The modern Philosophers, with obscure knowledge, insist on the division of sciences, which concern the handling of weapons, in the preliminary questions of Logic, and Metaphysics, investigating as to the universal, its antiquity, properties, and distinction, which Aristotle, Saint Thomas, Saint Isidore, Hugo de Sancto Victore, along with the stream of Logicians, and Metaphysicians deal with, and with special curiosity Julius Caesar Scaliger, and Eugubino.

Regarding the antiquity of sciences; some want them to be derived from Adam, passed on by traditions, rather than in writing, thus passing from one age to another, to the Greeks, and from these to our times. Others, with Eusebius Berossus, and Josephus admit that the first sciences were derived from Adam, and later concede various inventors, as reported by Polydore Virgil.

Regarding the discourse and reason (in which the philosophers do not disagree), it is inherent to man, that his understanding is like a blank slate, in which nothing is shaped, because he is born without any knowledge; although, with the propensity to know, the desire being more insistent for the necessary, or for the useful: the former, which moves, not only for comfort, but for reason: and the latter, for self-interest.

Both are the origin of sciences, with speculation being first, from which the speculative or theoretical terms resulted, whose end is the contemplation of the truth: and from this first consideration, the active, or practical ones were produced, which have their proper end in the work itself.

These are subdivided into two more adequate terms, because the active ones guide the actions that are in the same potential agent, on the part of intelligence: and the practical, or effective ones, guide the operations that are external, or outside the same potential agent, because they pass to extrinsic works, like playing instruments, etc. from where Aristotle concluded, that sciences, some are contemplative, others active: those effective, by means of which man with understanding recognizes, perfects, and guides actions, preparing in himself what is necessary: these, by which in effect pass to the extrinsic operation.

The strictly philosophical divide contemplative science into Metaphysics, which focuses on the spiritual and the common being; Physics, which deals with the sensible, such as humans, etc., and Mathematics, which looks at quantity, subdivided into continuous and discrete: continuous by Geometry, discrete by Arithmetic. Astrology, which contemplates the number, movements, and magnitude of the Heavens; Music, the number, proportion, and harmony; Perspective, the visual lines that distinguish the various ways of seeing, due to the varying position of objects. These are more accurately mathematical means rather than proper mathematical sciences: hence, they can be reduced to Physics, these four species, Astrology, Geography, Music, and Perspective, which originate from Geometry and Arithmetic, just as to Metaphysics are reduced the speculative, active sciences, which direct interior actions, such as Logic, and Dialectics: and those that touch on Moral Philosophy, widely discussed by Aristotle in his Ethics and Politics.

From these common principles, as parts of the active sciences, resulted the Arts, which distinguish humans in the common animal genus (as touched on by Pedro Gregorio) directing towards the necessary and useful in human society, either by voice, by letters, or by works: by voice, by the congruous means of words in various languages, which explain concepts: by letters, in Rhetorical and Oratorical eloquence, either for permanence in writings, or for communication with the absent, letters being elements that, in right arrangement, stand for words, forming syllables, dictions, periods, etc., from which History and Poetry, etc. achieve perfection. For these works, philosophers classify the seven liberal and noble arts, which are included in the common Latin verse:

Lingua, Tropus, Ratio, Numerus, Tonus, Angulus, Astra.

Lingua, signifies Grammar: Tropus, Rhetoric: Ratio, Logic: Numerus, Arithmetic: Tonus, Music: Angulus, Geometry: Astra, Astrology.

The first three, which are called trivium or trivial, look at and are directed to eloquence, and explanation of concepts.

The last four (which are the quadrivium) are directed to continuous and discrete quantity, and all seven earn the reputation of Liberal arts and science.

To these, the Logicians add another seven Arts, which they call servile, included in this verse:

Rus, Nemus, Arma, Faber, Vulnera, Lana, Rates.

Rus signifies Agriculture: Nemus, the Hunt, or Art of Hunting: Arma, Arms: Faber, Architecture: Vulnera, Surgery: Lana, Woolwork, or Art of Weaving: Rates, Navigation.

They tend to call these Arts servile, because they serve the body, just as the Liberal ones serve the soul: and both are considered worthy in a noble person: and to both, they add the mechanical arts, which are the operators in different species, widely and specifically discussed by the Philosopher.

Those who materially look at the term Arms, like Friar Pedro de Oña in his Logic, and other moderns, understand by the term Arms the Gladiator, or Laniſta Art, which they judge to be the skill of the Sword, without considering that the term Arms is a material generic, and not specific, as will be proven in its place, demonstrating that the understanding and exercise of the instrument named Sword is not only a Liberal Art, but also a science; making use of Logic, as the science of sciences, for being the investigator of the true and the false, as Boethius and Saint Thomas teach, and all the current philosophers; although some moderns, like Fathers Pereyra and Fonseca, want the investigation of sciences to touch on Metaphysics, because the metaphysician is like a craftsman, from where the investigation is consequently. But in this part, we follow the most received opinion of Boethius and Saint Thomas, and others, with Averroes, who calls Logic, the common instrument of all sciences. But the dispute here is not about that, but whether it is a science or art, and what kind, the understanding and exercise of the Sword.

Proceeding, therefore, radically, we consider the cognitive powers, which Celio Rodiginio named (taking the term from pure Greek) in science, art, and experience, recognizing them as analogous to each other, and all three species are proper to the understanding and exercise of the Sword, as will be demonstrated in these discourses.

Aristotle teaches that to discourse in the sciences, above all things, one must distinguish the equivocal terms, thus avoiding confusion in the terms, because the division of the sciences is recognized by the variety of instruments, and ways of knowing; that is, by the organs and means by which science is acquired, reasoning by topical places, by demonstration, to cause and effect, or vice versa. Where it is argued in the understanding, and exercise of the instrument Sword, it is also investigated by the same means: therefore, the understanding and exercise of the Sword is a science: the major premise is proven, because in the conclusion, the terms are Syncategorematic (that is, as Saint Thomas explains) consignificant, which are imprinted in the mind, in relation to the instruments and organs. The minor premise is noted: then the consequence is valid. To clarify further: the science of the Sword is distinguished in Docens (Teaching) and Vtens (Using), that is, intellectual and practicing. The teaching, which is Docens, is separated from the things, as intelligence is. The Vtens, or practicing, is that which is joined with the instruments. Therefore, the science of the Sword is both teaching and practicing; teaching, that is in Docens: and practicing, that is in Vtens.

Although in this division it seems that there is a place for the difficulty that philosophers present, noting that one dividing member is not formally whole of a division because one thing is not another. Then one dividing member is not formally the other, as Saint Thomas, Cajetan, Scotus, and Scaliger prove with effective reasons. Valduíno makes the example in Logic, by the division of Docens (Teaching) and Vtens (Using); and understands by Docens, that which measures; and by Vtens, that which is measured. From which it appears that the understanding of the instrument Sword, as far as it is Docens, can be a science, because it is measuring; but the practicing, which is Vtens, will be art, because it is measured.

But the difficulty is answered, that the understanding, and the demonstration, which is the same as Docens and Vtens, are one single acquisition, knowing by different organs, which are in themselves integral in a subject, as from Logic by Platonic doctrine, it is considered to be the first of all sciences, because it makes, reasons, and argues about the being, and the subject; the being and the subject are one aim, or final object: then Logic as Vtens, as well as Docens, is one single science; and the same consequence results in the understanding, and exercise of the instrument Sword, which is Docens and Vtens

But for the purpose, I argue thus: Science is a habit of the intellectual power, which considers the subject in its entirety: the understanding, and exercise of the Sword is a habit of the intellectual power, which considers the subject in its entirety; therefore, it is a science.

But I argue more clearly thus: That faculty is proper science, in which two requirements concur; one, that by certain, and first principles (certain, and evident) known, the terms are known; another, that from such knowledge certain, or evident conclusions are inferred, by certain, or evident consequences. In the understanding, and exercise of the Sword, then, such requirements concur, so strongly, that they are by themselves manifest to the understanding, because with its explained terms (without other proof) the understanding assents to the certainty of the conclusion, by the certainty of the consequences; from where a certain evident habit of necessary thing is caused by its known causes: therefore, the understanding, and exercise of the Sword is properly science.

A more evident argument is as follows: That faculty is a proper science in which two requisites concur; one, that through certain and primary principles (which are certain and evident), the terms are known; another, that from such knowledge certain or evident conclusions are inferred by certain or evident consequences. In the understanding and practice of the Sword, these requisites concur in such a way that they are manifest to the understanding by themselves, because with its explained terms (without other proof) the understanding assents to the certainty of the conclusion, by the certainty of the consequences; from where a certain habit is caused, evident of a necessary thing by its known causes: therefore, the understanding and practice of the Sword is properly a science.

Let the minor of this argument be a corollary: that is certain, or evident knowledge of necessary thing, investigated by its causes, which is acquired by mathematical demonstration. The understanding, and exercise of the Sword, then, is investigated by causes with mathematical demonstration: therefore, it is science, as a habit that is produced evident of necessary thing, investigated by its causes.

This is confirmed because the understanding and exercise of the Sword, as far as it is a teacher (Docens), mathematically demonstrates that it cannot have a true antecedent and a false consequence, although the topical syllogism produces opinion, and the sophistical error. In the mathematical argument, then, whether it is a problem or theorem, no fallacy is admitted, because its proof is demonstrative, and not by tropics and sophistics: therefore, the understanding and exercise of the Sword is a science that admits evidence.

From the perspective of the object (which is man in his entirety, and in his parts) understanding, and acting with movements known by their causes, from which the understanding and practice of the Sword demonstrate inherent passions, it is also proven to be science, as it clearly results from the common doctrines of Aristotle, Saint Thomas, Boethius, Cleanthes, Rodigino, and the Arabs; Algazel, and Alpharab, and others, proving, that Logic is science, and part of Philosophy, for the same reasons, which occur in the understanding and practice of the Sword.

Nevertheless, there are such sophistic minds that strive to assert that the understanding and practice of the Sword is not science, but Gladiatorial Art, and they argue thus

By the principles of secondary intentions, neither knowledge is given nor acquired. The understanding and exercise of the Sword are principles of secondary intentions: hence, the understanding and exercise of the Sword is not science, but Gladiatorial Art. This is demonstrated by the fact that the use of a thing is not the same thing, nor the use of the operation, but the operation itself: thus, neither will the use of science be science, and consequently, the exercise of the Sword, which is Vtens, will not be science. Moreover, the understanding and exercise of the Sword are reduced to the use of a physical instrument, to demonstrate the passions of the subject; and what is the principal cause (which is the instrument) is the one to produce science or art: then the understanding and exercise of the Sword (which is the causal instrument) is not science, but Gladiatorial Art. Furthermore, they justify themselves, assuming that between the principal agent and the instrument, which produces a similar effect, thus in the species (which is the instrumental), in truth it is not the same in the effect, which simulates the principal agent, to whom it should simulate, not the instrument. For example: it is explained in the generative power, which generates man, which is similar, not to the same generative power (which is instrumental), the same is seen in the artificial, because the statue is not similar to the saw, nor to the hammer (which are instruments), but it is only the likeness of the existing art, which was in the mind of the Craftsman, from where it is argued thus.

Science is according to the act of the scientist, chosen for the same science by its principle, which generates science. The Sword, then, is the chosen instrument, which instrumentally demonstrates its effect: therefore, its understanding and exercise is not science, nor can it generate it, much less in its own instrumental exercise.

The term Arms; which is generic; includes, and encompasses all species of its genus; and the term Arms is not of the seven Liberal Arts, but of the seven servile; and thus the Logicians, by the term Arms, understand the Gladiatorial, as carried by Oña, and others. The understanding and exercise of the Sword is a species of Arms, included and understood in its genus: therefore, it is not science, but Art of the servile, and not of the Liberal.

In these five acumen, many others are compiled, which are gathered from various writings and opinions, both of logicians and those who discuss what is commonly and vulgarly called Destreza or Fencing, which logicians reduce to the term Arms, not to its proper meaning, but to the Gladiatorial Art, where they are clearly deceived, as will be proved in its place, first responding to the aforementioned contrary arguments, which are the most sophistical and subtle of all I have read and communicated.

To respond more clearly, it is noted by the doctrine of Scotus that science is acquired by any adequate method, which is a means of knowing. Thus, the same Doctor resolves that Logic is called science because it commonly teaches and can be applied to various things, through which it reasons, argues, and proves; because the way of knowing can be common in application. Assuming this, we respond against the first contrary argument, denying the lesser, and saying that the understanding and exercise of the Sword is not acquired by the principles of second intentions, but by the radical causes teaching and practicing (which is the same as Docens and Vtens) that are adequate means of science. The understanding and exercise of the Sword, then, are not principles of instrumental second intentions, but of first radical causes, which are adequate means of knowing, Docens, and Vtens: therefore, the understanding and exercise of the Sword, Docens, and Vtens, is science and not Gladiatorial Art. Along the way, it is noted with the Philosopher Alexander, and others, that Lemus refers to, that before all things, in any science it is absurd not to first know what is the method with which one proceeds in it, to which cause it was shown at the beginning of this discourse, and its place will be demonstrated.

The major premise of the second argument is false, understanding it universally, because the natural entity (e.g., man) says a greater entity than that of its material cause, as Father Oña concedes because it is a perfect entity in its own species, as is also the object in the material cause of science, being matter about which science is exercised, from which it is not inconvenient, that science exceeds the entity in operation. The understanding and exercise, with which it is not the same operation: then it is science the understanding and exercise of the Sword, because it is Docens, as well as Vtens.

For further clarity, it is noted that the true and proper object by itself, although it does not cause science (because it does not influence it, but the science in the object) but says that the object is the cause of science, because it is specified by intrinsic order, for any knowledge (in a certain way) is measured by the known object, because it is the adequation of the object by the understanding, as philosophers feel: therefore, it is not absurd, that from such a cause, and measure of lesser entity is measured (in a certain way) the greater entity, and with this distinction, it is easily recognized, that although the understanding and exercise of the instrument Sword (for being an object) by itself does not cause science, because it does not influence it, but the science in the object; but it will be said that it is the cause of science, which is specified by intrinsic order; for any knowledge (in a certain way) is measured by the known object with which it is adequate: therefore, it is not inconvenient, that from the material object (which is of lesser entity) is caused science in the understanding (which is of greater entity) with which all the sophistry of the second contrary argument is convinced.

To the third, it is responded that the scientific act is resolved to be in it some principle by itself noted (as is common in all science) so in the understanding, and exercise of the Sword will be the first principle by itself noted the same instrument Sword, and its knowledge will be its first principle by itself known; however, the Sword will not be the same science, since the physical instrument does not fall under the scientific habit; because the knowledge of the instrumental principles does not fall under the scientific habit, as this does not need another regulating instrument but regulated. The instrument Sword is, then, the regulated instrument of the understanding and exercise of man, the main subject capable of science, to which only the Sword is a causal instrument, with which the passions of the subject are demonstrated, which is Docens, and Vtens: therefore, the understanding and exercise of the Sword (which is the instrument) although it is causal, as it has been said, is science, and not Gladiatorial Art.

In response to the entire apparatus and syllogism of the fourth opposing argument, a distinction is made between the instrument with which the effect is performed and the first agent (which is the science that regulates the same operation). From this, it follows that science is not just the act of the scientist, but the very science, in the likeness of which the act is directed and the instrument is chosen. The Sword, although it is the chosen instrument with which the first agent instrumentally directs and performs the effect, is not, however, the same science, nor similar to it, just as the saw or the hammer is not similar to the science existing in the idea of the scientific agent. Therefore, the understanding and exercise of the Sword, moved and directed by the understanding, arm, and hand of the scientific agent, is science, because science is not regulated by the act or the instrument, but the instrument and the act are regulated by the science.

The fifth contrary argument is answered conclusively by distinguishing the term Weapons, which is generic in terms of the pieces that make up all Military Weapons, as widely and skillfully demonstrated by Pedro Gregorio Tolosano; and specifically those corresponding to the Gladio, or Sword. In this regard, in terms of the manufacture of all weapon pieces, their species are included in their generic category Weapons, and their manufacture is indeed an art, and one of the seven servile arts; but for that reason, the term of the same Weapons, nor the Gladiatoria, as poorly explained by Father Oña, speaking like a pure scholar, but not as a military scientist. The same absurdity is confirmed in the term Rates, by which the same Author (and others who follow him) understood the Art of Navigation, erring in the lack of knowledge; because the term Rates, as a generic, only includes the species of Vessels, whose manufacture is one of the servile arts; but for that reason it does not include the science of navigation, which in itself is the most scientific part of Cosmography, which is subordinate (to what the common misunderstanding calls the Art of Navigation), being, as it is, a most noble science because of its causes. The understanding and exercise of the Sword, then, is not of the manufacture of the Weapon instrument, but of the science acquired in the understanding and exercise of the agent subject: therefore, it is a science, and not one of the seven servile arts; rather, it is the most noble science, as proven by the following reasons.

Firstly, because that science is most noble which is desirable for its own sake, like the Ethical, or Moral sciences, because they direct towards virtues; the Political, Economic sciences, because they direct towards the perfection of sociable life; and Medicine towards the health of man, etc. as can be inferred from the teachings of the Philosopher, and Saint Thomas, and many others: therefore, the understanding of the instrument Sword is desirable for its own sake due to the qualities referred to in the previous discourses, and those that any average intellect recognizes: therefore, it is a most noble science.

Sciences are also characterized by their subjects, and the subject of the understanding and exercise of the Sword is most noble, because it is man known in his entirety, and in his parts, and movements by power, and practiced act: therefore, the understanding and exercise of the Sword is a most noble science by the subject. Similarly, sciences are characterized by their own end. The understanding and exercise of the Sword, therefore, has its own end in defense and offense in man: therefore, it is the most noble science for its own end to which it is directed.

The certainty of the means with which an argument is made and knowledge is acquired is a great qualifier in sciences, as the Mathematics are estimable, and most noble because of the certainty of the means with which they argue and demonstrably prove, as philosophers concede. Therefore, the understanding and exercise of the Sword argues, acquires, and proves its knowledge by means of mathematical demonstrations: therefore, it is a most noble science because of the certainty of its means.

That science, as Aristotle says, is more qualified in its totality, which teaches the subject and object more intimately, and demonstrates its effect with greater certainty, than the one that only teaches the object to exist; but not being so demonstrable in its effects, as the Philosopher concludes. Therefore, the understanding and exercise of the Sword both teaches and demonstrates with certainty the subject, object, and their effects: therefore, it is one of the most noble and qualified sciences in its totality.

As a corollary of such a maxim, the same Philosopher considers the science that most infallibly manifests its certainty, like Geometry, Arithmetic, and Music, to be superior in its totality. Therefore, in the understanding and exercise of the Sword, the same demonstrations occur, because Geometry, Arithmetic, and proportions are subordinate to it: therefore, it is one of the most superior sciences in its totality

I avoid ostentatiously adorning this point, due to the brevity with which I proceed; however, it should not be omitted whether the understanding and exercise of the Sword is one science, or diverse. It can be proved that it is one science, in which Aristotle’s definition is admitted, to which I adhere, with the most concordant of his Expositors, saying: That is one science, which is of a single genus, and which is composed of its first principles in its parts and effects considered by themselves. The understanding and exercise of the Sword is of a single genus, which is composed of its first principles in its parts and effects considered by themselves: therefore, it is one science, and not diverse sciences.

The consequence is proved: The diversity of sciences is in the diversity of genres, and of their first principles, and in that the first principles of one are not demonstrated by the first principles of the other (as is inferred from the same text of the Philosopher) and the principles, when in themselves are diverse in the demonstrable to which they are directed, are not of the same genus: and they are of a genus, when they demonstrate it by themselves: although there may be many demonstrations of a same genus, but not by means of an order, but by means of diverse orders, as everything is looked at under one reason, Sub qua, as the Commentators of Aristotle widely explain, most of them, and those of most authority, agree on these principles. From which it follows that the unity of science is considered in three ways, either generic, or specific, or numeric, as Master Zumèl discusses, with the common current of the Logicians, with whom I say:

Generic is a science, with respect to the union in the same genus, although from distinct and diverse parts; even though they differ in essence and nature, they agree in the definition of the superior. Exempli gratia: Man and Lion (whose common reason is the comprehensive definition of Animal) are one genus, in as much as they are of the same reason; but such generic unity, although in the union of the genus is one science, is not therefore in the species; because it is called specific unity in the science, whose definition is proper, and adequate to a common essence of nature; so, they only differ in accidents, as Porphyry taught in the example of many men, who by the participation of one species are defined by one man in relation to it; and this in as much as the species is one specific science.

Numeric is that science, which according to some singular thing (although it is diverse in itself, and can be in any other singular thing) as in its entirety can be considered one, looks at diversity, according to a formal reason, as in the collection of numbers, whose sum is one, indivisible in itself, because the whole is no more, nor less, than the collected numbers; even though in another singular thing it can be considered division (as in the parts, or numbers of which it is composed) but not in the collection itself, which in it will always be one, with respect to Numeric science; and so in other considerations, as results from the doctrine of the Philosopher, who considers Grammar a science, although it is a collection of many voices. In the broad sense, all agree in one reason, which includes the mode of proceeding by demonstration, although by different modes of arguing: therefore, in as much as the understanding and reason in which they agree, demonstrating all the sciences, they unite among themselves: therefore, it can be said that they are one science in this consideration, as Mirandulano admits.

To our purpose, following the teachings of the Philosopher, Saint Thomas, Scotus, Zumel, and others, we will maintain that the truth and unity of science result from the abstraction of the object, which is acquired by the habit, which they call Scientific; and this, is not only achieved by the reason and species of the object, but requires facility and ability on the part of the acting power, to properly arrange the species to judge correctly by the ordered demonstration, as is required in the understanding and exercise of the instrument Sword, which being one science, needs facility and ability on the part of the acting power (which is the scientific man) to arrange the species for correct judgment, by the ordered demonstration in offense and defense, by a demonstrable science.

Those not very versed in Philosophy, presuming by sharpness of intellect, find it difficult to concede the life of science in the understanding and exercise of the Sword: and they say, that this is a material instrument of different genus, species, and number, than man: and so, the understanding and exercise of the Sword is not one science, with respect to man, and with respect to the instrument.

This enthymematic argument in appearance, the common people find it effective, but it is very fallacious, and sophistical, noting what the Philosophers call intention, and extension, in which Aristotle, and his Glossographers discourse, concluding, that intention is the power, or active quality in a subject individual, or compound, as in our purpose it is man with the Sword in hand, which for the understanding and exercise is a compound only the man armed with the weapon Sword.

And as the Father Oña shows, by intention the Philosophers understand, when in a subject, or part of it there is some quality, as heat, or movement: and extension, when the heat, or movement extend in another part. Exempli gratia, extension is when degrees of facility, or movement, are added with respect to another common consequent, as is the instrument Sword in the hand of man, who governs, and moves it, from where science is communicable, as in a whole heterogeneous, whose similar parts are degrees of facility, with respect to a same conclusion; and dissimilar, with respect to different conclusions, which nonetheless are called parts of a species, or of a compound, as is given in intelligence, as in movements, which look with diversity to an end, and understanding regulates them by a reason: thus the man with the Sword in hand should be considered, whose movements are governed by a single active power, which acquires, and works in understanding, and exercise with a single science, and extensive movement: Ergo habemus intentum.

Intellectual habits, unlike simple qualities (like a point), have different components and therefore are considered complex. This is because, instead of being confined to a single individual or matter like the human body, these habits involve a complex interplay of factors, enabling more flexibility and scope in our actions, whether towards a single conclusion or multiple ones. These actions don’t precede the act itself; instead, they are the product of the act. For instance, in using a sword, the intelligence and practice involved determine the outcome, whether it’s a single wound (a conclusion) or multiple ones. The actions aren’t produced before the act; they’re produced by the act itself. Thus, the ease of one action over another falls under the same category because they all stem from the same reasoning, embedded in a scientific principle or active power.

Nevertheless, as a crowning of this discourse, it remains to see whether this science of understanding, and exercise of the Sword, insofar as it looks at its object, is a real being, or a being of reason.

According to philosophers like Aristotle, Saint Thomas, Scotus, Durandus, and others, the concept of being can be divided into four types: substantial (the most perfect), accidental (less perfect), generative, and negational or lacking. All four types can be understood through reason. Aristotle further clarified that being can be real or existent in the mind. The latter is conceptual or rational, while the former is physical reality. In simpler terms, a being of reason refers to knowledge we gain through understanding, whereas a real being denotes the actual, physical manifestation of truth according to science.

Assuming so, avoiding controversies, and questions, in which Logicians, and Metaphysicians dilate, the following conclusions are formed to the purpose. The object specifies, and terminates the science: the understanding, and exercise of the Sword is a real object, for being the same Sword governed correctly: therefore its being is a real being, and not only a being of reason, because it is not limited to its term.

Demonstrable understanding is the greatest physical perfection of science, and thus is a real being: the understanding, and exercise of the Sword is demonstrable mathematically, because Mathematics is subordinate to it: therefore it is a real being.

Real science involves specific changes in the subject it’s studying. For example, the visual ability at a particular distance can accurately identify color and shape. In the same way, the skill and understanding of using a sword can be considered real science as it involves specific actions in relation to the object (the sword). So, the knowledge and practice of using the sword is a genuine entity. I’ve kept these discussions brief, and could have added more detail, enough to fill a book. But, I’m satisfied with showing that the understanding and practice of using the sword is a notable science in its own right. It’s unique, specialized, provable, and valuable both for its own sake and for the object it studies, which is a real entity