, Linea, y Superficie: la Arithmetica, los principios y cauſas del numero, &c. De donde el miſmo Philoſopho concluyò, que de todos los Entes ſe puede hazer reduccion à vno comun. Y aſsi Galeno diſcurriò probando, que ay Sciencias y Artes, que ſuponen vnas à otras.

The reasoning derives from what the Philosopher considered, noting that all Sciences and Arts have a specific kind of Being, principles, and causes of the subject: for example, Medicine is concerned with health, Geometry with the principles of magnitude, Point, Line, and Surface, and Arithmetic with the principles and causes of number, etc. From this, the same Philosopher concluded that all Beings can be reduced to a common one. Thus, Galen reasoned, proving that there are Sciences and Arts that presuppose one another.

Verificaſe lo antecedente en eſta Arte de regir la Eſpada, que como ſe ha dicho, es de habito de obrars lo verdadero por razon cierta, y lo faſlo por razon aparente, que ſe califica, y conſigue por coleccion de reglas, y preceptos; que ſi bien para ello ſe reduce à vniverſales de otras Artes, con todo eſſo no ſe aplican como agenos, ſino como proprios en eſta: reconociendo la maxima referida, qua las Artes, y Sciencias tienen entre sì cierto vnculo, y correſpondencia, con que participan vnas de otras, y mas en los modos de probar, y demonſtrar; por cuyos medios ſe excluyen los obſtaculos, y errores de el animo, quedando el entendimiento libre en ſu pureza, depurado como el oro por los preceptos y reglas, que conſiſtuyne Arte: reduciendo en eſta de le Eſpada los Entes Natural, de Razon, y Real, al Ente Mathematico; conſiguiendo en las propoſiciones la demonſtracion por argumentos Mathematicos, cuyas diſciplinas en lo eſpeculativo, conſideran las coſas abſtractas de toda materia ſenſible, obrando el Ente Mathematico Metaphyſicamente. En quanto à lo practico, paſſando à lo Phyſico, donde eſtà conjunta al ſugeto la entidad, y la razon de la materia ſenſible, como enſeño Proclo: à cuya cauſa, las Artes que proceden por los preceptos, y pruebas de las diſciplinas Mathematicas, ſe nobilitan ſobre otras Artes y Sciencias, por la evidencia de las demonſtraciones, que excluyendo todo lo duboſo, quietan el entendimiento con lo infalible de la concluſion, como ſe conſigue en eſta Arte por los argumentos Mathematicosm, de que en ella ſe vſa, que ſon Problema, Theorema, Lemma, y Corolario; que de neceſsidad (como preciſos) aqui ſe explican, porque de ellos reſulta la certeza de la propoſicion, aſsi en las diſciplinas Mathematicas, como en eſta Arte, donde ſe argumenta, concluye, y demueſtra por tales terminos, entendiendo que los capitales ſon Problema, y Theorema, y de ellos reſultan los menos precipuos, que ſon Lemmma, y Corolario.

The above is confirmed in this Art of governing the Sword, which, as has been said, is a habit of acting the true by certain reason, and the false by apparent reason. This is characterized and achieved by a collection of rules and precepts. Even if for this purpose it leans on the universals of other Arts, they are not applied as if foreign but as intrinsic to this one: acknowledging the stated maxim, that Arts and Sciences have a certain bond and correspondence among them, participating in each other, especially in ways of proving and demonstrating. Through these means, obstacles and errors of the spirit are eliminated, leaving the understanding free in its purity, refined like gold by the precepts and rules that constitute Art: reducing in this Sword Art the Natural, Reasoned, and Real Beings to the Mathematical Being; achieving in propositions the demonstration by mathematical arguments, whose disciplines in the speculative regard consider things abstracted from all sensible matter, treating the Mathematical Being metaphysically. As for the practical aspect, it moves to the Physical, where the entity and the reason for the sensible matter are conjoined, as Proclus taught. For this reason, the Arts that proceed by the precepts and proofs of mathematical disciplines are ennobled above other Arts and Sciences, due to the clarity of the demonstrations, which, excluding all that is dubious, calm the understanding with the infallibility of the conclusion, as achieved in this Art through mathematical arguments, used in it, which are Problem, Theorem, Lemma, and Corollary. These are necessarily (as essential) explained here, because from them arises the certainty of the proposition, both in mathematical disciplines and in this Art, where it is argued, concluded, and demonstrated by such terms, understanding that the main ones are Problem and Theorem, and from them arise the less prominent ones, which are Lemma and Corollary.

Problema, ſegun Clavio, y otros, en quanto argumento Mathematico, es aquella demonſtracion por cuyo medio ſe conſigue la conſtitucion de aquella propoſion que ſe quiere demonſtrar, con tal cualidad, que ſobre vn principio elegido, ſe puedan conſtituir diferentes figuras, como ſi ſobre vn linea recta dada, ſe conſtituye vn triangulo equilatero, qual moſtrò Euclides, ò otro de otra eſpecie; que por la ambiguedad que admite en poder conſtituir figuras, triangulos, ò quadtrangulos, ò otras diferentes, ſe nombra Problema, à ſemejanza de las queſtiones, que los Dialecticos por la miſma razon de abiguedad llaman Problematicas, porque admiten probabilidad por vna, y otra parte de la queſtion. Aſsi en los Mathematicos el Problema es aquel, que ſobre vn principio dado, conſigue la prueba de diverſas demonſtraciones, no abiguas, como ſe permite en la Dialectica, ſino con la evidencia que requiere el Mathematico argumento; con que ſon de diftinctas eſpecies el Problema Dialectico, y el Mathematico, como ſe vè en el Philoſopho, y en Euclides en los 14. Problemas, que demonſtrò en ſu primer Libro: y la miſma obſervacion puede hazerſe en los demàs, y en ſus Expoſitores, reconociendo que el Problema Mathematico, ſe diferencia del Dialectico en la certeza evidente con que, ſin ambiguedad, prueba infalible la demonſtracion de la propueſta queſtion, que el Mathematico llama Propoſicion.

A Problem, according to Clavius and others, in terms of a mathematical argument, is that demonstration by which the establishment of the proposition one wishes to demonstrate is achieved, with a certain quality, such that based on a chosen principle, different figures can be established, like constructing an equilateral triangle on a given straight line, as Euclid showed, or another of a different kind. Due to the ambiguity it allows in constructing figures, triangles, or quadrilaterals, or others that differ, it is named Problem, analogous to questions, which Dialecticians, for the same reason of ambiguity, call Problematic, because they admit probability from one side or the other of the question. Thus, in Mathematics, the Problem is the one that, based on a given principle, achieves the proof of various demonstrations, not ambiguous, as is allowed in Dialectics, but with the clarity that the mathematical argument requires. Therefore, the Dialectical Problem and the Mathematical Problem are of distinct species, as seen in the Philosopher, and in Euclid in the 14 Problems he demonstrated in his first Book. The same observation can be made in others and in their expositions, recognizing that the Mathematical Problem differs from the Dialectical in the evident certainty with which, without ambiguity, it infallibly proves the demonstration of the proposed question, which the Mathematician calls Proposition.

Theorema llaman los Mathematicos aquel argumento, que conſidera en la demonſtracion alguna paſsion, ò propriedad, paſſiones, ò propiedades de la miſma conſtitucion en la expreſſa formalidad de ella: à cuya cauſa el termino Theorema, ſignifica contemplacion, ò eſpeculacion, qual coligiò Tulio, tratando del Hado, y en terminos Mathematicos, qual notò Clavio, y ſe vè en Euclides en los 34. Theoremas del Libro primero, que conſtan en otras tantas propoſiciones Theorematicas; ſiendo la mas cèlebre la que colocò en la 47. propoſicion, que en orden de Theoremas es 33. diferenciandoſe, y diſtinguiendoſe el argumento Problema del Theorema, en que el Problema prueba la propoſicion, ſeguin la conſtituye, enſeñando evidente como ſe fabrica; y el Theorema no enſeña à formar conſtitucion alguna, ſino à inveſtigar por contemplacion Mathematica las paſsiones de la figura en ſu forma, demonſtrando en què es evidente, ò falàz la propoſicion, ſegun ſus paſsiones formales: de que reſulta, como advirtiò Clavio, que ſi ſe propuſieſſe en modo de Problema, que ſe conſtituyeſſe en el ſemicirculo de ſus extremos à la circunferencia, lineas que concurriendo en vn punto de la Peripheria, formanſe Angulo recto, ò Angulos rectos, ſerà redicula tal propoſicion, porque no es Problematica, ſino Theorematica: pues todos los Angulos que ſe cauſan en el Semicirculo, llevadas las lineas de ſus extremos à la circunferencia, ſon rectos forzoſamente, como ſe prueba, y demonſtrò Euclides. Lo miſmo ſe reconoce en la diftincion que ay de Problema à Theorema, ò al contrario, manifieſtaria que ignoraba la Geometria, y Arithmetica, y las eſpecies de ſus argumentos capitales, Problema, y Theorema; aunque vno, y otro, como genero ſummo, los incluye el termino Propoſicion, aſsi como animal al hombre, y al bruto; y por eſſo los Mathematicos forman diftinctos los terminos de la concluſion del Problema, y Theorema, porque en el Problema ſe concluye diziendo: Quod faciendum erat, à que correſponde en caſtellano, eſto es lo que ſe propuſo demonſtrar; ſiendo, aunque ſignificados por terminos diferentes, vno miſmo el ſin de los argumentos Problema, y Theorema, que ſe reducen por diferentes medios, à conſeguir la demonſtracion infalible, y evidente, que es la diferencia en que ſe diſtinguen los Sylogiſmos Mathematicos de los Dialecticos.

Mathematicians call a Theorem that argument which considers in its demonstration some quality, or property, qualities, or properties of its own constitution in its expressed formality. For this reason, the term Theorem means contemplation or speculation, as deduced by Cicero (Tulio) when discussing Fate, and in mathematical terms, as noted by Clavius, and as seen in Euclid in the 34 Theorems of the first book, which consist of as many theorematic propositions. The most famous of these is the one he placed in proposition 47, which in order of theorems is number 33. The arguments Problem and Theorem differ in that the Problem proves the proposition, according to how it is constituted, showing clearly how it is made; and the Theorem does not teach to form any constitution, but to investigate, through mathematical contemplation, the qualities of the figure in its form, demonstrating in what is evident or deceptive the proposition, according to its formal qualities. As Clavius noted, if it were proposed in the form of a Problem that straight lines were to be drawn from the ends of a semicircle to its circumference meeting at a point on the periphery, forming a right angle or right angles, such a proposition would be ridiculous, because it is not problematic, but theorematic: as all angles that are created in the semicircle, with lines drawn from their ends to the circumference, are necessarily right, as proven and demonstrated by Euclid. The same is recognized in the distinction between Problem and Theorem; otherwise, it would suggest ignorance of Geometry and Arithmetic and the types of their main arguments, Problem and Theorem. Although both, as the highest genus, are included in the term Proposition, just as the term animal includes both man and beast. Therefore, mathematicians form distinct the terms of the conclusion of the Problem and Theorem because in the Problem it concludes by saying: Quod faciendum erat, which corresponds in Spanish to, this is what was proposed to demonstrate. Although signified by different terms, the purpose of the arguments Problem and Theorem is the same, which, by different means, are reduced to achieve infallible and evident demonstration, which is the difference by which Mathematical Syllogisms are distinguished from Dialectical ones.

De eſtos dos capitales Problema, y Theorema (como no todas vezes, ni en todas propoſiciones ſe neceſsita forzoſamente de tanta formalidad) reſultan otros dos argumentos Mathematicos, menos precipuos, aunque tambien ſon demonſtrativos, y evidentes; y eligenſe para que mas facilmente ſe perciba, y entiende aquello miſmo que ſe ha demonſtrado, infiriendo ſegun modo Mathematico, otro Sylogiſmo final infalible, por mas breves terminos; y de eſta eſpecie es el argumento llamado Lemma, que como derivativo, ſe toma para otras demonſtraciones, no tanto como precipuas principales, quanto por alguna eſpecialidad, que ſe deriva de los radicales argumentos Problema, y Theorema: à cauſa Lemma, ſe dize que es conſtruccion para la demonſtracion de algun Theorema, ò Problema, que fue radical en la demonſtracion, facilitando ſu inteligencia, por medio del arugmento Sylogiſtico Mathematico nombrado Lemma, para que mas claro, breve, y facil ſe entienda: de donde Ciceron por la palabra Lemma, interpretò Sumpcion, que es lo miſmo que coſa que ſe toma de otra.

From these two primary arguments, Problem and Theorem, (as not always, nor in all propositions is there necessarily such formality), arise two other mathematical arguments, less prominent, but also demonstrative and evident. They are chosen so that what has been demonstrated can be more easily grasped and understood, deriving in a mathematical way another infallible final syllogism in more concise terms. Of this kind is the argument called Lemma, which, as a derivative, is used for other demonstrations, not so much as primary, but for some specificity derived from the foundational arguments Problem and Theorem. Because of the Lemma, it is said to be a construction for the demonstration of some Theorem or Problem that was foundational in the demonstration, facilitating its understanding through the mathematical syllogistic argument named Lemma, so that it is clearer, more concise, and easier to grasp. Hence, Cicero, by the word Lemma, interpreted it as Assumption, which is the same as something taken from another.

Quarto arugmento Mathematico muy vſado, es el que nombran Corolario, cuyo termino es mas translativo que proprio: pues recurriendo à la Etymologia de ſu ſignificado marco Varron, Suetonio Tranquilo, y Celio Rhodigino, dieron varias expoſiciones, las mas, agenas de las que obra el Corolario, en quanto argumento Mathematico, donde es entendido por vn Complemento, que ciñe, y colma el argumento, y demonſtracion principal, ora ſea Problema, ora Theorema, ſacando conſequencias infalibles del argumento primario, con que ſe adorna, y colma la propoſicion. Aſsi Celio, por autoridad de Plinio, dixo ſer lo miſmo Corolario, que ſupernumerario, aludiendo al ſentir de Varron, que lleva ſer lo proprio Corolario, que lo que ſe añade por complemento, ò colmo; y en eſtas ſignificaciones vſan los Mathematicos de el argumento Corolario con varias fraſes, diziendo: Ex hac propoſitione conſtat, Sequitur etiam, Ex hac propoſitione pari ratione, Maniſeſtum eſt, Conſtat enim, Ex his perſpicuum quo que eſt, Ex hac propoſitione colligitur, &c. y en otros modos, que todos ſignifican, que el Corolario es conſequencia Mathematica, que ſe añade, ciñe, ò colma, ò es ſupernumeraria à la propoſicion radical Problema, ò Theorema, ſiguiendo la naturaleza del principal argumento, y demonſtracion, dependiendo de la propoſicion, para colmarla, y ceñirla de evidencia: y en qualquier manera ſe deriva Corolario de Corolis, en que los curioſos pueden recurrir à los Autores citados, y à los Expoſitores de Euclides, y à Polonio Pergeo; notando, que aunque el Docto Padre Chriſtoval Clavo Bambergenſe, en los Prolegomenos que hizo à la expoſicion de los Elementos de Euclides, con vſar tan frequente del Corolario, omitiò ſu explicacion, aviendoe empeñado en la de los argumentos Problema, Theorema, y Lemma (en que cabe decente reparo) aqui de neceſsidad ſe ha tocado lo forzoſo, porque en eſta Arte de regir le Eſpada, que en comun ſe llama Deſtreza, ſe procede en el modo de probar por argumentos Mathematicos, en que ſe halla evidencia demonſtrativa, vſando de las diſciplinas Mathematicas, como de Artes que ſon ſubalternas à eſta.

The fourth mathematical argument, widely used, is what they call Corollary, whose term is more translative than proper. Going back to its etymology, Marcus Varro, Suetonius Tranquillus, and Caelius Rhodiginus provided various interpretations, most of which are unrelated to the role of the Corollary as a mathematical argument. In this context, it is understood as a complement that tightens and completes the main argument and demonstration, whether it be a Problem or a Theorem, drawing infallible consequences from the primary argument with which the proposition is adorned and completed. Thus, Caelius, citing Pliny, said that a Corollary is the same as a supernumerary, alluding to Varro’s notion that a Corollary is what is added as a complement or capstone. Mathematicians use the argument Corollary with various phrases, saying: Ex hac propositione constat, Sequitur etiam, Ex hac propositione pari ratione, Manifestum est, Constat enim, Ex his perspicuum quoque est, Ex hac propositione colligitur, &c. and in other ways, all of which mean that the Corollary is a mathematical consequence that is added, encircles, or caps, or is supernumerary to the foundational proposition Problem or Theorem, following the nature of the main argument and demonstration, depending on the proposition to complete it and surround it with evidence. In any manner, if Corollary derives from Corolis, the curious can refer to the cited authors and the expositors of Euclid and to Apollonius of Perga. It’s worth noting that even though the learned Father Christoval Clavius of Bamberg, in the prolegomena he wrote for the exposition of the Elements of Euclid, frequently used the Corollary, he omitted its explanation, having delved into the arguments Problem, Theorem, and Lemma (a noteworthy omission). Here, it has been necessarily touched upon because in this Art of wielding the Sword, commonly called Destreza, the method of proof by mathematical arguments is pursued, wherein demonstrative evidence is found, making use of mathematical disciplines as arts that are subordinate to this one.

Para mas facilitar la inteligencia, pondrè en el ſegundo Capitulo de eſte Libro las difinicones del Methodo, que han dado los Autores antiguos; y conſecutivo à eſto proſeguirè los demàs materiales de que ſe compone la Deſtreza, conformandome con poca diferencia en los nombres, y vocablos, con los que eſtàn recibidos por buenos; porque mi intento no es embarazar, ſino ayudar quanto me fuere poſsible, en orden à facilitar los fundamentos, y verdadera inteligencia de eſta Sciencia, y que ſus operaciones vayan de ſuerte reguladas, y ajuſtadas, que los profeſſores puedan gozar en ellas de la plenitud de perfecciones, de que ſon capaces en la potencia del hombre.

To further facilitate understanding, I will place in the second chapter of this book the definitions of the Method given by ancient authors. Following this, I will continue with the other materials that make up the Destreza, aligning myself with little variation in the names and terms with those that are accepted as good. This is because my intention is not to complicate, but to assist as much as possible, in order to simplify the fundamentals and true understanding of this science, so that its operations are so well-regulated and adjusted that practitioners can enjoy in them the fullness of perfections that are possible within the potential of man.