DISCVRSO SEXTO.

LOGICA DE ESTA CIENCIA: Vozes vninerſales

SIXTH DISCOURSE.

LOGIC OF THIS SCIENCE: Universal voices

Convienene Logicos, y Metaphyſicos, que toda ciencia es de Vniverſales, porque de ſingulares no es ciencia, como ſinitò Scoto, y ſe deduce de la razon, à cauſa de que el Vniverſal tiene ſus condiciones requiſitas para el ſugeto, y objeto de la ciencia: que eſta conſta de ente difinible, y eſte debe conſiderarſe con paſsiones demonſtrables; y el Philofopho prueba, que el Vniverſal es Ente, y debaxo de la razon No ente, no puede entenderſe ciencia: y dà la razon, porque lo inteligible mueve el entendimiento à entender, por ſer virtud paſsiva del miſmo entendimiento, como en ſeñò el Philofopho, y explicò Scoto, diziendo, que reflexando en si miſmo el entendimiento, conoce la razon de ſu opinion, por la fuerça de ſu operacion intelectual, conocibiendo conceptos por vniverſales, con que paſſa à lo demàs en la operacion, qual ſe experimenta en eſta ciencia, por primeras, y ſegundas intenciones, no ſolo en el entender, ſino en el obrar, percibiendo por vniverſales los primeros conceptos con diſtinciones, por que como dixo Torrejon: Aquella coſas, que ſegun ſus entidades, ſe ſignifican, ſon de la primera intencion; y aquellas que declaran las afecciones de las coſas (porque las participa el entendimiento) ſon de la ſegunda intencion: y eſte modo de entender, y obrar en ſu principio, originaſe de Vniverſales; de que ſe dà ciencia, derivandoſe del entender por primera, y ſegunda intencion el obrar en eſta cienca por intencion primera, y ſegunda, ſiendo lo fundamental la inteligencia de los Vniverſales, en que dàn por inventor (en quanto al metodo, y explicacion) à Porphryio, Apoſtata de la Fè Catholica, Griego de Nacion, que cerca del año de 280. del Nacimiento de neuſtro Redemtpor, floreciò en Sicilia, ſiendo Preceptor pulico de Philoſofia, moviendoſe para tal obra al ruego de Chriſauro, noble Romano, que deſeaba entender las categorias del Philofopho con los principios baſtantes, que lo fueron los Predicables de Porphryio, que en comun llaman vozes en las Eſcuelas, reducidas à cinco, que ſon, Genero, Eſpecie, Diferencia, Proprio, y Accidente.

Logicians and Metaphysicists agree that every science is of Universals, because there is no science of singulars, as Duns Scotus indicated, and is deduced from reason, because the Universal has its requisite conditions for the subject and object of science: this consists of a definable entity, and this should be considered with demonstrable passions; and the Philosopher proves that the Universal is Being, and under the condition of Non-being, science cannot be understood: and he gives the reason, because the intelligible moves the understanding to understand, being a passive virtue of the same understanding, as the Philosopher pointed out, and Scotus explained, saying that by reflecting on itself, the understanding knows the reason for its opinion, due to the strength of its intellectual operation, conceiving concepts as universals, with which it proceeds to the rest in operation, as is experienced in this science, by first and second intentions, not only in understanding, but also in acting, perceiving the first concepts with distinctions by universals, because as Torrejon said: Those things, which according to their entities, are signified, are of the first intention; and those that declare the affections of things (because the understanding participates in them) are of the second intention: and this way of understanding and acting in principle, originates from Universals; from which science is given, deriving from understanding by first and second intention the acting in this science by first and second intention, the fundamental thing being the understanding of Universals, in which Porphyry, an Apostate of the Catholic Faith, Greek by Nation, is considered the inventor (in terms of method and explanation), who flourished in Sicily around the year 280. after the Birth of our Redeemer, being a public Preceptor of Philosophy, moved to such work at the request of Chrysaur, a Roman nobleman, who wished to understand the categories of the Philosopher with sufficient principles, which were the Predicables of Porphyry, commonly called voices in the Schools, reduced to five, which are, Genus, Species, Difference, Proper, and Accident.

En las Eſcuclas muevenſe queſtiones, ſi eſtos Vniverſales, ò Predicables ſon vozes, ò entidades; ò ſi ſignifican entidades, y vozes? Concuerdanſe las opiniones, reconociendo, que lo mas recibido en las Vniverſidades, es, lammar las vozes, porque la Logica, y Dialectica ſe tienen por diſputa, que ſe conſigue con palabras, ſermociando: y ſermocinar, ſignifica vozes, y coſas, con que conviene el termino à vno , y otro ſentido, como ſe prueba por Ciceron, y expreſsò San Aguſtin, que puede vèr el curioſo, de que ſe ſaca el vencimiento de la dificultad.

In schools, questions are raised, whether these Universals, or Predicables are voices, or entities; or if they signify entities, and voices? Opinions concur, recognizing that the most received in Universities, is to call them voices, because Logic, and Dialectic are considered as debate, which is achieved with words, speaking: and speaking, signifies voices, and things, with which the term is suitable to one, and another sense, as it is proven by Cicero, and expressed by Saint Augustine, that the curious can see, from which the overcoming of the difficulty is derived.

Supueſto, que los Vniverſales pueden ſignificar vozes, y coſas, omitiendo lo prolixo de las queſtiones, en que ſe dilatan los Logicos, ſe procurarà ceñir lo eſſencial, que haze à eſta ciencia, ſiguiendo lo mas recibido en las Eſcuelas, y mas concordante en los Autores graves.

Given that the Universals can signify voices, and things, omitting the lengthiness of the questions, in which the Logicians dilate, the essential that makes this science will be sought to be girded, following the most received in the Schools, and most in agreement in the serious Authors.

Con tal reſolucion hallanſe tres diviſiones en las vozes, notadas por la agudeza de Logicos, y Metaphyſicos: la primera, y mas generica es en vozes ſimples, y en vozes compueſtas. Voz ſimple es aquella, que no conſta de muchas dicciones, y voz compueſta es la que de muchas dicciones ſe compone.

With such resolution, three divisions are found in the voices, noted by the acuity of Logicians, and Metaphysicians: the first, and most generic is in simple voices, and in compound voices. A simple voice is that which does not consist of many sayings, and a compound voice is the one that is composed of many sayings.

Dizeſe, que ſerà voz ſimple, la que no conſta de muchas dicciones, porque puede conſta de algunas, y ſer ſimple, ſignificando vn ſolo ſingular.

It is said that a voice will be simple, the one that does not consist of many sayings, because it can consist of some, and be simple, signifying a single singular.

Y al contrario, ſerà voz compueſta, la que anque ſe ciña à pocas dicciones, ſignifica muchos ſingulares, ò muchas coſas; v.g. Eſtocada, Cuchillada, en quanto ſignifican eſpecie ſingular de herida, aſsi por ſer vna la diccion, como por el eſpecifico ſignificado, ſon vozes ſimples. Al contrario, es voz compueſta la que de numero de dicciones ſe conſtituye, y ſignifica diverſas coſas, como , Tajo, y Revès, que ſon eſpecies del genero Cuchillada, y ſignifican diverſas coſas. Mas debe advertiſe, que ay vozes compueſtas por el numero de dicciones, que ſon ſimples por el ſingular, que ſignifican; v.g. Tajo Diagonal, Tajo Vertical, que ſon compueſtas vozes en quanto al numero de dicciones, y ſimples, por el ſingular ſignificado, que eſto ſucede, quando ſe juntan en la compoſicion el Genero, y la Diferencia.

On the contrary, a voice will be compound, which although it adheres to few expressions, signifies many singulars, or many things; e.g. Thrust, Slash, insofar as they signify a singular species of wound, thus being a single expression, and because of the specific meaning, they are simple voices. On the contrary, it is a compound voice that is constituted by a number of expressions, and signifies various things, like Cut, and Reverse, which are species of the genus Slash, and signify various things. But it should be noted that there are compound voices by the number of expressions, which are simple by the singular they signify; e.g. Diagonal Cut, Vertical Cut, which are compound voices as to the number of expressions, and simple, by the singular meaning, that this happens, when the Genus, and the Difference join in the composition.

Conſideraſe otra diviſion en otros dos modos, que reſultand de la voz, y el termino, como voz ſynonoma, y homonima. Voz ſimple ſynonoma es aquella, que ſignifica muchos ſingulares en vna miſma razon generica, como Eſtocada, Cuchillada. Voz homonima es la que ſignifica coſas diverſas con vna ſimple voz, que en vulgar ſe llama equivoco.

Another division is considered in two other modes, resulting from the voice, and the term, like synonymous voice, and homonymous voice. A simple synonymous voice is one that signifies many singulars in a same generic reason, like Thrust, Slash. A homonymous voice is the one that signifies various things with a single voice, which in vulgar is called equivocal.

Otra diſtincion ſe conſidera en voz comun, y en voz ſingular: voz comun es propriamente generica, porque con vn termino predicamental ſignifica diverſos ſingulares, como Eſtocada, que es voz comun à las heridas de punta: y Cuchillada, à las heridas de corte. Voz ſingualr es la que ſe impone à vna ſingular eſpecie, como Tajo, Revès, Eſtocada. Otras diferncias ſe hallan en los Logicos, y Metaphyſicos, que ſon mas priprias à otras ciencias, que à la de la Eſpada, donde ſon baſtantes las propueſtas.

Another distinction is considered in common voice, and in singular voice: a common voice is properly generic, because with a predicamental term it signifies various singulars, such as Thrust, which is a common voice to puncture wounds: and Slash, to cutting wounds. A singular voice is the one that is assigned to a singular species, like Cut, Reverse, Thrust. Other differences are found in Logicians, and Metaphysicians, which are more suitable for other sciences, than for that of the Sword, where the proposed ones are sufficient.

Segun Porphryio, y ſus Exploſitores, reducenſe à cino las vozes (que llaman Predicables, ò Vniverſales) y ſon, Genero, Eſpecie, Diſerencia, Proprio, y Accidente, como ſe ha dicho.

According to Porphyry, and his expositors, the voices (which they call Predicables, or Universals) are reduced to five, which are, Genus, Species, Difference, Proper, and Accident, as has been said.

Scoto, en prueba de la produccion, y numero de eſtas vozes, reſuelve (por autoridad de Porphryio) que ſon cinco, y no mas; ſi bien, colocandoſe en diverſos modos, conſierando, que el Vniverſal, ò ſignifica ſubſtancia, ò accidente. Si ſubſtancia, en todo, ò en parte material, ſerà Genero: ſi formal, ſerà Diferencia: ſi en toda ſubſtancia, ſerà Eſpecie, que dize el ſer de los individuos inmediatos al Genero: ſi accidente, ò es convertible, ò no es convertible? Si es convertible, es Proprio; ſi no es convertible, es Accidente comun, y aſsi quinto Vniverſal: y concluye, que como no es poſsible (à neuſtro entender) ſignificar lo que ſe dize de muchos, ſino por eſtos cinco modos, no ſon mas, que eſtos cinco los Vniverſales.

Scotus, in proof of the production, and number of these voices, resolves (by authority of Porphyry) that they are five, and no more; although, placing them in different ways, considering that the Universal, either signifies substance, or accident. If substance, in whole, or in material part, it will be Genus: if formal, it will be Difference: if in all substance, it will be Species, which tells the being of the immediate individuals to the Genus: if accident, either it is convertible, or it is not convertible? If it is convertible, it is Proper; if it is not convertible, it is Common Accident, and thus the fifth Universal: and concludes, that as it is not possible (to our understanding) to signify what is said of many, except by these five ways, the Universals are no more than these five.

Reconocerſe por doctrina del Philofopho, que en tres modos dos ſe dize convenir, ò ſer de vna miſma razon; entendiendoſe en Genero, en Eſpecie, en Numero: Porque aquello ſe dize convenir, ſiendo de vn miſmo vn genero, que debaxo de Genero proximo ſe contiene; como Tajo, y Revès, que ſu Genero proximo es Cuchillada, que incluye las heridas de corte. Llamaſe Genero proximo aquel, entre el qual, y la Eſpecie no ay otro genero intermedio, como ſe vee, que entre el genero Cuchillada, y las eſpecies Tajo, y Revès, no ay otro intermido.

It is recognized by the doctrine of the Philosopher that in three ways two things are said to agree, or to be of the same reason; this is understood in Genus, in Species, in Number: Because that is said to agree, being of the same genus, which is contained under the nearest Genus; such as Cut and Reverse, whose nearest Genus is Cut, which includes the wounds of cut. The nearest Genus is called that, between which, and the Species there is no other intermediate genus, as you see, that between the Genus Cut, and the Species Cut, and Reverse, there is no other intermediate.

Convenir en eſpecie dizeſe, quando debaxo de vna Eſpecie inſima ſe contienen eſpecies ſingulares, como Tajo Diagonal, ò Tajo Vertical, &c. que ſon eſpecies ſingulares de vna inſima Eſpecis, que los Logicos llaman Individuos.

Agreement in species is said, when under a same lowest Species, singular species are contained, such as Diagonal Cut, or Vertical Cut, etc. which are singular species of a same lowest Species, which the Logicians call Individuals.

Eſpecie infima ſingular es, quando la Eſpecie no puede ſer genero, ſino que preciſamente ſe contiene en ſu fer de Eſpecie mſima, ò fingular, como Eſtocada de Quarto Circulo, que no puede ſer Genero, ni Eſpecie en comun, ſino en ſingular eſpecifico.

A singular lowest Species is, when the Species cannot be Genus, but precisely it is contained in its very species or singular, like a Quarter Circle Stab, which cannot be Genus, nor Species in common, but in singular specific.

Convenir en Numero, entiendeſe quando, vna, y otra coſa convienen numericamente, que puede ſer en cinco modos: vno, quando convienen en vn miſmo nombre, y numero, como Eſtocada de Primera Intencion, Eſtocada de Segunda Intencion, que conviene en el nombre generico, Eſtocada, y en el numero por Primera Intencion, y Segunda Intencion, que aunque diferencian en la infima Eſpecie, convienen numericamente.

Agreement in Number is understood when one and another thing agree numerically, which can be in five ways: one, when they agree in the same name, and number, such as First Intention Stab, Second Intention Stab, which agree in the generic name, Stab, and in the number for First Intention, and Second Intention, which although they differ in the lowest Species, they agree numerically.

Otro, quando ſiendo diverſos los nombres, convienen en vn ſignificando, como Tajo Diagonal, Revès Diagonal, que aunque ſon diverſos los nombres, y las eſpecies, convienen en vn ſignificando, que es Diagonal.

Another, when being different names, they agree in one meaning, like Diagonal Cut, Diagonal Reverse, although the names, and species, are different, they agree in one meaning, which is Diagonal.

Otro, quando ſon de vn miſmo numero la difinicion, y el difinido, como difiniendo la Cuchillada, ſerà eſſencial, diziendo: Que es herida, que ſe cauſa on el ſilo de la Eſpada, que conviene con Cuchillada, por ſer à cauſa de cuchilla, y no de la punta, con que convienen la difinicion, y lo difinido en la eſſencia de ſer golpe cortante.

Another, when the definition and the defined are of the same number, like defining the Cut, it will be essential, saying: That it is a wound caused by the edge of the Sword, which agrees with Cut, for being due to the blade, and not to the point, with which the definition and the defined agree in the essence of being a cutting strike.

Otro, quando convienen el Proprio, y el ſugeto en vna numeracion, como el ſugeto, y la propriedad, que en eſta ciencia, el ſugeto es el hombre, y la propriedad herir al contrario, por movimiento, ò movimientos, que ſon proprios en el hombre, ò violentos, ò naturales, &c. que pueden convenir en vna numeracion.

Another, when the Property and the subject agree in one enumeration, as the subject, and the property, that in this science, the subject is the man, and the property to wound the opponent, by movement, or movements, which are proper in the man, or violent, or natural, etc. which can agree in one enumeration.

Otro, quando ſe conviene en vn miſmo numero accidental, como combatiente contra comatiente, que convienen en la accidente de la Eſpada, con que vno, y otro eſtà armado, &c.

Another, when agreed in the same accidental number, like combatant against combatant, who agree in the accident of the Sword, with which one and the other are armed, etc.

Aſsi como ſe conviene en Genero, Eſpecie, y Numero; aſsi tambien ſe difiere en los miſmos tres modos, porque diferir en Genero es, quando los generos proximos ſon diverſos, como Eſtocada, Cuchillada, &c.

Just as it agrees in Genus, Species, and Number; so also it differs in the same three ways, because to differ in Genus is when the nearest genera are different, like Stab, Cut, etc.

Diferencia en Eſpecie es, quando aunque convengan en el Genero proximo, ò remoto, ſe diferencian en la Eſpecie, como Tajo, y Revès, que convienen en el genero Cuchillada, y diferen en las eſpecies.

Difference in Species is when, although they agree in the proximate or remote Genus, they differ in the Species, like Cut, and Reverse, which agree in the genus Cut, and differ in the species.

Diferir en Numero es, quando no ay la conveniencia en vnas miſmas vnidades, porque aunque convengan en genero, y en Eſpecie, difieren en el Numero, como Tajo Diagonal, medio Tajo Diagonal, que convienen en el Genero, y en la Eſpecie, y difieren en el Numero, que vno es de movimiento entero, y otro de medio movimiento, reſpecto del entero.

In various modes of agreement and difference, a certain order or analogy is found in diverse proportions. Because those things that agree in Number are said to agree maximally; those that agree in Genus, are said to agree less; and those that agree in Species, are said to agree medially.

En vnos, y otros modos de convenir, y diferir, ſe halla cierto orden, ò analogia en proporciones diverſas, porque aquellas coſas que convienen en el Numero; ſe dizen convenir maximamente: y las convienen en el Genero, ſe dizen convenir menos: y las que convienen en la Eſpecie, ſe dize, que medialmente convienen.

In various modes of agreement and difference, a certain order or analogy is found in diverse proportions. Because those things that agree in Number are said to agree maximally; those that agree in Genus, are said to agree less; and those that agree in Species, are said to agree medially.

Al contrario, las que difieren en el genero, maximamente difieren: las que difieren en el Numero, menos diferen: y en vno, y otro modo, las que convienen, ò que difieren en la Eſpecie, medialmente difieren, ò convienen, como Eſtocada, y Cuchillada, que maximamente difieren, por diferir en Genero, Tajo Vertical, y Tajo Diagonal, que medialmente difieren, por diferir la Eſpecie; y Tajo, y medio Tajo, que menos difieren, por diferir en el Numero de entero à menor movimiento.

Conversely, those that differ in Genus differ maximally; those that differ in Number, differ less; and in both modes, those that agree or differ in Species, differ or agree medially. Like Stab and Cut, which differ maximally by differing in Genus; Vertical Cut and Diagonal Cut, which differ medially by differing in Species; and Cut and half Cut, which differ less by differing in Number from whole to lesser movement.

Con los principos antecedentes en eſte Diſcurſo, ſe facilita la inteligencia de cada vno de los Predicables de Porphryio, neceſſarios en eſta Ciencia para los PRedicamentos del Philoſopho, de cuya doctrina ſe colige, que en primer lugar ſe conſidera el Genero, por la continua generacion que dèl ſe produce. Difiniòle Porphryio, diziendo: Genero es lo que de muchas Eſpecies diferentes ſe predica: v.g. Eſtocada. Cauſaſe el termino en Genero por el inſtrumento con que ſe executa, conſiderandole como cauſa material de la herida, que ſe obra con Eſtoque, eſpecie de Eſpada, que carece de cuchilla, de donde, à toda herida de punt de Eſpada, ſe dà el nombre generico de Eſtocada, incluyendo tal Genero todas las heridas, executadas con punte de Eſpada, reducido ſu termino al Eſtoque, proque con èl no ſe hiere por corte, como tambien por cauſa material inftrumental, ſon del genero Puñalada todas aquellas eſpecies de heridas, que ſe cometen, y executan con inſtrumento corto, movido de la cauſa eſiciente del puño del hombre, de donde al inſtrumento apto à tales movimientos genericamente ſe llama Puñal, aunque en inſima eſpecie tenga otro nombre, como Cuchillo, Daga, Almarada, &c.

With the previous principles in this Discourse, the understanding of each of Porphyry’s Predicables, necessary in this Science for the Predicaments of the Philosopher, is facilitated. From his doctrine it is inferred that the Genus is considered first due to the continuous generation that is produced from it. Porphyry defined it, saying: Genus is what is predicated of many different Species: e.g. Stab. The term in Genus is caused by the instrument with which it is executed, considering it as the material cause of the wound, which is made with an Estoc, a type of Sword, which lacks a blade. Therefore, the generic name of Stab is given to all wounds made with the point of a Sword, including such a Genus all wounds, executed with the point of a Sword, reduced its term to the Estoc, because with it you do not wound by cut. Likewise, for the instrumental material cause, all those species of wounds that are committed and executed with a short instrument, moved by the efficient cause of the man’s fist, belong to the genus Dagger Strike. Therefore, the instrument suitable for such generic movements is generically called a Dagger, even if in the lowest species it has another name, like Knife, Dagger, Almarada, etc.

El Genero ſe conſidera en dos maneras, que ſon, Supremo, y Interiecto, que es lo miſmo en vulgar, que interpueſto, ò intermedio. Genero Supremo entiendeſe Aquel que lo es de tal ſuerte, que no puede ſer eſpecie. Genero Interpueſto, ò Intermedio Es el que entre el Genero, y la Eſpecie admite interieccion, ò intermedio de otro Genero mas infimo, y à eſte llaman Genero remoto; v.g. herida es termino remoto, porque lo que produce es la primera diviſion en generos mas infimos, que lo ſon, Cuchillada, y Eſtocada, &c. aſsi del Genero Cuchillada (que es intermedio) reſulta la divifion en generos mas infimos, que ſon, Tajo, Revès, &c. y eſtos producen eſpecies, como Diagonal, Vertical, &c. haſta las mas infimas.

The Genus is considered in two ways, which are Supreme and Interjected, which is the same in common speech as interposed or intermediate. Supreme Genus is understood as That which is such that it cannot be a species. Interposed or Intermediate Genus Is the one that between the Genus and the Species admits the interjection or intermediate of another lower Genus, and this is called remote Genus; e.g., wound is a remote term, because what it produces is the first division into lower genera, such as Cut and Stab, etc. Thus, from the Genus Cut (which is intermediate), the division results in lower genera, which are Slash, Reverse, etc. and these produce species, such as Diagonal, Vertical, etc. up to the most specific.

No ſon de aqui las queſtiones, que mueven Logicos, y Metaphyſicos, ſi es material, ò formal el ſignificado del Genero; ò ſi el Genero en comun tiene vn ſignificado material, ò ſi larelacion del Genero es vna con la de la Eſpecie, ò la miſma naturaleza del Genero, quanto à ſu difinicion, ò ſi eſta ſe admite deſcriptiva, ò à cauſas; y ſi es deſcriptiva, ſi la mas propria es la de Porphryio: en què modo ſe conſideran, y ſepàran el Genero, y Diferencia: y ſi el Genero es en potencia, ò en acto: y ſi ſe predica de la Eſpecie, como parte, ò como todo: ò ſi de vna, ò ſi de muchas Eſpecies: como es pricipios de la Eſpecie, y qual ſea la difinicion de lo difinido en quanto al Genero? Aſsi otra multitud de dudas, y queſtiones, que puede vèr el curioſo en los Expoſitores de Porphryio, y Ariſtoteles, y en Logicos, y Metaphyſicos, de que ſe puede formar volumen, y hazer catalogo de Autores, que ocupen mucho papel.

The questions raised by Logicians and Metaphysicists, whether the meaning of the Genus is material or formal; or if the Genus in common has a material meaning; or if the relation of the Genus is one with that of the Species, or the same nature of the Genus, as to its definition; or if this is descriptive or causal; and if it is descriptive, if the most proper is that of Porphyry: in what way are the Genus and Difference considered and separated; and if the Genus is in potency or in act; and if it is predicated of the Species, as part or as a whole; or if of one or if of many Species: how it is the principle of the Species, and what is the definition of the defined in relation to the Genus? Thus, a multitude of doubts and questions, which the curious can see in the Expositors of Porphyry and Aristotle, and in Logicians and Metaphysicists, from which a volume can be formed, and a catalogue of Authors can be made, which would occupy a lot of paper.

En ocho contextos dividen los Expoſitores de Porphryio lo que tratò de Eſpecie, como Vniverſal. Aqui puedeſe reconocer, que eſta es voz homonima, porque admite ſignificar coſas diferentes, à cauſa que la palabra Eſpecie, tomada del idioma Latino, vale en el Eſpañol por forma eſpecioſa, que equivale à Perſeccion, con los demàs ſignificados, que notan Ambroſio Calepino, y Paſſeraſio.

Expositors of Porphyry divide what he discussed about Species as a Universal into eight contexts. Here it can be recognized that this is a homonymous term, because it admits different meanings, since the word Species, taken from Latin, is used in Spanish for a form that is species-like, which is equivalent to Perfection, along with other meanings noted by Ambrosius Calepinus and Passeratius.

Los Dialecticos, y Logicos difinen eſta voz por aquella Eſpecie, que baxo de vn aſsignado Genero ſe coloca. Eſta difinicion es conforme à la de Porphryio, que dixo: Eſpecie es aquella, que ſe comprehende debaxo del Genero, que de ellas ſe predica. Y mas comun por el miſmo Porphryio: Eſpecie es la que de muchas diferencias en numero ſe predica. Y mas deſcriptiva: Eſpecie es aquella, de debaxo de vn miſmo genero (ſobre el qual no tranſciendo otro) fe coloca infima, de tal ſuerte, que debaxo de ella no ſe dà otra eſpecie. De todo reſulta, que el Genero, y la Eſpecie ſon relativos, y mutuamente ſe difinen, porque el conocimiento del vno depende del otro por ſu relacion.

Dialecticians and logicians define this term as that species which is placed under an assigned Genus. This definition is consistent with that of Porphyry, who said: Species is that which is included under the Genus, which is predicated of them. And more commonly by the same Porphyry: Species is that which is predicated of many differences in number. And more descriptively: Species is that which, under the same genus (upon which it does not transcend another), is placed at the lowest level, such that no other species is given under it. From all this it follows that the Genus and the Species are relatives, and they mutually define each other, because the knowledge of one depends on the other due to their relationship.

Porphyrio coloca la Eſpecie inmediata al Genero, porque ſe comete à èl, como en eſta ciencia, que Herida es fumo Genero, ſobre el qual no aſciende otro, y ſu inmediata Eſpecie Cuchillada, &c. y mediata en numero, Tajo, Revès, &c. De eſtos principios ſe forma otra difinicion, diziendo: Eſpecie es aquella, que ſe predica de los diferentes en numero. Por eſta difinicion ſe inquiere qual ſea la entidad, queſe buſca, como Tajo, ſi es Diagonal, ò Vertical, &c. Eſtocada, ſi es de Quarto Circulo, &c. buſcando por los diferentes en numero la infima eſpecie.

Porphyry places the Species immediately after the Genus because it commits to it, as in this science, where Wound is the highest Genus, above which no other ascends, and its immediate Species is Cut, etc., and its mediated in number, Slash, Backslash, etc. From these principles another definition is formed, saying: Species is that which is predicated of the different in number. By this definition, one inquires what the entity being sought is, like Slash, if it is Diagonal or Vertical, etc., Thrust, if it is of Quarter Circle, etc., searching for the lowest species through the different in number.

Divideſe el conocimiento de la Eſpecie en intermedia, è infima, porque intermedia es, la que ſiendo Eſpecie, reſpecto de otro Genero, puede ſer Genero, reſpecto de otra Eſpecie; y tales ſon todos los intermedios entre el Genero ſupremo, y la Eſpecie infima; en cuya conſideracion, los que ſe refieren à los inferiores, ſon Generos: v.g. de la Herida en ſumo genero, ſu Eſpecie intermedia ſerà Cuchillada, ò Eſtocada, que reſpecto al ſupremo Genero Herida, ſon Eſpecies, Cuchillada, Eſtocada; y reſpecto à mas infima Eſpecie, la Cuchillada es Genero, y la Eſtocada es Genero, como reſulta demonſtrable, formando categoria deſde el Genero ſupremo, haſta la mas infima Eſpecie, que no admite otra poſterior. Eſto es lo eſſencial en eſta Ciencia, en que ſe omiten muchas queſtiones, que ſe diſputan en las Eſcuelas.

The understanding of the Species is divided into intermediate and lowest, because an intermediate one is, being a Species with respect to another Genus, it can be a Genus with respect to another Species; and such are all intermediates between the highest Genus and the lowest Species; in this consideration, those that refer to the lower ones are Genera: e.g., from the Wound in highest genus, its intermediate Species will be Cut, or Thrust, which with respect to the supreme Genus Wound, are Species, Cut, Thrust; and with respect to a lower Species, the Cut is a Genus, and the Thrust is a Genus, as can be demonstrably shown, forming a category from the highest Genus to the lowest Species, which does not admit another after it. This is essential in this Science, in which many questions debated in schools are omitted.

Colocaſe por tercera voz, ò termino Vninverſal entre los Predicables de Porphryio la diccion Diferencia (que el Griego pronuncia Diaphora que ez voz ambigua, y ſignifica dividir, cortar, ordenar, diſta, diferir, diferencciar, ſignificados todos, que reſultand del verbo Differo.

The term Difference is placed as the third word, or Universal term among the Predicables of Porphyry (which in Greek is pronounced Diaphora, a term that is ambiguous and signifies divide, cut, arrange, distance, differ, differentiate, all of which are meanings that result from the verb Differ.

Porphryio entiende el termino, ò voz Diferencia, en tres modos, que ſon, comun, proprio, propiſsimo.

Porphyry understands the term or word Difference in three ways, which are: common, proper, and most proper.

Diferencia comun (ſegun miſmo Porphryio, y ſus Expoſitores) es aquella, que por accidente dize ſeparacion del ſugeto, ò ſugetos, demonſtrando, como vna coſa difere de otra, ò en vn miſmo, remiſo, ò violento, ſon diferencias por accidentes en vn ſugeto, eſperar, ò acomete, que tambien ſe admiten en el combate en ſugetos diferentes, quando pelean: y eſtas diferencias, que ſe perciben por el acto phyſico en la operacion, ſon diferencias phyſicas, como metaphyſicas aquellas que ſe perciben en el entendimiento por la eſpeculacion; y porque vnas, y otras ſe cauſan de accidentes, llamanſe Diferencias en comun.

The common Difference (according to Porphyry himself and his Expositors) is that which, by accident, denotes separation from the subject or subjects, demonstrating, for example, how one thing differs from another, or in the same, slow or violent, these are differences by accidents in a subject, to wait or to attack, which are also admitted in combat in different subjects when they fight: and these differences, which are perceived by the physical act in the operation, are physical differences, like metaphysical ones those that are perceived in the understanding by speculation; and because both types are caused by accidents, they are called Differences in common.

Segun Porphryio, Diferencia propria es el accidente inſeparable, con que vna coſa, ò ſugeto ſe diferencia de otro, como proceder por corte la Cuchillada, y por punta la Eſtocada, que ſon accidentes inſeparables, que maniſieſtan propria Diferencia.

According to Porphyry, Proper Difference is the inseparable accident with which one thing or subject differs from another, such as proceeding by cut the Cut, and by point the Thrust, which are inseparable accidents that manifest a proper Difference.

Diferencia propriſsima (ſegun Porphryio, y Santo Thomàs) es aquella, que meuſta la diſtincion, y diferencia, que ay ſegun eſſencia, ò ſegun eſpecie; v.g. el hombre, y el leon: Cuchillada, y Eſtocada, que en la eſſencia, y la Eſpecie difieren propriſsimamente, aunque en el Genero ſe comprehendan; pues animal comprehende al hombre, y al leon; y herida à la Cuchillada, y à la Eſtocada; y ſe diſtinguen, y conocen en eſſencia, y eſpecie por la diferncia.

The most proper Difference (according to Porphyry and Saint Thomas) is that which shows the distinction and difference according to essence or species; e.g. man and lion; Cut and Thrust, which in essence and species differ most properly, even though they are included in the Genus; since animal includes man and lion; and wound includes Cut, and Thrust; and they are distinguished and recognized in essence and species by the difference.

Omitenſe de aviſo otras cinco difiniciones, diſtintas, que notò Porphryio, en cuya explicacion Logicos, y Metaphyſicos, ſe dilatan à varias queſtiones, que el curioſo puede vèr en muchos, y latamente en Porphryio, y Santo Thomàs, Scoto, &c.

The other five distinct definitions noted by Porphyry are deliberately omitted. Logicians and Metaphysicians elaborate on these in various questions. The curious can see these extensively in works by Porphyry, St. Thomas, Scotus, etc.

Proprio. Eſta voz (ſegun opinon de Porphryio, y ſus Expoſitores) en orden de naturaleza, es quarto Predicable, porque ſe acerca à la miſma naturaleza de le Eſpecie, como propriedad, que ſe conſidera en ella en quarto modos.

The term Proper (according to the opinion of Porphyry and his expositors) is the fourth Predicable in order of nature, because it approaches the very nature of the Species, as a property that is considered in it in four ways.

El primero, ſegun algun accidente, que conviene à todo individuo de alguna Eſpecie, como herir por movimiento de Eſpada, Diagonal, ò Verticalmente, &c. que es accidente, que conviene à la individualidad de la Eſpecie de la herida de corte, ò ſea Tajo, ò Revès, &c.

The first, according to some accident, applies to every individual of some species, like wounding by moving a sword diagonally, or vertically, etc. This is an accident that applies to the individuality of the species of the cutting wound, whether it is a slash or backhand, etc.

Segundo modo es quando algun accidente conviene à ſolos los individuos de alguna eſpecie, como Dieſtro, no Dieſtro, que ſi bien civienen al hombre, ſugeto de eſta ciencia, y los que la aprehenden, vſan, ò profeſſan, no por eſſo en ella ſon todos Dieſtros, ni todos no Dieſtros.

The second way is when some accident applies only to the individuals of some species, like Skilled, not Skilled, which, although they apply to man, the subject of this science, and those who learn, use, or profess it, not for that reason are all in it skilled, nor all not skilled.

Tercero es, quando algun accidente conviene à todo individuo de alguna eſpecie; mas no, con todo eſſo, le conviene ſiempre, como Eſtocada de Quarto Circulo, que es accidente, que conviene à la individualidad de tal Eſtocada; mas no ſiempre à lo individuo de la herida de punta, que puede ſer en otra infima eſpecie.

The third way is when some accident applies to every individual of some species; but, nevertheless, it does not always apply, like Thrust of the Quarter Circle, which is an accident that applies to the individuality of such a Thrust; but not always to the individual of the point wound, which can be in another lowest species.

Quarto modo es, quando algun accidente conviene ſiempre à todo individuo de vna Eſpecie, ſegun la aptitud, mas no ſegun la neceſsidad, qual ſucede al hombre en todas la paſsiones, en que tiene aptitud permanente en potencia,mas no en acto continuo, como moverſe, y mover el inſtrumento con que obra, en que permanente eſtà en potentica, mas no en acto continuo.

The fourth way is when some accident always applies to every individual of a species, according to aptitude, but not according to necessity, as happens to man in all passions, in which he has a permanent aptitude in potential, but not in continuous action, such as moving, and moving the instrument with which he works, in which he is permanently potential, but not in continuous action.

De aqui ſe adiverte, que el ſegundo, y tercero modo ſe entienden por el acto, no por la potencia natural, ſino por la acquiſita; y en la natural pertenece al quarto modo.

From here, it is noted that the second and third modes are understood by the act, not by the natural potential, but by the acquired one; and in the natural, it pertains to the fourth mode.

Eſta voz, ò quarto Predicable eſſencialmente difineſe aſsi; Proprio es aquello, que conviene al ſugeto todo, ſolo, y ſiempre, y que ſe reciproca con aquella coſa, ò ſugeto, de que es proprio.

This term, or fourth Predicable, is essentially defined as follows; Proper is that which applies to every subject, only, and always, and reciprocates with that thing, or subject, of which it is proper.

Mas no, con todo eſſo, pertence à la interior eſſencia, porque en parte ſe diſtingue el Proprio del Genero por la Diferencia, que pertencece à la Eſpecie en la parte eſſencial interior, con que ſe reciproca.

However, it does not belong to the internal essence because the Proper is partially distinguished from the Genus by the Difference, which pertains to the Species in the internal essential part, with which it reciprocates.

Diſtingueſe el Proprio del Accidente comun, en que eſte no ſe reciproca con aquello de que es comun accidente, mas el Proprio reciprocaſe con aquello, de que es proprio. De que ſe infiere, que el Proprio reſulta en cierto modo fluente à la naturaleza, y eſſencia, de que es proprio. A cuya cauſa, el Proprio ſeparaſe del Accidente comun, porque el Accidente no pertenece à la pura eſſencia de la coſa, de que es accidente; mas el Proprio procede de la miſma eſſencia, como de principios eſſencials de la coſa, ò ſugeto de es proprio.

Proper is distinguished from common Accident in that the latter does not reciprocate with that which is a common accident, but the Proper does reciprocate with that of which it is proper. From this, it is inferred that the Proper results in a certain way flowing to the nature, and essence, of which it is proper. For this reason, the Proper separates from the common Accident because the Accident does not belong to the pure essence of the thing, of which it is an accident; but the Proper proceeds from the same essence, as from the essential principles of the thing, or subject, of which it is proper.

Eſtas concluſiones ſon las mas proprias à eſta ciencia, con que aqui ſe omiten otras eſpecies, y queſtiones, que ſon mas de la Philofophia, Phyfica, y Metaphyſica; donde ſe controvierte, en què modo el Proprio es generico, ò infimo, ò interiecto, ò tranſcendente: como pueden ver los curioſos en los Exporſitores de Porphryio.

These conclusions are the most appropriate for this science, so other species and questions that pertain more to Philosophy, Physics, and Metaphysics are omitted here. In these disciplines, it is debated in what way the Proper is generic, or infimum, or interjected, or transcendent: as those curious can see in the Expositors of Porphyry.

Accidente. Eſta quinto vniverſal difiniòle Porphryio en tres modos. El primero dixo, que Accidente es aqeullo, que peude eſta, ò no eſtar ſin corrupcion del ſugeto.

Accident. This fifth universal was defined by Porphyry in three ways. The first said, Accident is that which can exist or not exist without the corruption of the subject.

Subdivideſe eſta difinicion en accidente ſeperable ò inſeparable del ſugeto: Aquel es accidente, que puede ſer en vn ſugeto; en ſer, y en no ſer del miſmo ſugeto. Y por negacion ſe difine: Aquel es accidente, que ni es Genero, ni Eſpecie, ni es Diferencia, ni es Proprio, aunque ſiempre es en algun ſugeto.

This definition is subdivided into separable or inseparable accident from the subject: That is an accident which can exist in a subject; in being, and in not being of the same subject. And by negation it is defined: That is an accident which is neither Genre, nor Species, nor Difference, nor Proper, although it is always in some subject.

Dilatanſe en eſta voz Vniverlal los Metaphyficos, y Logicos, explicando las difiniciones de Porphyrio, moviendo varias queſtiones, de que ſe elige lo que mas haze à eſta Ciencia, donde en quanto al movimiento, ſe conſidera como Accidente comun, que puede eſtar, y no eſtar en el ſugeto del Dieſtro, ò el no Dieſtro fin corrupcion del miſmo ſugeto, porque la operacion es ſegun las diferencias de accidentarſe el movimiento. Y tambien fe conſideran accidentes ſeparables, è inſeparables del ſugeto; porque vnos ſon inherentes en èl, y eſtos no ſon ſeparables; y otros, que no ſon inherentes en el miſmo ſugeto, ſon ſeparables, como latamente llevan los Expoſitores de la primera, y ſegunda Difinicion.

Metaphysicians and Logicians expand on this Universal term, explaining the definitions of Porphyry, raising various questions, from which what most applies to this Science is selected, where in terms of movement, it is considered as a common Accident, which can exist, and not exist in the subject of the Skilled, or the non-Skilled without corruption of the same subject, because the operation is according to the differences of the movement’s accident. And separable and inseparable accidents from the subject are also considered; because some are inherent in it, and these are not separable; and others, which are not inherent in the same subject, are separable, as the Expositors of the first and second Definition extensively explain.

Ay, con todo eſſo, accidentes, que en la cogitacion intelectual ſe transforman en otros accidentes, que fe producen à la operacion, reſpecto de la naturaleza accidente; v.g. en la herida de corte (que es Cuchillada) y en la herida de punta (que es Eſtocada) conſideralas el agente Phyficos reſpecto de ſus accidentes inſeparables, que ſon inherentes en la miſma eſpecie de la herida, que determina el Dieſtro por primera intencion; mas en el diſcurſo del combate concurre tal accidente eſtraño de parte del contrario, que el Dieſtro en la cogitacion intelecual transforma la herida de corte, que determinò cometer, en herida de punta, que por ſegunda intencion executò, recibiendo accidentalmente transformacion la herida de corte en herida de punta, como tambien pudiera transformar la herida de punta de primera intencion antes de executarla, en herida de corte, executada por intencion ſegunda. Todo ſe demonſtrarà en ſus proprio lugares, reſultando de todo, que en el perfecto obrar por Accidente comun, el Accidente no es Genero, ni Eſpecie, ni Diferenciam, ni Proprio, ſino otra quinta voz Predicable, que diviſo, y diverſo del Accidente Predicamental, à cauſa de que el Accidente Predicamental mira à lo que no es Subſtancia, y el Predicamental es al contrario, porque fe conſidera en la ſubſtancia, dividiendoſe en los nueve Accidentes, que admiten categorias por la particion del ente: debiendo aqui conſiderarſe, que el Accidente Predicable, y el Accidente Predicamental difieren en diverſo modo, porque el vno ſe conſidera A parte rei, (que es ſegun ſu ſer real) y el otro (ſegun ſu ſer objectivo) que es diſio, y diverſo de la miſma ſubtancia, intransformable de accidente en accidente, reſpecto de la cogitacion intelectual; y eſte ſolo es Predicable, y voz Vniverſal, y el otro categorico A parte rei, incluſo en la particion del ente, de que ſe trada en los Predicamentos del Philoſopho, en que ſe entra con mas luz, teniendo conocimiento de los Predicable sde Porphryio, de que ſe ha tratado en eſte Diſcurſo, por vtil, y neceſſario à eſta Ciencia de la inteligencia, y exercicio de la Eſpada, eligiendo lo forçoſo, y excluyendo lo que mas propriamente haze à la Phyfica, y Metaphyſica, ſegun ſe diſputa en las Eſcuelas.

However, there are accidents that, in intellectual cogitation, transform into other accidents that are produced by operation, in respect to the accidental nature; for example, in the case of a cutting wound (which is a Slash) and in the case of a puncture wound (which is a Thrust), the Physical agent considers them in relation to their inseparable accidents, which are inherent in the very species of the wound, which the Right-handed determines by first intention; but in the course of combat, such a foreign accident occurs on the part of the opponent, that the Right-handed in intellectual cogitation transforms the cutting wound, which he decided to commit, into a puncture wound, which he executed by second intention, the cutting wound being accidentally transformed into a puncture wound, just as he could also transform the puncture wound of first intention before executing it, into a cutting wound, executed by second intention. Everything will be demonstrated in its proper places, resulting from all this, that in the perfect act by Common Accident, the Accident is neither Genus, nor Species, nor Difference, nor Property, but another fifth Predicable term, which is divided, and diverse from the Predicamental Accident, because the Predicamental Accident looks at what is not Substance, and the Predicamental is the opposite, because it is considered in the substance, dividing into the nine Accidents, which admit categories by the partition of being: it should be considered here, that the Predicable Accident, and the Predicamental Accident differ in various ways, because one is considered A parte rei, (which is according to its real being) and the other (according to its objective being) which is said, and diverse from the same substance, untransformable from accident to accident, in respect to intellectual cogitation; and this alone is Predicable, and Universal term, and the other categorical A parte rei, included in the partition of being, which is dealt with in the Categories of the Philosopher, in which more light is entered, having knowledge of the Predicables of Porphyry, which has been discussed in this Discourse, as useful, and necessary for this Science of understanding, and exercise of the Sword, choosing what is necessary, and excluding what most properly applies to Physics, and Metaphysics, as is disputed in the Schools.