DISCVRSO QVINTO.

LOGICA DE ESTA CIENCIA: de la Difinicion, y Diviſion

FIFTH DISCOURSE.

LOGIC OF THIS SCIENCE: of the Definition, and Division

Aviendose Demonſtrado por mayor en lod Diſcurſos antecedentes, que la inteligencia, y exercicio de la Eſpada es ciencia (de que ſe produce el arte) concurriendo la experiencia en la parte exerciente, no es de omitir el metodo, y preceptos por donde ſe rige, aſsi lo racionable Logico, qual es comun en todas ciencias, como lo Dialectico diſputable, que mira las reglas, y preceptos con qe la experiencia ſe perficiona, configuiendoſe de todo, lo que el vulgo llama Deſtreza.

Having demonstrated in the previous discourses that the understanding and practice of the sword is a science (from which art is produced), with experience contributing to the practicing part, it is not to be omitted the method and precepts by which it is governed. This includes the rational logic, which is common in all sciences, as well as the disputable dialectic, which looks at the rules and precepts with which experience is perfected, resulting in what the common people call Skill.

Por terminos principales à toda ciencia, conſideran los Philoſophos, Logicos,y Dialecticos la difinicion, y la diviſion, con cuyo conocimiento, mejor ſe entra en los predicables, predicamentos, cathegorias, &c. en que habituado el entendimiento, ſe guia para la demonſtracion, adquiriendo lo probable, ò lo evidente, que es el ſcopo de toda ciencia y arte, y diſciplina, como tambien ſe reconoce en la inteligencia, y exercicio de la Eſpada, en que de fuerça ſe neceſsita: de los terminos, Difinicion, Diviſion, &c. como partes integrales del argumento, y demonftracion.

Philosophers, logicians, and dialecticians consider the definition and division as principal terms to all science. With the understanding of these, one can better engage in the predicables, predicaments, categories, etc., in which the understanding becomes accustomed to guiding towards demonstration, acquiring what is probable or evident, which is the aim of all science, art, and discipline. This is also recognized in the understanding and practice of the sword, where the terms: Definition, Division, etc., are necessarily integral parts of the argument and demonstration.

Tocaſe comunmente por dificultad en las Eſcuelas, qual ſe primero en orden, la Difinicion, ò la Diviſion? y conſideran, que ſi ſe refieren à diverſas coſas, primero es la diviſion en el orden de naturaleza, porque por la diviſion de los ſuperiores ſe inveſtiga la difinicion de los inferiores: v.g. por la diviſion de la ſubſtancia ſe inquiere la diſinicion del animal; y aſsi, primero es la diviſion, que la definicion, porque primero es dividir el genero ſumo, que difinir la eſpecie.

It is commonly touched upon in schools as a difficulty, which comes first in order: the Definition or the Division? They consider that if they refer to different things, the division is first in the order of nature, because by the division of the superiors the definition of the inferiors is investigated: e.g. by the division of the substance the definition of the animal is sought; and thus, the division is first, before the definition, because it is first to divide the highest genus than to define the species.

Mas al contrario, fi la difinicion, y la diviſion ſe refieren à la miſma coſa difinida, primero es la difinicion, que la diviſion en orden natural, y de doctrina; v.g. ſi ſe mira al animal que ſe ha de difinir, primero es la difinicion, que la diviſion. La razon es clara: la difinicion es cierta compoſicion de la coſa difinida, y la diviſion, à la verdad, es la reſolucion: y ſegun orden de naturaleza, primero ſe compone, que ſe divida, y refuelva.

On the contrary, if the definition and the division refer to the same thing defined, the definition is first before the division in natural order, and of doctrine; e.g. if the animal to be defined is considered, the definition is first, then the division. The reason is clear: the definition is a certain composition of the thing defined, and the division, indeed, is the resolution: and according to the order of nature, it is first composed, then divided, and resolved.

Aſsi tambien (fegun orden de doctrina) primero es la difinicion, que la diviſion: porque ſegun tal orden, la coſa primero ſe debe difinir, que dividir: por effo ſe compàra la difinicion con la argumentacion, en quanto es parte de la miſma difinicion, de donde los Logicos en las queſtiones, primero inquieren, y argumentan la calidad de la difinicion, que ſaquen la reſolucion para las concluſiones ciertas.

Por eſſo, hablando de los preceptos de difinir, y dividir, primero ſe debe diſputar de los de difinir en orden de doctrina, y dignidad: en orden de doctrina, porque no bien ſe puede entender que ſea la diviſion, ſino por la difinicion: y en orden de dignidad, porque la difinicion explica la eſſencia de lo difinido: como tambien en la ciencia de la Eſpada, la eſſencia de lo difinido en ella no ſe explica por la diviſion, fino por la difinicion en primer lugar, como ſe irà demonſtrando; y aqui por la brevedad, y claridad ponèmos las concluſiones deſnudas del aparato diſputable, y varias opiniones de Autores, à cauſa de que, como và dicho, no tenèmos por fin el oſtentar, ſino explicar lo preciſo a nueſtro empeño, procurandonos ceñir à lo forcoſo en lo que ſe eſcrive.

Therefore, when talking about the precepts of defining and dividing, the principles of defining should be disputed first in terms of doctrine and dignity: in terms of doctrine, because the concept of division cannot be properly understood without the definition: and in terms of dignity, because the definition explains the essence of what is defined: just as in the science of the Sword, the essence of what is defined in it is not explained by the division, but by the definition in the first place, as will be demonstrated; and here for the sake of brevity and clarity, we present the naked conclusions without the disputable apparatus, and various opinions of authors, because, as it has been said, our aim is not to show off, but to explain what is necessary for our endeavor, trying to stick to what is necessary in what is written.

Enſeña Ariſtoteles, que de vn ſugeto difinido no ſe dàn muchas difiniciones quiditativas, como ni muchas eſſencias, porque ſi ſe dieſſen, ſu todo ſupremo no ſeria difinible, de donde Scoto concluye, que de vn abſoluto (de que la difinicion indica ſu ſer) no ſe dan muchas difiniciones. De que ſe arguye: la difinicion es vna abſoluta, &c. luego la difinicion de la Difinicion debe ſer vna, y no muchas.

Aristotle teaches that there are not many quidditative definitions given of a defined subject, just as there are not many essences, because if there were, its supreme whole would not be definable. From this, Scotus concludes that there are not many definitions of an absolute (of which the definition indicates its being). From this, it is argued: the definition is one absolute, etc., therefore the definition of Definition must be one, and not many.

Por eſta cauſa, el miſmo Philoſopho difiniò la difinicion de la Difinicion, diziendo: Ser oracion, que explica la eſſencia de la coſa. En eſta ſubſtancia, por diferentes fraſis, concuerdan Philoſophos, y Rhetoricos, de donde colegimos por difinicion de la difinicion, Ser oracion, que explica la naturaleza eſſencial de lo difinido en ambito breviſsimo de palabras.

For this reason, the same Philosopher defined the definition of the Definition, saying: It is a sentence that explains the essence of the thing. In this substance, Philosophers and Rhetoricians agree in different phrases, from which we deduce the definition of the definition, being: It is a sentence that explains the essential nature of what is defined in the shortest possible number of words.

Dezimos, que es oracion, porque no es voz ſimple; zibire e: como ſi ſe dizeſſe, el Gladio es enſe: es Eſpada, no ſerà difinicion, fino propoſicion identica, ò palabra ſimple. En la oracion admitenſe mas vozes: vna pertecta, que conſta de vna palabra, como, Hombre blanco; otra imperfecta, ò compueſta, que no conſta de vna voz, ſino muchas, como, el hombre es animal participe de razon; y aſsi, aunque es oracion, no es ſola dificion, ſino difinicion y difinido, porque para la difinicion baſta el genero, y diferencia, que ſe explica por Animal participe de razon, y la voz hombre no es de la difinicion, porque es lo difinido.

We say that it is a sentence because it is not a simple word; if you were to say, the Gladius is a sword: it is a sword, it would not be a definition, but a simple or identical proposition. In a sentence, there are more words; one perfect, which consists of one word, such as White man; another imperfect or compound, which does not consist of one word, but many, such as Man is an animal participant of reason; and so, although it is a sentence, it is not only a definition but a definition and the defined, because for the definition, the genre and difference are enough, which is explained by Animal participant of reason; the word man is not part of the definition, it is the defined.

Por eſſo la difinicion no ha de ſer obſcura, ni ambigua, fino lucida, clara, y propria, aſsi Quintiliano dixo: La difinicion es oracion de la coſa propueſta, propria, lucida, y en breves palabras comprehenſa. De donde Ariſtoteles la nombrò Oros, diziendo el miſmo Quintiliano, que ſignifica Termino, en aluſion de los limites en los campos, que tambien ſe nombran Terminos, porque incluyen lo que comprehenden, diſtinguiendoſe vnos de otros.

Therefore, the definition should not be obscure or ambiguous, but lucid, clear, and proper, so Quintilian said: The definition is a sentence of the proposed thing, proper, lucid, and comprehended in brief words. From this, Aristotle named it Oros, with Quintilian explaining that it signifies Term, in allusion to the boundaries in the fields, which are also named Terms, because they include what they comprehend, distinguishing one from another.

Boecio confiderò quinze maneras de difiniciones, no por la eſſencia, ſino por el modo de la compoſicion: los Modernos Eſcolaſticos contentanſe con dividir la difinicion en dos modos; vno, difinicion de la coſa, que es aquella, que la explica, ſegun ſu miſmo ſer, y eſſencia; y eſta llaman Eſſencial, y la dividen à cauſas, y à efectos, &c. otro modo nombran difinicion del nombre, porque explica, que ſignifica el nombre: y efte le conſideran en cinco modos.

Boethius considered fifteen types of definitions, not by essence, but by the manner of composition: the Modern Scholastics are content to divide the definition into two modes; one, definition of the thing, which is that which explains it, according to its own being, and essence; and this they call Essential, and they divide it into causes, and effects, etc. Another mode they name definition of the name, because it explains what the name signifies: and they consider it in five modes.

El primero, quando vn vocablo, nombre, ò termino obſcuro, ſe demueſtra por otro claro inteligible, como Fretum, que es angoſtura, ò eſtrecho de Mar, pueſto entre dos tierras continuadas: Movimiento Cero, que ſignifica cierto modo de obrar con la Eſpada.

The first, when an obscure word, name, or term is demonstrated by another clear, intelligible one, like Fretum, which is a narrow or strait of Sea, placed between two continuous lands: Zero Movement, which signifies a certain way of acting with the Sword.

Segundo modo es, quando ſe explica la etymologia del nombre, ò termino, como Parricida, aquel que mata à ſu padre: Triangulo, aquella figura, que conſta de tres angulos: Cuchillada, aquella herida, que ſe haze con el ſilo de la cuchilla de la Eſpada.

The second mode is when the etymology of the name or term is explained, like Parricide, the one who kills his father: Triangle, that figure which consists of three angles: Cuchillada, that wound made with the blade of the Sword.

Tercio modo es, quando ſe explica por analogia, ò metaphora, como Adolencia, es flor de la edad: La mente, en el animo, lo que en los ojos en el cuerpo: Eſtocada, por aquella herida, que ſe haze con tal forma de Eſpada, que no tiene ſilos cortantes en la cuchilla, como el Eſtoque, à que haze aluſion por analogica, ò metaphora.

The third mode is when it is explained by analogy, or metaphor, like Adolescence, is the flower of age: The mind, in the soul, is what the eyes are in the body: Estocada, for that wound made with such a form of Sword, which has no cutting edges on the blade, like the Estoque, to which it alludes by analogy, or metaphor.

Quarto modo es, quando ſe explica por exemplo, ò comparacion: v.g. el animal bruto es como el hombre en lo ſenſitivo, en lo movible, &c. el Tajo, y el Revès parecenſe en herir por corte.

The fourth mode is when it is explained by example or comparison: for example, the brute animal is like a man in sensitivity and in movement, etc. The Cut and the Reverse resemble each other in delivering a cutting strike.

Quinto modo es por negacion, como, virtud es huir los vicios. Dios no es fubſtancia criada, no es finito, &c. el Revès no es Tajo, y menos Eſtocada.

The fifth mode is by negation, such as virtue is to avoid vices. God is not a created substance, He is not finite, etc. The Reverse is not a Cut, and even less a Thrust.

Por eſtos principios ſe moviò el Philoſopho à conſiderar por diviſion de la difinicion, en aquella que mira à la razon de la coſa difinida; y en aquella que mira al nombre, aſsi dixo: Difinicion de la coſa difinida es aquella, que es medio de la demonſtracion, ò por la naturaleza del ſugeto difinido, ò à cauſas, y eſta ſe llama eſſencial: la difinicion del nombre es aquella, que no es proprio medio de la demonſtracion, como las difiniciones ab officijs, ab electis, &c. de que latamente habla Ariſtoteles, y diſputan los Dialecticos

These principles moved the Philosopher to consider the division of the definition, in that which looks at the reason for the thing defined and in that which looks at the name, so he said: The definition of the thing defined is that which is the means of demonstration, either by the nature of the subject defined, or due to causes, and this is called essential. The definition of the name is that which is not a proper means of demonstration, like definitions from offices, elected, etc. of which Aristotle speaks broadly, and the Dialectics discuss.

Son tres diferentes entre si, no por la eſſencia, fino por el modo de las difiniciones; que ſon medio en la demonftracion; la primera, que es por genero, y diferencia, ſe alça con el nombre de eſſencial por antonomaſia: la ſegunda, aunque tambien es eſſencial, llamaſe A cauſis petita: la tercera es la deſcripcion, porque ſe explica el difinido por paſsiones, ò propriedades, como el Hombre es animal riſible: que es ſolo propriedad, y no conſtitucion: lo miſmo es el Triangulo Equilatero, Tajo Vertical, que ſon difiniciones eſſenciales de figura Mathematica, y de herida cortante; porque todas, y las ſemejantes manifieſtan lo intimo de lo que difinen: à todas tres abraça la Difinicion, que explica la eſſencia de la coſa difinida por aquello, que es intimo en ella miſma: y en la que concurren eſtas calidades, admite el termino, ò calificacion de eſſencial.

There are three types of definitions different from each other, not by essence, but by the mode of the definitions; which are a means in the demonstration; the first, which is by genus and difference, is raised with the name of essential by antonomasia: the second, although it is also essential, is called ‘sought from causes’: the third is the description, because the defined is explained by passions, or properties, like ‘Man is a laughing animal’: which is only property, and not constitution: the same is the Equilateral Triangle, Vertical Cut, which are essential definitions of a mathematical figure and of a cutting wound; because all, and the like, manifest the intimate of what they define: all three are embraced by the Definition, which explains the essence of the thing defined by that which is intimate in it itself: and in the one in which these qualities concur, it accepts the term or qualification of essential.

Para cuya inteligencia, debe advertirſe, que vnas conſideraciones ſon ſin las quales puede ſer: el fugeto difinido, y otras ſon tales, que fin ellas no puede ſubſiſtir. En las que ſon tan accidentales, que ſin ellas, puede ſer el ſugeto, no dàn eſſencia la difinicion, como eſtàr ſentado, ò en pie; dormir, ò velar; que eſtas conſideraciones, y las ſemejantes, no quitan la ſubſiſtencia al ſugeto, ò á la coſa difinida; pues el hombre en pie, ò ſentado; en quietud, ò movimiento; durmiendo, ò velando; ſubſiſte en todo ſu ſer, y ſe difine fin ellas, Otras ay, que no ſon accidentales, ſino eſſenciales, porque ſin ellas no ſubſiſte entero el ſugero, ò coſa difinida, como las alas en el paxaro, que no es entero phyſicamente ſin alas; mas con todo effo puede difinirſe, y entenderſe por Genero, y Diferencia propria del fugeto.

For understanding this, it should be noted that there are some considerations that are accidental, meaning the subject defined can exist without them, and others are such that without them the subject cannot subsist. In those that are so accidental that without them the subject can exist, they do not provide essence to the definition, such as being seated or standing; sleeping or waking; these considerations, and the like, do not take away the subsistence of the subject, or the thing defined; for the man standing or seated; in stillness, or movement; sleeping or waking; subsists in all his being, and is defined without them. There are others that are not accidental, but essential, because without them the subject or thing defined does not subsist whole, such as wings in a bird, which is not physically complete without wings; but with all this it can be defined, and understood by Genus, and Difference proper to the subject.

Otras conſideraciones ay, que ſin ellas, ni el fugeto puede ſer, ni difinirſe, ni entenderſe: eſtas propriamente llamanſe intimas, como animal racional, herida en ſu eſpecie infima, que ſon conſideraciones infimas en el ſugeto; porque el hombre no puede ſubſiſtir, ni conocerſe ſin ellas; ni la herida, ſino por ſu eſpecie infima, en que ſe explica ſu infima, y intima diferencia, como Eſtocada de Quarto Circulo, que el termino Eſtocada es genero, y el Quarto Circulo diferencia infima, y intima: lo miſmo ſe dira en toda coſa difinida, aſsi como el Triangulo no ſubſiſte en ſu figura ſin tres angulos; y mas eſſencial, ſi ſe declara por ſu infima, è intima diferencia, Octogono , Yſoceles, &c. porque Genero es aquel, que incluye diferentes eſpecies: y la Diferencia es la que ſepàra, y repreſenta las propriedades intimas de la Eſpecie; y por eſſo ſe recurre à las intimas, y infimas diferencias del ſugeto, que le ſepàran de las otras eſpecies, que ſe incluyen en el genero, de donde ſe entiende lo que comunmente dizen los Philoſophos, que el genero ſe ha de conſtituir de la materia, y la diferencia de la forma, en que ſe conoce lo que propriamente es del genero; y lo que propriamente es de la diferencia infima, ò intima en el ſugeto, para formar la difinicion eſſencial; v.g. Tajo Vertical, Tajo Diagonal, &c. que ſe difinen, y conocen por ſu infima, è intima diferencia, reſpecto de ſu infimo genero, que por eſſo ſe conſidera, que ay tambien generos generalifsimos, que incluyen, y abraçan en si otros generos, como en la ciencia de la Eſpada ſon generos generalifsimos heridas, movimientos, que ſon capazes de incluir en si otros generos, no tan generales, como en las heridas, cuchilladas, eſtocadas, que ſon generos para otros generos mas infimos, como Tajos, Reveſes, &c. y aſsi en los movimientos. Exempli gratia: en la linea recta de vna categoria, ò predicamento, deſcendiendo de vn fumo genero à vna infima eſpecie, diraſe herida: ò es de corte, ò punta. De corte? Cuchillada: Cuchillada?Tajo, ò Revès, Revès Diagonal, ò Vertical. Y aſcendiendo, diràſe Revès Diagonal: luego cuchillada. Cuchillada? luego herida de corte.

There are other considerations, without which, neither the subject can exist, nor can it be defined or understood: these are properly called intimate, like rational animal, wound in its lowest species, which are the lowest considerations in the subject; because man cannot subsist or be known without them; nor the wound, but by its lowest species, in which its lowest and intimate difference is explained, like Stab of Quarter Circle, where the term Stab is genus, and Quarter Circle is the lowest and intimate difference: the same can be said in every defined thing, just as the Triangle does not subsist in its figure without three angles; and more essential, if it is declared by its lowest, intimate difference, Octagon, Isosceles, etc. because Genus is that which includes different species: and Difference is that which separates, and represents the intimate properties of the Species; and therefore we resort to the intimate, and lowest differences of the subject, that separate it from the other species, which are included in the genus, from which it is understood what the Philosophers commonly say, that the genus must be constituted from the matter, and the difference from the form, in which what properly belongs to the genus is known; and what properly belongs to the lowest, or intimate difference in the subject, to form the essential definition; e.g. Vertical Cut, Diagonal Cut, etc. which are defined, and known by their lowest, intimate difference, with respect to their lowest genus, which is why it is considered, that there are also very general genera, that include, and embrace in themselves other genera, as in the science of the Sword there are very general genera wounds, movements, which are capable of including in themselves other genera, not so general, as in wounds, slashings, stabbings, which are genera for other lower genera, such as Cuts, Backstrokes, etc. and so in movements. For example: in the straight line of a category, or predicament, descending from a high genus to a lowest species, it will be said wound: or is it cutting, or point. Cutting? Slashing: Slashing? Cut, or Backstroke, Backstroke Diagonal, or Vertical. And ascending, it will be said Diagonal Backstroke: then slashing. Slashing? then cutting wound.

El proprio metodo ſe conſidera en la Philoſophia, como ſi dixeramos: Vegetable, ſolo el hombre, el bruto, y la planta, &c. y eſtos Generos generales, y mas generales en la difinicion requiren mas confideraciones, recurriendo deſde vn ſumo Genero à vna Eſpecie infima, ò al contrario, aſcendiendo deſde le Eſpecie infima al Genero ſumo de ſu predicamento, como ſe demonſtrarà en ſu lugar: advirtiendo aqui, que ay ſumos Generos, ò principios, que no admiten difinicion eſſencial por Genero, y Diferencia, porque el Genero, ò principio ſimpliſsimo no admite Diferencia en si, como el punto, que es principio de la quantidad; mas no es quantidad, porque no tiene partes, y aſsi carce de diferencia: mas no por eſſo es indifinible (pues todo lo ſinito, ſe ſumo Genero, ò principio, es difinible) ſino por ſalta de Genero, y Diferencia A cauſis, ò por deſcription: aſsi Ariſtoteles compàra la Difinicion eſſencial al mumero, por que aſsi como al numero, ſi en el ſe añade, ò ſe quita, muda la eſpecie; como v.g. en el ternario, ſi ſe le añade vna vnidad, es quiternario; y fi ſele quita, es binario; aſsi tambien en la Difinicion eſſencial, ſi ſe añade, ò ſe quita, ſe evierte la difinicion, ò paſſando de vn genero menos general à otro mas general, ò al contrario, como latamente diſputan Logicos, y Metaphyſicos: lo miſmo ſe experimenta en la cienca de la Eſpada, en que quitada, ò añadida vna intima, ò infima Diferencia, evierte la Difinicion, como queda apuntado, y es patente.

The same method is considered in Philosophy, as if we were to say: Vegetable, only man, brute, and plant, etc. and these general and more general Genres in the definition require more considerations, going from a highest Genus to a lowest Species, or conversely, ascending from the lowest Species to the highest Genus of its predicament, as will be demonstrated in its place: noting here, that there are highest Genres, or principles, that do not admit essential definition by Genus, and Difference, because the simplest Genus or principle does not admit Difference in itself, like the point, which is the principle of quantity; but it is not quantity, because it does not have parts, and thus lacks difference: but not for that reason is it indefinable (since everything finite, be it highest Genus, or principle, is definable) but due to lack of Genus, and Difference From Causes, or by description: thus Aristotle compares the essential Definition to the number, because just as with the number, if something is added or removed, it changes the species; e.g. in the ternary, if one unit is added, it becomes quaternary; and if one is removed, it becomes binary; so also in the essential Definition, if something is added or removed, the definition is inverted, or passing from a less general genre to a more general one, or vice versa, as Logicians and Metaphysicians broadly dispute: the same is experienced in the science of the Sword, in which removed or added an intimate, or lowest Difference, inverts the Definition, as has been pointed out, and is evident.

Segundo modo de Difinicion eſſencial es A cauſis, ò por vno, ò por mas, ò por todas: para cuya inteligencia, ſe ſupone con el Philofopho, y ſus Expoſitores, y el corriente de las Eſcuelas, que ſon quatro las cauſas, material, formal, eficiente, y final, y colocamoslas por tal orden quanto à la naturaleza, que primero es la materia, que ſe introduzga la forma, y luego ſe conſideran la cauſa eficiente, y la final, reconociendo ſiempre, que los agentes naturales, haziendo padecen: porque ſolo Dios es cauſa eficiente|primera, y aſsi Cauſa de cauſas, Criador de la materia prima; y las demàs que ſe conſideran, ſon cauſas phyſicas, y poſteriores: v.g. en el hombre, diràſe, que es animal, cuya materia phyſica en el primero fue el limo de la tierra, y en la propagacion la materia prolifica: en lo formal diraſe, que es alma racional, que le dà sèr, y forma, producida, por la eficiente; y dirvàſe del hombre, que es animal, que conſta de cuerpo humano, y alma racional; y en eſta difinicion, el cuerpo es materia, y el alma forma, y por ſupremo eficiente recurreſe al principio eſſencial, que es Dios, que en el limo de la tierra, diſpueſto, inſpirò la forma vital racional, de donde el fin eſſencial del hombre es para conſeguir el fin à que fue criado, y por todas cauſas podrà dezirſe, que es animal, que confta de cuerpo humano, con alma racional, criada por Dios, cauſa principal eficiente, que le criò para el perfectiſsimo fin que debe aſpirar, que es verle, y amarle en la Bienaventurança.

The second mode of essential Definition is From Causes, or by one, or by more, or by all: for understanding this, it is assumed with the Philosopher, his Expositors, and the current of the Schools, that there are four causes, material, formal, efficient, and final, and we place them in such order as to nature, that first is the matter, then the form is introduced, and then the efficient and final cause are considered, always recognizing that natural agents, making, suffer: because only God is the first efficient cause, and so Cause of causes, Creator of prime matter; and the others that are considered, are physical causes, and subsequent: e.g. in man, it will be said, that he is an animal, whose physical matter in the first was the slime of the earth, and in propagation the prolific matter: in the formal it will be said, that he is a rational soul, which gives him being, and form, produced, by the efficient; and it will be said of man, that he is an animal, consisting of a human body, and a rational soul; and in this definition, the body is matter, and the soul is form, and by supreme efficient we recur to the essential principle, which is God, who in the slime of the earth, disposed, inspired the rational vital form, from which the essential end of man is to achieve the end for which he was created, and by all causes it can be said, that he is an animal, consisting of a human body, with a rational soul, created by God, the principal efficient cause, who created him for the most perfect end he should aspire to, which is to see and love Him in Beatitude.

En las demàs ciencias inveſtiganſe las cauſas, ſegun el orden de naturaleza, y por ella ſe forma difinicion eſſencial de lo difinido. Aſsi tambien en la inteligencia, y exercicio de la Eſpada, por ſer ciencia, hallanſe las difiniciones à cauſas pedidas, y ſon tambien eſſenciales, como ſe demonſtrarà en ſu lugar, quando ſe trate de las cauſas deſta ciencia.

In the rest of the sciences, causes are investigated according to the order of nature, and through it, an essential definition of what is defined is formed. Similarly, in understanding and practicing Swordsmanship, being a science, definitions are found by causes and they are also essential, as will be demonstrated in its place when dealing with the causes of this science.

En tercer lugar de difinicion eſſencial, que puede ſer medio demonſtrable, es la deſcripcion; y aunque eſta no es tan quiditativa, como la que reſulta de genero, y diferencia, ò à caufas; no por eſſo le falta la eſſencia, pues la explica en oracion breve, que la deſcribe, de tal ſuerte, que es medio para la demonſtracion, y aſsi ſe difine, diziendo: La deſcripcion es oracion breven, que explica qual ſea la coſa difinible por alguna, ò algunas de ſas propriedades, ò por coleccion de muchos accidentes, y proprios del ſugeto.

The third form of essential definition, which can be demonstrable, is description; and although this is not as quidditative as the one resulting from genus and difference, or causes, it does not lack essence, as it explains it in a brief sentence, which describes it in such a way that it is a means for demonstration, and thus it is defined, saying: Description is a brief sentence that explains what the definable thing is through some or some of its properties, or by the collection of many accidents, and proper of the subject.

Por alguna de ſus propriedades, como quando el hombre ſe difine por animal riſible, ò por admirativo, ò todo junto: porque la admiraction es propriedad de el hombre, y la riſa tambien, y el ſugeto admirativo es riſible, y el que es riſible, es admirativo, que ſon propriedades etl hombre, y baſtantes, para difinirle por deſcripcion; pero tambien ſe puede por coleccion de muchos accidentes, como animal de dos pies, que canrece de plumas, que ſi bien ſon accidentes, que cada vne ſon propriedades de otros animales; pues las aves ſon de dos pies, y los pezes carecen de plumas, no concurren los tales accidentes juntos tan propriamente como en el hombre, ſin que tenga lugar lo de Ecce homo Platonis en el Gallo ſin plumas, como cuenta Achiles Bocchio. En la cienceia de la Eſpada, muchas difiniciones ſe hazen por deſcripcion, como de la miſma Eſpada, que es vn Inſtrumento de dos filos en proporcionada longitud, y anchura, conſtando de aguda punta, y tal ornato en ſu principio, que haga defenſa à la mano que le rige, y le dè aptitud para impedir al inſtrumento contrario, à que ha de oponerſe. Y aſsi ſu podràn forma otras difiniciones deſcriptas.

By some of its properties, such as when a man is defined as a laughing or admiring animal, or all together: because admiration is a property of man, and laughter is also, and the subject of admiration is laughable, and the one who is laughable is admirable, which are properties of man, and sufficient to define him by description; but it can also be done by the collection of many accidents, like a two-legged animal that lacks feathers, which are accidents, that each are properties of other animals; because birds are two-legged, and fish lack feathers, these accidents do not occur together as properly as in man, without having a place for the Ecce homo Platonis in the featherless rooster, as Achilles Bocchio tells. In the science of the Sword, many definitions are made by description, such as of the Sword itself, which is an instrument of two edges in proportional length and width, consisting of a sharp point, and such ornament at its beginning, that provides defense to the hand that guides it, and gives it aptitude to impede the opposing instrument, to which it has to oppose. And so, other described definitions can be formed.

Ariſtoteles, reconociendo preceptos de muchos, para acertar la difinicion, diò los figuientes: la primera regla es, que ſea diſtinta, y clara, y contra eſte precepto ſe yerra en dos modos; el primero, ſin en la difinicion ſe coloca la coſa difinida, como diziendo: El racional es animal participe de razon, la Dialectica es pericia de diſputar dialectico, donde el ſugeto racional, y Dialectica ſon lo difinido, que no lo admite la difinicion, pues para eſta es baſtante, y eſſencial el genero, y la diferencia, y ſobre el miſmo ſugeto difinido, como dezir: Cuchillada, ò Tajo Vertical, donde ſe comete el miſmo vicio.

Aristotle, recognizing the precepts of many to find the correct definition, gave the following: the first rule is that it should be distinct and clear, and this precept is violated in two ways; the first, if the thing to be defined is included in the definition, such as saying: The rational is an animal partaking of reason, Dialectics is the skill of arguing dialectically, where the subjects rational and Dialectics are what is being defined, which should not be included in the definition, as for this, the genus and the difference are sufficient, and essential, and on the same defined subject, like saying: A stab, or Vertical Slash, where the same mistake is committed.

El ſegundo error es, ſi en la difinicion ſe coloca voz obſcura, ambigua, ò homonima, como dezir: La generacion es movimiento de no ſer á fer; que tal difinicion es vicioſa, porque Movimiento es voz ambigua,y no forma diſtinta en la difimcion; la obſcuridad ſe comete, quando en la difinicion ſe vſan vozes obſcuras, como dezir: La tierra, es nutriz de los vivientes, que el vicio ſe comete en la palabra Nutriz, que es metaphorica, reſpecto de la tierra. Tambien ſe comete obſcuridad en los modos de dezir improprios, como: La Ley es imagen de aquellos que ſon juſtos, que es ſraſis impropria à la difinicion, de que tambien ſe excluyen las palabras inuſitadas.

The second error is if an obscure, ambiguous, or homonymous voice is included in the definition, such as saying: Generation is movement from non-being to being; such a definition is faulty, because Movement is an ambiguous word, and does not form a distinct definition; obscurity is committed when obscure words are used in the definition, such as saying: The earth is the nurturer of the living, the error is committed in the word Nurturer, which is metaphorical with respect to the earth. Obscurity is also committed in improper ways of speaking, such as: The Law is the image of those who are just, which is an improper phrase for the definition, from which unusual words are also excluded.

Segunda regla en la difinicion es, que no ſea mayor, ni menor, que lo difinido; eſto es, que no debe convenir à mas, que à lo que difine, porque lo eſtraño es vicioſo en la difinicion, que ſerà mayor, quando ſe dilata à mas que lo forçoſo, redundando termnios: y menor, quando le faltare alguno neceſſario à la inteligencia de lo que ſe difine.

The second rule in the definition is that it should not be greater or smaller than what is being defined; this means that it should not apply to more than what it defines, because what is extraneous is faulty in the definition, which will be greater when it expands to more than necessary, with redundant terms: and smaller when it lacks some term necessary to the understanding of what is being defined.

La tercera regla es, adequarſe al ſugeto, ò coſa difinida, con tal propriedad, que ſe entienda lo intimo de lo difinido; de tal ſuerte, que lo que le conviene, convenga con la difinicion; y lo que coniene à la difinicion convenga, con lo difinido reciprocamente, qual ſe reconoce en la difinicion recibida del hombre por Animal participe de razon, que conviene à la difinicion, y al ſugeto: todo eſto los Philofophos explican brevemente, diziendo, que difinido, y difinicion ſean convertibles.

The third rule is to match the subject, or thing being defined, with such property that the intimate of what is defined is understood; in such a way that what suits it, suits the definition; and what suits the definition, suits what is defined reciprocally, as is recognized in the accepted definition of man as an Animal participant of reason, which suits the definition, and the subject: all this the Philosophers explain briefly, saying, that defined, and definition are convertible.

Quarta regla, que en la difinicion nada aya ſuperfluo, que ſe conocerà, quando quitada alguna palabra, ò particula de la difinicion, queda baſtante, como dezir: Animal racional, admirativo, y riſible, que es ſuperfluo, porque angue ſe quiten las dicciones, Admirativo, riſible, ò las ſemejantes, queda baſtante la difinicion, diziendo: Animal racional.

The fourth rule is that in the definition there should be nothing superfluous, which will be recognized when, if any word or particle of the definition is removed, it remains sufficient, as in saying: Rational, admiring, and laughing animal, which is superfluous, because even if the words, Admiring, laughing, or the like are removed, the definition remains sufficient, saying: Rational animal.

Quinta relga, que lo difinido ſe reconozca ſi es capàz de genero, y diferencia, para que reſulte lo eſſencial, porque careciendo de verdadero genero, y diferencia, ſe avrà de eligir por cauſas, ò por deſcripcion, y eſto ſe conſiga aſcendiendo, y deſcendiendo por la linear recta de las categorias, como ſe demonſtrarà en los Predicamentos.

The fifth rule is that what is defined should be recognized if it is capable of genus and difference, so that the essential results, because lacking true genus and difference, one will have to choose by causes, or by description, and this is achieved by ascending and descending along the straight line of the categories, as will be demonstrated in the Predicaments.

Ariſtoteles hallò dos medios de inveſtigar la Difinicion, vno el de la compoſicion, otro el de la reſolucion, porque primero (ſegun orden) es componer, que reſolver.

Aristotle found two means of investigating the Definition, one through composition, another through resolution, because the first order is to compose rather than to resolve.

Para la compoſicion, ſe ha de buſcar el genero; y hallado, divideſe por contrarias diferencias, y de eſtas eligenſe las proprias, è inmediatas de la coſa difinida, excluyendo las repugnantes, procediendo aſsi, haſta que ſe pueda formar oracion propria, coveniente à lo que ſe difine; v.g. en el hombre ſe inveſtiga el ſumo genero de ſu categoria, due ſerà Subſtancia, y eſte ſe nombra ſumo genero, de donde ſe deriva: dividiràſe, pues, la ſubſtancia en ſus diferencias, que ſon, corporea, è incorporea; y porque el ſe incorporeo repunga al hombre, eligeſe lo que le conviene, que es coproreo, y diràſe: El hombre es ſubtancia corporea; y porque no ſe conſigue la intima diferencia del hombre con ſolo ſer ſubſtancia corporea, paſſaſe à la inmediata diferencia de la parte corporea, que es, ſer animada, ò inanimada; y como lo inanimado repugna al hombre, eligeſe lo que le convience, que es ſer ſubſtancia corporea animada: mas como la animada puede fer ſenſible, è inſenſible; y lo inſenſible repunga al hombre, eligeſe lo que le compete, que es, ſer ſenſible, y diràſe, que es ſubſtancia corporea animada ſenſible; y como los ſenſitivos ſe diferencian en participes de razon, y en faltos de razon, y es repugnante al hombre carecer de razon; convienele ſer participe de razon, à cuya cauſa eligiràſe la diferencia intima que le compete, que es, ſer participe de razon; y de eſta diferencia, y del genero proximo inmediato, que es animal, ſe ſormarà la difinicion eſſencial por genero, y diferencia, hallada por la compſicion del Predicamento, ò categoria de la ſubſtancia, diſcurriendo por la linear recta del Predicamento, porque en las partes de la difinicion ſe debe obſervar tal orden, que primero ſe coloque el genero, y deſpues las diferencias, y entre las generals ſe elijan las menos generales, haſta hallar la mas intima à lo difinido. Y por eſte metodo ſe inveſtiga todo lo que admite difinicion eſſencial por genero, y diferencia, hallando lo proprio que compete à la difinicion, ſegun ha difinicion de la Difinicion, como ſe demonſtrarà en la ciencia de le Eſpada en ſu predicamento, ò categoria.

For the composition, the genus must be sought; and once found, it is divided by contrary differences, and from these the proper and immediate ones of the thing being defined are chosen, excluding the repugnant ones, proceeding in this way until a proper sentence can be formed, suitable to what is being defined; e.g. in man, the highest genus of his category is sought, which will be Substance, and this is called the highest genus, from which it is derived: therefore, the substance will be divided into its differences, which are, corporeal, and incorporeal; and because the incorporeal is repugnant to man, what suits him is chosen, which is corporeal, and it will be said: Man is a corporeal substance; and because the intimate difference of man is not achieved with only being a corporeal substance, one proceeds to the immediate difference of the corporeal part, which is, being animated, or inanimated; and as the inanimated is repugnant to man, what suits him is chosen, which is to be an animated corporeal substance: but as the animated can be sensible, or insensible; and the insensible is repugnant to man, what competes with him is chosen, which is, being sensible, and it will be said, that he is a sensible animated corporeal substance; and as the sensitives differ in participants of reason, and in those lacking reason, and it is repugnant to man to lack reason; it is convenient for him to be a participant of reason, for which reason the intimate difference that competes with him will be chosen, which is, being a participant of reason; and from this difference, and from the immediate proximate genus, which is animal, the essential definition by genus, and difference, found by the composition of the Predicament, or category of substance, will be formed, discoursing along the straight line of the Predicament, because in the parts of the definition such an order must be observed, that the genus is placed first, and then the differences, and among the general ones, the least general ones are chosen, until the most intimate to the defined is found. And by this method, everything that admits an essential definition by genus and difference is investigated, finding what properly competes with the definition, according to the definition of the Definition, as will be demonstrated in the science of the Sword in its predicament, or category.

En la Difinicion à cauſas ſe procede en la compoſicion, in quiriendo las que le ſon proprias al ſugeto difinido, y por ellas inveſtigando las intimas, haſta elegir la infima, diferencia, ò la propriſsima, que reſulta de cauſa, ò cauſas.

In creating a definition based on causes, you compose it by finding the properties that are unique to the subject being defined, investigating until you find the most specific or most intimate differences that result from the causes.

En la deſcripcion ſe inquieren los accidentes proprios del ſugeto, y por alguno propriſsimo, ò algunos que le equivalen, ſe deſcrive en ambito breve el ſugeto, ò coſa difinida: de tal ſuerte, que aquella deſcripcion enteramente no competa à otro ſugeto, ò coſa, ſin al que ſe difine, que por eſſo Porphryio dize, que el predicado ſtrictè proprio convenit omni ſoli, & ſemper, à que pueden aplicarſe los xemplares referidos.

When creating a descriptive definition, you examine the specific characteristics of the subject. You then describe the subject or the thing being defined in a brief scope using the most unique characteristic or a few equivalent ones. It is important that this description should not apply to any other subject or thing but only to what is being defined. That is why Porphyry says that the strictly proper predicate applies to every single one, and always. The examples mentioned earlier can be applied to this principle.

Mirando ſolo à lo preciſo de la Diviſion, procurarèmos ceñirnos à lo ineſcuſable de ſu inteligencia, omitiendo oſtentacion de diſputas, y opiniones varias de que ay tando dicho, que forma volumenes, eligiendo entre lo mucho eſcrito, lo ineſcuſable à neuſtro empeño, advirtiendo antes de la quiditativa dificinion de la Diviſion, que tomada eſta voz latamente, es homonima: y conſiderada en particular, diſtingueſe por enumeracion, y particion, à caufa de que la diviſion procede de diverſos generos del Todo, de que debe ſer la primera conſideracion, y diſputa.

Focusing solely on the essentials of Division, we will try to limit ourselves to what is necessary for its understanding, avoiding an ostentation of debates and various opinions of which so much has been said that it forms volumes. Among the vast writings, we choose what is inexcusably relevant to our task. But before we delve into the intrinsic definition of Division, note that this term, taken broadly, is homonymous. When considered in particular, it is distinguished by enumeration and partition, because division originates from various types of wholes, which should be the primary consideration and discussion.

Del Todo ay muchos generos, y de ellos, porque hazen à neuſtro intento, elegimos dos; vno, el que ſe nombra. Todo integro; ontro, el Todo vniverſal: Todo integro es aquel, que coſta de ſus partes integrales, como la caſa, que conſta de fundamentos, paredes, y techos, &c. y la Deſtreza, que incluye entera perſeccion: Todo vniverſal es el que ſe predica de ſus partes: como animal, que es todo vniverſal, reſpecto del hombre, leon, cavallo, &c. porque el hombre es animal, y el cavallo, y el leon.

There are many types of Wholes, and among them, because they serve our purpose, we select two: one, what is called a Whole Integral; the other, the Whole Universal. The Whole Integral is one that consists of its integral parts, like a house, which consists of foundations, walls, and roofs, etc., and Skill, which includes complete perfection. The Whole Universal is what is predicated of its parts: like an animal, which is a universal whole with respect to man, lion, horse, etc. because a man is an animal, and a horse, and a lion.

Entre eſtos dos generos de todo ſe hallan tres diferencias: la primer es, que el Todo integro, no ſe predica de ſus partes rectamente, porque ſerà falſo dizir, la pared es caſa, ò el fundamento es caſa: mas el Todo vniverſal predicaſe rectamente de ſus partes, como ſi ſe dize, el hombre es animal, ò el cavallo es animal, ò el leon es animal, que es veradera concluſion. La ſegunda diferencia eſtà en que el Todo integro es poſterior à ſus partes, y el Todo vniverſal es anterior. La tercera diferencia es, que el Todo integro, aunque perezca, pueden permanecer algundas de ſus partes, y en el Todo vniverſal ſe deſtruyen las partes, deſtruido el Todo.

Between these two types of wholes, there are three differences: the first is that the Whole Integral is not directly predicated of its parts, because it would be false to say, the wall is a house, or the foundation is a house. However, the Whole Universal is rightly predicated of its parts, as if one says, the man is an animal, or the horse is an animal, or the lion is an animal, which is a true conclusion. The second difference is that the Whole Integral is posterior to its parts, and the Whole Universal is anterior. The third difference is that the Whole Integral, even if it perishes, some of its parts can remain, while in the Whole Universal, the parts are destroyed when the Whole is destroyed.

Aſsi en la ciencia de la Eſpada, todo itnegro podrà llamarſe todo la Deſtreza, que ſe compone de diferentes partes integrales; mas porque en el Integro la difinicion podrà hazerſe por el Todo, y no por las partes rectamente; y en el Vnierſo podrà diferencias, que vàn referidas (que todas ſon aplicables à la ciencia de la Eſpada, que vulgarmente ſe nombra Deſtreza, que tanto neceſsita de diviſiones diſtributivas de lo mas general, y comun, à lo menos comun, y mas eſpecial) ſe reconocerà, que eſpecie de Diviſion es la particion, ò numeracion de grados, ò numeros, &c.

Thus, in the science of the Sword, the whole integral can be called the whole Skill, which is composed of different integral parts; but because in the Integral, the definition can be made by the Whole, and not by the parts rightly; and in the Universal, it can have differences, which are referred to (all are applicable to the science of the Sword, which is commonly named Skill, which needs so much of distributive divisions from the most general, and common, to the less common, and more special) it will be recognized, that the kind of Division is the partition, or enumeration of degrees, or numbers, etc.

Es la Diviſion en dos maneras, ò por el nombre, por la entidad, como Eſtocada, Tajo, Revès, que hazen diviſion por el nombre, y por la coſa, con el adjunto, que haze mas individual la Diviſion, conſtituyendola en infima eſpecie, como Tajo Vertical, Tajo Diagonal, Eſtocada de Quarto Circulo, que por el adjunto de la infima diferencia, no ſolo conſiguen la diferencia, que individualiza la eſpecie, de que reſulta, que la Diviſion ſe ſubdivide en los dos terminos, Nombre, y coſa, que ſe explican aſsi.

Division is in two ways, by name and by entity, like Thrust, Cut, Reverse, which make division by name, and by thing, with the addition, which makes the Division more individual, constituting it in the lowest species, like Vertical Cut, Diagonal Cut, Thrust of Quarter Circle, that by the addition of the lowest difference, they not only achieve the difference that individualizes the species, from which it results that the Division is subdivided into two terms, Name, and thing, which are explained thus.

Diviſion de nombre es, quando el nombre ſe demueſtra, que puede ſer en dos maneras; vna, quando la voz es homonima, y ſe diſtingue en ſus ſignificaciones, como Tajo, que ſin adjunto, es voz homonima, que incluye varias eſpecies de herida cortante, ſignificada con ſolo vn termino, ò nombre.

Division of name is, when the name is shown, which can be in two ways; one, when the voice is homonymous, and it is distinguished in its significations, like Cut, which without addition, is a homonymous voice, which includes various species of cutting wound, signified with only one term, or name.

Otra Diviſion ſe halla en la oracion amphibologica de el nombre, quando ſe diſtingue, y divide en ſus verdaderos ſentidos, como en el Oraculo Dephico, preguntado: Quomodò vincendum? Reſpondio: Haſtà Romanos, que puede ſignificar ſentidos contrarios, entendiendo, ò Ser los Romanos vencidos con lança, ò Ser con lança vencerdores: y en la ciencia de le Eſpada ſerà amphibologica, Tajo, A-tajo, que puede ſignificar tal oracion preceptos contrarios, como ſi ſe conſtruyen, dividiendo las ſignificaciones, podrà enterderſe Tajo la vna, y Atajo la otra: y ſi ſe hazen de vna ſignificacion, ſe enterderàn vn Tajo contra otro Tajo, colocandolas, diſiunta la A. y eſtas amphibologicas, que ſuelen cometerſe, ò por la falta de la explicacion, ò por afectar la brevedad, deben evitarſe en la ciencia de la Eſpada, en voz, y en eſcrito: y lo advertimos, por no omitir la explicacion entera en los termnios.

Another Division is found in the amphibolic sentence of the name, when it is distinguished and divided in its true senses, as in the Delphic Oracle, asked: Quomodò vincendum? Responded: Hasta Romanos, which can signify contrary senses, understanding, either ‘The Romans to be defeated with a spear,’ or ‘With a spear, the Romans are victors.’ And in the science of the Sword, Cut, Avoidance will be amphibolic, which can signify such a sentence contrary precepts, as if they are constructed, dividing the significations, one could understand Cut as one, and Avoidance as another: and if they are made of one signification, they will understand one Cut against another Cut, placing them, disjoining the A. And these amphibolic, which are usually committed, either for lack of explanation, or for affecting brevity, should be avoided in the science of the Sword, in voice, and in writing: and we point it out, so as not to omit the complete explanation in the terms.

Diviſion de la coſa es, quando ſe diſtribuye en ſus partes, que ſe comete en tres maneras: la primera, por Diviſion eſſencial: la ſegunda, por accidente: la tercera, por particion. Diviſion eſſencial ſubdivideſe en diviſion del genero, y en diviſion de la eſpecie por el genero, como Animal, que admite diviſion en hombre, y bruto; por la eſpecie, el hombre en Pedro, Juan, &c. el bruto, en leon, cavallo, &c. mas debe obſervarſe, que la diviſion del genero por diferencias, no es del todo diverſa de aquella, que ſe divide por eſpecie, porque à la verdad el genero, no ſe divide en diferencias, como en partes, ſino como en eſpecie por nombres de diferencias, como la diferencia de racional la de bruto, &c. de donde la diviſion miſma, que ſe haze del genero animal en hombre, y bruto, es la que conſtituye la diferencia de eſpecies.

Division of the thing is, when it is distributed in its parts, which is done in three ways: the first, by essential division: the second, by accident: the third, by partition. Essential division is subdivided into division of the genus, and division of the species by the genus, like Animal, which admits division into man, and brute; by the species, man into Peter, John, etc., the brute, into lion, horse, etc. However, it should be observed that the division of the genus by differences is not completely different from that which is divided by species, because in truth the genus is not divided into differences, as in parts, but as in species by names of differences, like the difference of rational, the one of brute, etc. Hence the very division, which is made of the genus animal into man, and brute, is the one that constitutes the difference of species.

A neuſtro intento reconcenſe tales diviſiones, cauſadas de la diſtribucion en partes, reſpectuando el genero à las eſpecies, como en los generos proximos, y remotos de las heridas, que Cuchillada mira al genero de las heridas cortantes, que por la fuerça de la diſtribucion, ſe dividen en eſpecies tambien genericas, y eſtas en ma infimas diferencias, que hazen mas individuales los ſignificados con los adjuntos, Vertical, Diagonal, &c.

For our purpose, such divisions are recognized, caused by the distribution in parts, respecting the genus to the species, as in the proximate and remote genera of wounds, that a Knife cut looks at the genus of cutting wounds, which by the force of distribution, are divided into also generic species, and these into the lowest differences, which make the meanings more individual with the additions, Vertical, Diagonal, etc.

Pruebaſe lo referido con dos razones; la primera, que en todo buena diviſion eſſencial, todo diviſo ſe ha de entedner, y repetir en las partes dividentes, como en los animales, vnos, que participan de razon; otros, que carecen de ella: luego el diviſo Genero Animal ſe ha de entender, y repetir en las partes dividentes; v.g. Animales, alguno es particpe de razon, alguno carace de razon. De donde el animal particip de razon, no ed ſolo diferencia, ſino la eſpecie miſma del hombre; y tambien animal careciente de razon, no es ſolo diferencia, ſino la eſpecie miſma del bruto, porque la diviſion del genero en eſpecies, por nombre de eſpecies, y otra por nombre de diferencias; y vna, y otra en vna eſſencialidad equivalente. La miſma razon milta en la ciencia de la Eſpada, como ſe ha demonſtrado en el exmplo antecedente, que por ſer tan claro, no ſe conduplica.

The above is proven with two reasons; the first is that in every good essential division, every divide must be understood, and repeated in the dividing parts, as in animals, some, who participate in reason; others, who lack it: then the divide Animal Genus must be understood, and repeated in the dividing parts; e.g., Some animals are partakers of reason, some lack reason. From where the animal participant of reason, is not only difference, but the very species of man; and also animal lacking reason, is not only difference, but the very species of the brute, because the division of the genus into species, by name of species, and another by name of differences; and one, and another in an equivalent essentiality. The same reason is valid in the science of the Sword, as has been demonstrated in the preceding example, which, being so clear, is not duplicated

La ſegunda razon es, que el Todo debe predicarſe de ſus parates dividentes, por eſſo no ſe predica de las diſerencias, como enſeño Ariſtoteles: luego la diviſion de animal en participe de razon, y careciente de razon, no es diviſion del generl en diferencias, ſino es en eſpecies por nombre de diferencias. De donde Boecio ſe moviò à dezir, que el Genero ſe ha de dividir en eſpecies por nombres de eſpecies, y no por nombres de diferencias.

The second reason is that the whole should be predicated of its dividing parts, therefore it is not predicated of differences, as Aristotle taught: hence, the division of an animal into those possessing reason, and those lacking it, is not a division of the general into differences, but it is in species by the name of differences. This is why Boethius was moved to say that the genus must be divided into species by the names of species, not by the names of differences.

A nueſtro intento notaſe, que la Diviſion eſſencial (que en otro modo ſuele llamarſe diviſion del genero) ſe nombra eſſencial, porque todo el diviſo es de eſſencia de partes Dividentes, como en el genero ſumo, Herida, en todas ſus partes diviſo, cauſa diviſion eſſencial en infimos generos de heridas, haſta las infimas eſpecies dellas.

For our purpose, note that the essential division (which in another way is usually called division of the genus) is called essential because the whole divided is of the essence of the dividing parts, as in the highest genus, ‘Wound’, in all its parts, it causes essential division into the lowest genera of wounds, to the most specific species of them.

La ſegun da diviſas eſſencial es por accidente, conſiderada da en tres maneras: la primera es del fugeto en accidentes, y en eſta todo el diviſo, ſugeto, y partes dividentes ſon accidentes; v.g. de los hombres, vnos ſon blancos, otros negros, otros, ni del todo blancos, ni del todo negros; y en eſte modo el fugeto, y partes admiten accidentes, no ſeparados de la eſſencialidad, como tambien en los movimientos accidentados, vnos ſon violentos, otros remiſos, otros medios entre remiſo, y violento, que podràn llamarſe naturales, y todos ſe admiten, y ſe dividen, ſin ſepararſe de ſu eſſencialidad.

The second essential division is by accident, considered in three ways: the first is from the subject to accidents, and in this all the divided, subject, and dividing parts are accidents; for example, of men, some are white, others are black, others are not entirely white, nor entirely black; and in this way, the subject and parts admit accidents, not separated from the essentiality, just as in accidental movements, some are violent, others are slow, others are between slow and violent, which can be called natural, and all are admitted and divided, without separating from their essentiality.

La ſegunda manera es Diviſion de accidentes en ſugeto, en que todo el diviſo es accidente, y las partes dividentes ſon ſugetos, v.g. los habitos del entendimiento, vnos eſtàn ſitos en el animo, otros inherentes en el cuerpo, en quanto ſus operaciones accidentadas; con que puede cauſarſe diviſion de accidentes en ſugetos, en que el diviſo puede ſer accidente, y las partes dividentes ſugetos, qual puede experimentar el Dieſtro en los accidentes del combate.

The second way is the division of accidents into subjects, in which all the divided is accident, and the dividing parts are subjects, for example, the habits of the mind, some are situated in the soul, others inherent in the body, as far as their accidental operations; so that a division of accidents into subjects can occur, in which the divided can be an accident, and the dividing parts subjects, which can be experienced by the expert in the accidents of combat.

La tercera manera es Diviſion de accidentè en accidentes, en que todo el diviſo, y partes dividentes ſon accidentes: como de las acciones, vna es erronea, otra es acertada, aquella por la ignorancia, eſta por el eſtudio, y exercicio, como en eſta cienca de la Eſpada, que obrando en el conflicto del combate por las acciones proprias, y contrarias, donde la diviſion es forçoſa de accidente en accidentes, ſiendo todo el diviſo, y partes dividentes accidentes; porque el combate ſe reduce à operaciones, que ſon accidentes, y eſtas operaciones, vnas ſe hazen con acierto, otras con error; las que ſon con acierto, reſultan de la inteligencia, y exercicio de la Eſpada; las que ſe yerran, cauſanſe de ignorar eſta ciencia, ò el arte; que de ella ſe produce, ò la experiencia con que ſe perficiona.

The third way is the division of accidents into accidents, in which all the divided, and dividing parts are accidents: as in the actions, one is erroneous, another is correct, the former due to ignorance, the latter due to study, and practice, as in this science of the Sword, that acting in the conflict of combat by its proper and contrary actions, where the division is forcibly from accident to accidents, being all the divided, and dividing parts accidents; because the combat is reduced to operations, which are accidents, and these operations, some are done correctly, others with error; those that are done correctly, result from the understanding, and practice of the Sword; those that are mistaken, are caused by ignorance of this science, or the art; which is produced from it, or the experience with which it is perfected.

La Diviſion por particion es dupla, conſiderando la vna de todo el integro en partes homogeneas, ò ſimilares, que admiten el nombre Todo; como quando el agua ſe divide en ſus partes, y el ayre en las ſuyas, que qualquiera parte es agua, y qualquiera parte de ayre es ayre, y qualquiera parte de movimiento es movimiento.

The division by partition is double, considering one of the whole integral into homogeneous, or similar parts, which admit the name Whole; as when water is divided into its parts, and air into its own, any part is water, and any part of air is air, and any part of movement is movement.

Otra Diviſion es por particion, y eſta ſe conſidera de todo el integro en partes etherogeneas (eſto es, diſsimilares) que por si no admiten nombre de Todo, como en la caſa diviſa en fundamentos, paredes, techo, &c. y la pared no es caſa, ni el fundamento es caſa, &c. y en la fabrica del cuerpo, el braço no es cabeça, &c. Aſsi en la ciencia de la Eſpada, que toda ſe compone de partes diſsimilares, como en eſpecies de movimientos del cuerpo, braço, y Eſpada, diſsimilares entre si, por ſus diviſiones, y diferencias, con tal proporcion reguladas, que juntas con las demàs partes, que concurren en los actos, perficionan eſta ciencia, que el vulgo llama Deſtreza.

Another division is by partition, and this is considered of the whole integral into heterogeneous parts (that is, dissimilar) which by themselves do not admit the name of Whole, as in the house divided into foundations, walls, roof, etc., and the wall is not a house, nor the foundation is a house, etc., and in the structure of the body, the arm is not the head, etc. Thus, in the science of the Sword, which is all composed of dissimilar parts, as in types of movements of the body, arm, and Sword, dissimilar among themselves, by their divisions, and differences, regulated with such proportion that, together with the other parts that contribute to the actions, they perfect this science, which the common people call Skill.

Para concluir lo que toca à la Diviſion ſacamos de lo mucho que ay eſcrito en tan dilatada materia, las reglas ſiguientes. Que la Diviſion ſe haga en partes propinquas, y no remotas, porque el animal no ſe divide en primer termino, en Pedro, Juan, &c, ò en cavallo, ò leon, &c. ni la herida en Tajo Diagonal, ò Vertical, &c. ſino que primeros es la diviſion de animal en hombre, y en bruto, y deſpues en ſus infimas diferencias, como herida en primer termino, ò genero, de corte, ò punta: en ſegunda de corte, en Cuchillada: en terceto Cuchillda, en Tajo, Revès, &c. y en la infima diferencia, Tajo Vertical, &c.

To conclude what pertains to the Division, we take from much that has been written on such a wide subject, the following rules. That the Division be made into nearby parts, and not distant ones, because the animal is not divided in the first term into Pedro, Juan, etc., or into horse, or lion, etc., nor the wound into Diagonal Cut, or Vertical, etc., but first is the division of animal into human, and into brute, and then into its lowest differences, as wound in the first term, or genus, of cut, or point: in the second of cut, into Slash: in the third Slash, into Cut, Reverse, etc. and in the lowest difference, Vertical Cut, etc.

Segnda regla, que como las partes dividentes, cada vna de por si tomadas, ſon menores, que el todo diviſo, v todas juntas colectas deben componer ſu todo; de la miſma ſuerte ſe han de aver con el integro diviſo, como todo el genero animcal diviſo en hombre, y bruto; porque hombre por si ſolo conſiderado, monos terminos es, que animal, y bruto; mas hombre, y bruto en coleccion recibenſe en el termino Animal, porque el termino Animal diviſo, ò es hombre, ò es brutol y qualquiera hombre, ò bruto es Animal: aſsi Cuchillada, ò es Tajo, ò es Revès; y Tajo, y Revès juntos, recibenſe en el termino generico Cuchillada, porque qualquier Tajo, ò Revès es Cuchillada.

The second rule is that, just as the dividing parts, each one taken by itself, are smaller than the whole divided, and all of them collected together should compose the whole, so it must be with the integral division, like the whole genre of animal divided into man and beast; because man considered by itself, has fewer terms than animal and beast; but man and beast in collection fall under the term Animal, because the term Animal divided, is either man or beast, and any man or beast is an Animal: similarly, a Sword-stroke, is either a Cut or a Reverse; and Cut and Reverse together, fall under the generic term Sword-stroke, because any Cut or Reverse is a Sword-stroke.

Tercera regla es, que las partes diviſas ſean opueſtas entre si, como la entidad, y la razon, que ſe oponen: v.g. Animal, vno hombre, otro bruto, que ſon opueſtos entre si, porque no cabe en vn ſugeto ſer hombre, y leon. Y en quanto à la razon, como las acciones, que vnas ſon honeſtas, otras vtiles, otras delectables, y ſe dividen en el genero accion; v.g. la exercitacion de las letras es honeſta, en quanto ſe mira como virtud; y ſiendo virtud, puede ſer vtil, en quanto aprovecha para conſeguir algun ſin vtil; y ſiendo honeſta, y vtil, puede lucir, y cauſar deleyte, como preuba el Philofopho. En la exercitacion de la Eſpada, en quanto à la razon, y en quanto à la entidad, las partes dividentes, ſon opueſtas entre si. En quanto à la razon, porque el entendimiento duivide theoricamente las acciones, para inveſtigar, en què ſe diſtinguen, y en què ſe opponen, conſiguiendo por tal diviſion ſu conocimiento por intimas, è infimas diferencias: y en quanto à la realidad, que ſe reduce à operacion efectiva, regula las partes dividentes, como la Eſtocada, el Tajo, el Revès, que ſon partes dividentes del genero Herida, y deſcendiendo à ſus intimas, y infimas diferencias, califica en què ſon opueſtos el Tajo al Revès, en què el Vertical al Diagonal, &c.

The third rule is that the dividing parts should be opposed to each other, as the entity and the reason that oppose each other: e.g., Animal, one is a man, the other a beast, which are opposed to each other, because it is not possible for a subject to be both man and lion. And in terms of reason, as with actions, some are honest, others useful, others enjoyable, and are divided into the genre action; e.g., the practice of letters is honest, insofar as it is considered a virtue; and being a virtue, it can be useful, as it helps to achieve some useful end; and being honest and useful, it can shine and cause delight, as proven by the Philosopher.In the practice of the Sword, in terms of reason and entity, the dividing parts are opposed to each other. In terms of reason, because the understanding theoretically divides actions to investigate in what they differ and in what they oppose, achieving through such division its knowledge by intimate and ultimate differences: and in terms of reality, which is reduced to effective operation, it regulates the dividing parts, like the Thrust, the Cut, the Reverse, which are dividing parts of the genre Wound, and descending to their intimate and ultimate differences, qualifies in what the Cut is opposed to the Reverse, in what the Vertical is to the Diagonal, etc.

Quarta regla, coligeſe de Ciceron, que dize, no convenir la parte colocada debaxo de vn Genero, con otra parte, que debaxo del Genero ſe coloque diviſa; eſto es, no convenir la parte dividente, que ſe contiene debaxo de vn Genero, debaxo de otra parte dividente: porque no ſerà buena diviſion de los animales, vno Hombre, otro Bruto, otro Leon; porque yà Leon ſe contiene debaxo de la parte dividente Bruto. Aſsi Platon enſeño, que la diviſion debe conſta de dos partes, porque ſi conſta de muchas ſe han de reducir à dos, por negacion, ò privacion, como en eſta diviſion de animales, vno terreſtres, otros aquaticos, otros volatiles, que ſe reducen à dos partes, por negacion, diſtinguiendo, ò es terreſtre, ò no es terreſtre; ò es aquatil, ò no es aquatil; ò es volatil, ò no es volatil; y eſta ſentencia ſigue Boecio, argumentando aſsi: La Diviſion debe hazerſe por partes opueſtas: ſon opueſtas? luego dos: luego la Diviſion debe conſtar de dos opueſtas partes. Mas Ariſtoteles parece, que reſuta eſta opinion, y con razon, formando dilatado diſurſo (que puede vèr el curioſo) bien, que ſe reduce à que ſi la Diviſion huvieſſe de conſtar de ſolas dos partes, reſultaria, que ſe multiplicaſſen las Diviſiones; v.g. la virtud ſe divide en juſticia, fortaleza, prudencia, &c. y por la doctrina de Boecio, neceſsitariaſe de multiplicar las diviſiones, diziendo: Juſticia? ſu opueſtro es injuſticia, y aſsi en las demàs, que cauſaria inconveniente laborioſo en la diviſion.

The fourth rule is inferred from Cicero, who says that it is not appropriate for a part placed under a Genus to agree with another part, which is placed under the Genus divided; this is, it is not appropriate for the dividing part, which is contained under a Genus, to agree with another dividing part: because it will not be a good division of animals, one Human, another Beast, another Lion; because Lion is already contained under the dividing part Beast. Thus, Plato taught that the division should consist of two parts, because if it consists of many parts they have to be reduced to two, by negation, or privation, as in this division of animals, some terrestrial, others aquatic, others flying, which are reduced to two parts, by negation, distinguishing, either it is terrestrial, or it is not terrestrial; either it is aquatic, or it is not aquatic; either it is flying, or it is not flying; and Boethius follows this sentence, arguing thus: The Division must be made by opposite parts: are they opposite? then two: then the Division must consist of two opposite parts. But Aristotle seems to refute this opinion, and rightly so, forming a broad discourse (which the curious can see), that if the Division had to consist of only two parts, it would result in the multiplication of the Divisions; e.g., virtue is divided into justice, strength, prudence, etc., and by Boethius’s doctrine, it would necessitate multiplying the divisions, saying: Justice? its opposite is injustice, and so on in the others, which would cause inconvenient laboriousness in the division.

No es forçoſo, ni neceſſario reducir la Diviſion à ſolas dos partes opueſtas, como lleva Boecio; pues ſu opinion ſe peude entender, y ſalvar con el termino Repugnancia, aunque las eſpecies ſean muchas, y diferentes entre si, como en los brutos, leon, cavallo, toro &c. cuyas eſpecies, por la repugnancia, ſe dividen ſin la negacion, como ſe colige de la doctrina de Ariſtoteles, que ſeguimos en la cienca de la Eſpada, donde el Genero Herida ſe divide en varias diferencias, que ſe dividen por el termino Repugnancia, como el Tajo, y el Revès en ſus infimas eſpecies. Lo miſmo en los movimienitos, en las proſturas, &c. que ſin inconveniente ſe dividen por ſu repugnancia, ſin recurrir à la negacion, ò doc ſingulares opueſtos; con lo qual avemos procurado ceñir lo que toca à la Divinicion, y Diviſion, ſu inteligencia, y preceptos en lo perteneciente à la ciencia de la Eſpada, pondiendo para mas claridad, no ſolamente exemplos Philoſopicos, ſino propprios deſta miſma ciencia, juzgando, que aſsi mas demonſtrablemente con vnos, y otros, el diſurſo comprehenderà, que en efte exercicio tienen lugar, y ſon forçoſos los preceptos de ciencia: y con tales fundamentos vendrèmos à las demonſtraciones, y argumentos topicos, y mathematicos, que produciràn lo probable, y lo evidente de la inteligencia, y exercicio de la Eſpada, que vulgarmente ſe llama Deſtreza, y al que la conſigue, Dieſtro; y acomodandonos à lo mas comun, vſarèmos, en muchas partes los miſmos terminos, Deſtreza, y Dieſtro, y paſſarèmos con tal advertencia à la explicacion de las vozes, que nombran Vniverſals, ò Predicables.

It is not obligatory, nor necessary to reduce the Division to only two opposite parts, as Boethius implies; for his opinion can be understood and saved with the term Repugnance, even if the species are many and different from each other, as in beasts, lion, horse, bull, etc. These species, due to their repugnance, are divided without the need for negation, as can be inferred from the doctrine of Aristotle, which we follow in the science of the Sword, where the Genus Injury is divided into various differences, which are divided by the term Repugnance, such as the Cut and the Reverse in their lowest species. The same in movements, in postures, etc. which can be divided by their repugnance without inconvenience, without resorting to negation, or to two singular opposites; with which we have sought to encompass what pertains to the Division, its understanding, and precepts in relation to the science of the Sword, providing for greater clarity, not only philosophical examples, but ones specific to this very science, judging that in this way, more demonstrably with both, the discourse will comprehend, that in this exercise the precepts of science have a place and are necessary: and with such foundations we will come to the demonstrations, and topical and mathematical arguments, which will produce what is probable, and the evident from the understanding, and exercise of the Sword, which is commonly called Skill, and to the one who achieves it, Skilled; and accommodating ourselves to the most common, we will use, in many parts the same terms, Skill, and Skilled, and we will pass with such attention to the explanation of the words, that name Universals, or Predicables.