This knowledge is achieved by two means of investigating and proving, one Philosophical, and the other Mathematical. The Philosophical is by reasoning and entities, and it will be said with the Philosopher: Demonstration is a syllogism, which consists of true principles immediate to primitive knowledge, from whose causes the conclusion originates. The Mathematical is by evidence, which results from the arguments, Problem, and Theorem, as means of demonstration, as Clavius ​​proved.

These definitions are understood by Logicians and Mathematicians, both in the term Science, and in that of Demonstration: agreeing that there is a certain apparatus that precedes, to which the name of Prenotion is given, which is that antecedent knowledge of the parts of the Demonstration, considered before the distinct formality.

Prenotion is divided into that which exists in the nature of things, and that which is part of the Demonstration: and both are acquired by two means, which are acquired by real entity, or by Mathematical entity. In the first way, reasoning works by discourse, and syllogism, enthymeme, dilemma, etc., constituted in their figures, forming propositions, premises that Dialectics call Major and Minor, from which the consequence results. In the second, the demonstration of what is perceived by Mathematical entity is achieved, either by Problem, or in Theorem, which precisely makes infallible the external knowledge of the Mathematical entity.

Through both means, argumentation and proof are applied in this Science, as will be seen in the second Book, where the theoretical is reduced to practical, distinguishing the propositions of Tactics, and wounds, some of which can be theorems (demonstrating themselves as infallible) and others problematic (which are understood as possible) and in these contingency takes place, not on the part of the proposition, but of the operation: noting that in one way or another, a demonstration is not perfect that does not have evident certainty in its genus and species, because only demonstration is given of what is necessary, or evident.

Given the above, it is a common question in Schools whether First principles are science, and if they are, on what are they based? The Philosopher’s sentence resolves this, The first principles are known first, and more than the conclusion. From the reason the consequence is deduced, because the Conclusion in the Demonstration must be known, and evident, and produced from antecedent principles: therefore, the First principles are known more, and before the conclusion.

For further clarity, it is assumed that the term Science, is admitted variously by the Philosophers, saying Being that certain knowledge, which the understanding acquires by necessary means. In this way, knowledge through first principles can be called Science: in another it will be when the certain knowledge of the conclusion is acquired by Demonstration, although in this strictly it is not acquired by science in the Schools, but by intelligence, as the Conimbricenses, and Louvanists argue.

From such opinions arises the inquiry, in what way is the knowledge of the First principles generated in the understanding? To this difficulty, the Platonists respond, that such knowledge is in man, as inherent by nature, because (as Plato himself suggests) the rational soul was created with the knowledge of the essential first principles. Aristotle, and with him all the Peripatetics, oppose the Platonists, affirming, that the rational soul at the beginning of its creation, is like a blank slate, on which nothing is painted, from where they induce, that the knowledge of the First principles is acquired by man by induction from the sense, passing to memory, and from repeated memory to experience, and from experience to indubitable knowledge, originating from all that is named First principles: e.g. reasoning will be said: The whole is greater than the part.

This common notion is recognized, that it is by induction of the sense, which passed to the memory, and from memory to experience, and from experience to indubitable knowledge, which acquires by such means what is a First principle, defined as: Being a collection of singulars contained under a common demonstration or reason, with which a universal principle was generated in the understanding, that the whole is greater than the part. The same is found in the other First principles, from whose certainty the species of science is achieved, which, although it is not by causes, comes to be so by infallible Demonstration, acquired in the understanding before the conclusion by principles, which are in such a way that they not only signify infallible concept, but numerically they are what is known with certainty.

As a complement to the above, the difference between Opinion and Science must be considered, and how they are distinguished: because (according to the most common) Science properly is the knowledge of effects by causes, from where the Poet said:

Happy is the one who is able to understand the causes of things.

Opinion is understood as that knowledge, acquired by objective concepts; or at most, by reason entity, with which probability and fallacy fit, and is distinguished in true and fallacious: True is that where the essence of the believed is, as it is believed. The Uncertain, or false opinion is defined by this, that it is the one that is produced from a mediated, fallacious, or contingent proposition. The reason is, because that from which opinion is formed (although to make it, it is estimated to be the same as the true essence) in so far as it is not demonstrable, it cannot be estimated as a certain and necessary thing, and so it arises from a mediated or contingent proposition, which does not admit infallible demonstration: if it admitted it, it would cease to be opinion, and it would be science; but it is not science, because it is only based on a mediated or contingent proposition. Mediated proposition in the Schools is understood as the one that admits other intermediates, and these do not make a demonstration as long as they are not reduced to immediate ones in the infallible conclusion, for whose cause, by the immediate ones, science is achieved.

From all this, three differences can be gleaned between Science and Opinion: the first, that Science is certain and necessary knowledge, and Opinion is uncertain, deceptive, or not necessary; the second, that Science is about necessary and permanent things, and Opinion about contingent or variable things; the third, that Science works by demonstration, and Opinion (at most) by probable reasoning, even though in appearance it induces demonstration. Concluding in good philosophy, that true science works by demonstration, without admitting pure opinion, because of one same thing in one same subject, and time, man cannot have opinion and science, because they cannot be given, because certain and uncertain knowledge do not coincide in one understanding, since they necessarily exclude one another; and thus, two diametrically repugnant contradictories do not exist in the same one, such as white not white, right not right, etc.

For all this, in the Science of the Sword, Science and Opinion are diverse, because the actions of man, and his way of understanding, and acting is diverse, and those that are done with science admit infallible demonstration, and are done with perfect knowledge; and those that are only of opinion, are subject to the contingency of being certain or uncertain; for example, any Treta (trick or ruse) that is done and formed with science, admits a demonstration that completely satisfies reason and understanding; and the one that is only by opinion, is subject to uncertainty, and deception.

Having taught the Philosopher in the posterior Analytics the essence of Demonstration, and Science, he formed the eight books, which he titled Topics, which is the same as places, which make the basis in the thesis, or hypothesis of the argument, from where the true syllogism arises, which receives the name of Topic, which means the Potissimo probable, just as the Elencho, or defective, we reduce the Topics places to the ten most received in the Schools, excluding those who put more number, to which various questions are introduced, which are omitted, for not being proper to our subject.

If we look at the Etymology of the term Topic, it is a Greek word, whose meaning is thing of place, from where the term to find places for arguments was chosen, as Cicero widely showed, and Aristotle taught, qualifying the second species of probable syllogisms, to whose sin are investigated those who are named common places: of the arguments, in which for any question the probability is found: and for this reason also to these places Topics are given the same name, and that of invention: because with such a medium, common places are recognized, which make a foundation to the arguable, which in its whole such art is titled Dialectic.

The utilities that result from topical places are many: among others, the Philosopher notes four: the first, that they are beneficial in the conflict of disputes in any science; the second, for the understanding they lend in the dialogues and writings of the Philosophers, to refute some sentences, and accept others; the third, because they produce the most probable consequences in difficulties; the fourth, because they demonstrate the first principles, because the topics themselves are first principles.

The first contains those propositions that are accepted by everyone, like axioms, or like notions, that they call pronouncements, which are especially used by mathematicians; the second, those that, if not by everyone, are received by many; the third, those that are confirmed by classic authors; the fourth, those that result from what is the common consensus of the wise, both in sciences and in arts; the fifth, what the experience and demonstration produce; the sixth, those that are composed of authority, and reason, with which the understanding agrees. From everything it results the difference, that exists between probable and necessary, because from the probable one does not achieve more than opinion; and from the necessary, science: and this is permanent, and the probable is not, because it depends on what is opinable.

An argument is reason, that makes faith in the doubtful thing. It says Reason, because not everything that makes faith, is an argument. It is proven by example: sight makes faith, as far as what is seen. And yet, it is not an argument, because it is not discourse. Discourse, then, is reasoning, and not physical sight, and the argument is discourse, and reasoning: then sight, although it makes faith, is not an argument: then not everything that makes faith, is an argument but probably by reasoning.

It manifests mathematically in the difference that there is from speculative geometry to the practical one, and from working with ruler and compass, or by speculation: because the speculative is by mathematical entity, acquired by reasoning, that makes faith in things, as probable: not like sight, that makes it without giving reasoned faith, but by visible evidence, in which there is no argument.

In the Science of the Sword, these two differences are found in Tricks and Wounds: some are achieved and proven by argument, in which there is a probability that makes reasoned faith, and others by visible experimental operation, in which no reasoned argument precedes. These are the ones that are performed without Science, by observations of those who only have empirical exercise, unlike those that are done with perfection, in which science concurs. For these, the places called Topics are sought, and also to make evident the imperfection of the others. And the Topics are defined, according to the understanding and explanation of various Authors, in this form.

Cicero called them Place, or seat, receptacle, or treasure of the argument, in which indication of what is sought is found on one side or the other, facilitating the demonstration in the disputable, by means of the explanation of places. And the same Cicero distinguishes that this receptacle, or treasure, should be considered, like gold in the mine.

Aristotle, more Philosopher than Rhetorician, defined: Place, or Topic is the element of the enthymeme; that is, place, or principle, from where the enthymematic arguments are taken. Rodolphus Agricola compared the Topic places to the receptacles, or boxes of the Boticas, where the simples from which the antidote is composed are found by the labels.

As for how many these places are, due to the variety of opinions, it admits a large dispute (alien to our intention), so we refer the curious to Aristotle, who put many in eight books: and in the Rhetorics reduced them to 28. other Ancients, and Moderns to 23. and to 24. and to more, and to fewer numbers, as seen in Santo Thomás, Alexandro Aphrodisiense, Theophrastus, Rodolphus Agricola, etc.

In line with our objective, following the Moderns to Dr. Pedro Juan Nuñez and others, who have sought to reduce these topical places to a few, we choose ten, the most accepted in the Schools, which are: 1. Causes, 2. Effects, 3. Subjects, 4. Adjuncts, 5. Comparison, 6. Differentials, or opposites, 7. Definition, 8. Division, 9. Etymology, 10. Authority.

1 Cause is where the effect depends: so the cause is first, then the effect, and always distinct and essential as far as itself is concerned, because there is nothing created without cause, although cases of causes occur, as Aristotle exclaimed: natural causes in Philosophy are four: 1. Material, 2. Formal, 3. Efficient, 4. Final. Place them in Philosopher, as they have been put, and the Schools concur in the same order, for the reason that Pedro Gregorio gave, conceding that matter and form are causes, and are principles, with the distinction that form comprehends the subject matter; the efficient, which comprehends matter and form; and the final, which comprehends the efficient: and to this method of linking causes the Greeks signified with the word Symerasmatha, which means as much as Linkages among themselves, from where with the current of Philosophers the same Pedro Gregorio noticed, that some causes can be causes of others, although in their placement they are respected for comprehension and dignity, more than for another reason, the Schools agreeing that the first is the Material cause, second the Form, third, the Efficient, and fourth the Final.

Causes are distinguished into universal and particular: universal are God, Nature, the Sun, etc. in the particular are Father, Mother, Craftsman, Fighter, Expert, non-Expert, etc. Causes are given by accident, such as Occasion, Chance, etc. that do not produce universal causes. Of this kind are the Tactics of the opposing fighter, who as a free agent forms them; and being of this quality, the Expert with his universal knowledge acts against them with science and art, and such Tactics are called accidental, because the Expert, although à priori he has knowledge of all the possibility of his opponent, the individualizations that precede from it, are accidental acts.

Causes are also distinguished as intelligible and operative: intelligible ones are those that the understanding perceives without reaching the executed operation. Such are the Tactics, which in terms of premeditation are metaphysically perceived in the intelligence, by the discourse, and the reason of the Master, in such a way that it is not purely by being of reason, which is subject to being a chimera, but by real being, that can pass to mathematical being, although it achieves no more than aptitude for execution. Physical ones are those that are physically and naturally considered and executed; and in both, this Science consists of intelligence and exercise.

Material is that which has the aptitude to receive form. Matter is divided into sensible and insensible: sensible is that which the sense perceives, such as metal, accepting various forms, and like movement, which admits various Tactics, etc. Insensible is called that matter, which is only perceived by the understanding; and from such cause it is named intelligible: and in both ways in this Science, Matter is considered in its causal principle, compared to the prime Matter, which philosophers call.

Properly in this Science, movement is given as material cause, because it has aptitude to receive various forms in genus, and species, as is demonstrated in the second Book, and remains touched in its place, where Movement, and stillness were treated.

Form is that which comprehends the matter, and constitutes in it a formed thing, distinct from another. It is divided into essential and accidental: essential is that which constitutes perfect, natural, and physical formality, like the rational soul, which is the essential form of man, in whom, as a physical and organic instrument, the soul vivifies, and provides the essential formality, constituting a living animal, participant of reason, distinct from the brute: accidental form is understood as that, which is considered by some accident, in respect to the subject, as taught by the Philosopher, although in the common sense of the Schools it is applied to the Predicament of Quality, and the Expositors move the questions in the explanation of the fourth species, and touch the terms conform and deform, beauty and ugliness.

From this place arguments are produced by formal cause, both affirmative and negative: for example, in affirmative, does it have a soul participating in reason? Then it is capable of science and discipline, etc. Is it constituted by coupled terms? Then it is a figure in terminated quantity, etc. in the negative, is it an animal participating in reason? Then it is not a brute: is it not constituted by coupled terms? Then it is not a figure, etc. and note that if the form were accidental, it would not produce a firm argument, but at most, probable.

Concluding for this Science, that in natural forms, which are considered by intelligence and exercise, the form is conjoined with the matter; and in the formal it comprehends it, because the material power passes to actual, which is form introduced by efficient cause, just as the metal passes to statue by the Craftsman, who reduces to formal act the potential, with which the matter comprehended by formal cause, is reduced to formality of statue, or other figure, by the Craftsman. The Expert also forms the Tactics, and wounds, in which the matter, which is the movement, or movements, are comprehended by the form, or forms, that by the efficient cause (just like the Craftsman in the metal) the material passes from potential of material cause to act of formal cause, constituting Tactics, and wounds, formed with distinction from one form to others, as experienced by the Expert, that being the material cause the movement in genre, he comprehends it, and reduces it to forms of Tactics, and distinct wounds, which by the form are different from each other, with distinction from one to another. In them is also found the division of essential and accidental formal cause, in which the referred doctrines are applied, by the common consideration of causes, from which places are taken for the arguments topically; for example, by affirmation is it a cutting wound? Then Slash, Chop, Reverse, etc. is it a puncture wound? then Thrust in its genre and species, etc. and by the negative is it such a Trick, or wound? Then it is not its contrary. Is it a wound of first intention? Then not of second.

From what has been discussed in the Material and Formal causes, we come to the knowledge of the Efficient cause, which is defined: Efficient cause is that which produces effect in something, comprehending matter and form.

This definition permits numerous divisions, as the Efficient Cause is considered in various ways. Initially, it is distinguished in two manners of operation: one, that follows the necessity in the operation, restraining the will to the potency, as in the unskilled person, who is compelled by the skilled person to act necessarily against his own will or power; or because the same nature necessitates the operation, as in the fire, which heats; and in the snow, which cools, etc.

In another way, the Efficient Cause operates, either freely, or as obstructed: freely, in the wounds, and Tactics of First-intention; obstructed, in the wounds, and Tactics of Second-intention, with respect to the skilled and unskilled person, because the skilled person acts without impediment, as an efficient cause, free in power, in will, and in scientific knowledge, with regard to the same skilled person.

Philosophers consider another division in the Efficient Cause, which is in two ways: one, when the cause produces an effect by itself alone, like the Sun, which produces the artificial day, the skilled person the Tactic, and the wound, etc. Another, when the effect is produced, not solely from the pure and unadulterated efficient cause, but also another coincides, like the natural day, which is caused by two movements, the rotation, and the Sun: or as in this Science, when from the movement, or Tactic, that a combatant formed, a disposition is given for another movement, or Tactic to the contrary.

Another division is recognized in the efficient cause, for at times it acts subjugating, and at other times it acts as subjected to another cause, with such a distinction that when it acts subjugating, its effects are independent of another efficient cause, and when it acts subjected, it is in regard to another cause.

Another way to consider efficient causes, as philosophers call them, are Instrumental causes. These also allow for divisions, in terms of the instrument. For example, in this science, if the instrument - the sword - were absent in the efficient cause, which is the combination of a man with a sword, the actions of both the man and the sword would cease. Just as a man with sight, if he were missing his eyes (the instruments of seeing), his ability to see would end due to the lack of the visual instrument. In another way, there are instrumental causes that would not completely end all of the efficient cause, as they don’t provide the absolute action, but rather more aptitude, or comfort in the act, like a horse in cavalry actions, on the journey, or in combat. Even if it were missing, it would not completely remove the ability for the agent to fight or make the journey. The same can be said about the Skilled person. Even though a regular and perfectly proportioned sword gives him the aptitude to execute a perfect Tactic, if he were missing it, he could use a shorter or more defective sword to defend himself and attack his opponent, not with as much aptitude, but at least with the courage and skill that such an instrument could provide.

The efficient cause allows for divisions in other ways. One is when it produces the effect and preserves the power within itself to produce other similar ones. Like the sun, which with its presence and movements produces greater and lesser days, referred to as artificial, and conserves the power within itself to produce others. Similarly, the Skilled one, who produces Tactics and wounds, preserves the power within himself to reproduce and repeat many other Tactics and wounds.

These efficient causes are called preservative, in contrast to those that are efficient; sufficient, and not preservative, which are those that do not conserve power for new acts. For example, in the case of the unskilled one, who forms some Tactic and wound, but does not conserve power to immediately produce with knowledge and skill other similar or dissimilar Tactics and wounds.

From all this, it is concluded for this science that in it the efficient cause is the combination of a man with a sword in his hand. Including matter and form of movement, Tactic, and wound, it produces the effect of Skill through intellectual knowledge and exercise. This includes the five aforementioned divisions and others that can be found by ingenuity. From this, they establish areas for the efficient cause to form the basis of their Topical arguments, as is recognized and demonstrated in the second book in their appropriate places.

The fourth and final cause is for the sake of, and is defined as: The final cause is the ultimate end of the material, formal, and efficient causes; it comprehends them by terminating them. The end is divided into apparent and true: the apparent end is one that rests on opinion; the true one, on demonstrable evidence. The ends, generically, are either useful, pleasurable, or honest; these touch more on moral and natural philosophy than on this Science, which admits the consideration and argument, due to causes in the proper terms of understanding and practice of this Science. The final cause is defense and offense, which includes the preceding causes, as it is their ultimate end; and as far as the essential goes, we refer to the Discourse on Offense and Defense, where the most important aspects were attempted to be inferred; and here we conclude, that in Skill there are both apparent and true ends. The apparent end is one that operates by opinion, which at most seems probable: the true end is one that operates by knowledge, demonstrating topical places, because defense and offense are due to the final cause in the understanding and practice of the Sword.

2 The effect is what proceeds from cause to causes: like the day, which is the effect of the Sun, and of the swift and natural movement; the construction of the Architect, the defense and offense with a sword by the Skilled one. The effects are distinguished and receive names (as Rodolphus Agricola said) by the work, and the work by the cause; if by the material, they are material; if by the formal, formal, if by the efficient, ordered; if by the final, dedicated, or in other terms, that suggest the effects by the causes; and of one kind and another, for the arguments, they choose places, which they call Topical by effects, and in this Science the same considerations are held, looking at the causes, and the effects that proceed from them.

3 The subject is defined as: It is the receptacle of the adjuncts, such as the soul, which is the subject of the powers, memory, understanding, and will, and of science; and the living body, subject to health and sickness; and the whole man with a sword in hand, subject to Skill, etc.

This subject, Man armed with a Sword (as described in the first and last Predicament), is considered with different qualities, with respect to the individuals, with which they admit distinction, some with respect to others; and although the generic definition is one comprehensive in the lowest species, there are distinct definitions, according to the concurrence of the adjuncts, of which each subject is a receptacle, considered in its lowest species.

The subject admits another distinction, which is in three ways: the first is called of Inhesion, the second of Action, the third of Circumstance. Subject of Inhesion is that in which the adjuncts persist, such as color in the animal, in the plant, in the flower, in the armed man, in the unarmed man, etc., such qualities are specific inhesion in the adjuncts that persist in the subject. Subject of Action is that in which the essential subject acts with the adjuncts, and the adjuncts with it, as the fire in the wood, or another combustible matter: the man with a Sword, and other weapons: the Trick, and wound, with respect to the Skilled one; the statue with respect to the Sculptor, etc. Thus in this way all the objects of the senses, which concur in the work, are said to be subjects of action with respect to the sense, which deals with the object, and concurs in the operation, like the painting, the surface, the body, and every visible object, with respect to sight; the combatant, with respect to another combatant; the Sword, with respect to another Sword; the rational subjects, with respect to the Sciences, and moral and physical acts; the human body, with respect to Medicine; the numbers, with respect to Arithmetic; the Straight and Curved lines, the figures, the bodies, etc. with respect to Geometry; the Stars, and their movements, aspects, and positions, with respect to Astronomy; their influences, with respect to Astrology; the harmonic proportions, with respect to Music, etc. and in conclusion, these, and the other objects, which act as adjuncts with the essential subject, are called subject of Action in this second way.

Subject of Circumstance is that which is surrounded by adjuncts, like the Captain, who is a subject of circumstance, with respect to the Soldiers, who he commands in company; the Field Master with respect to the Military Third; the General, with respect to the entire Army; the City, with respect to its Citizens; the man, with respect to the habit and weapons, that surround him, etc. From this place to Subjects, theses, and hypotheses are taken for arguments by Inhesion, by Action, and by Circumstance, all considered in the subject, as a receptacle of adjuncts.

4 Adjuncts are directly associated with subjects because they are the accidents that persist in the subject. Therefore, topical places can be taken for arguments from any kind of accidents, because subjects and adjuncts are related, where any entity that admits adjuncts is named a subject, and adjuncts are those that are inherent, with respect to the subject in the three pointed out modes, of Inhesion, Action, and Circumstance.

5 This place is defined by saying: Repugnant, or Dissentaneous are those that oppose each other, such as disease and health; the combatant and the combatant, etc. These, and their likes, in which there is opposition of contrariness, are considered Dissentaneous, or Repugnant in two ways, because they are either discrepant or contrary.

Discrepant are those, not absolutely contrary ex diametro (like white to black, day to night, clear light to dark darkness), but that partly disagree among themselves, without becoming evident contraries in the whole.

Contrary in the whole are those, which oppose each other ex diametro, according to their greater opposition, as touched on in the title of Opposites, and Contraries, after the Predicaments, see the logicians in the true and simulated contradictories, dissenting, and repugnant, where the curious will find a wide field for this Topical place, drawing out very useful arguments for this Science; where there are Tactics, and wounds, that are only discrepant in the manner of their formation; and others, which oppose each other ex diametro by absolute contradictories, as demonstrated in the second Book.

6 Compared are those that have similarity among themselves, or can be Parallel, or consist of some analogy. This place includes the third Predicament of His, quæ ad aliquid, and after the Predicaments, what Logicians, and Philosophers discuss in the Similes, and Dissimiles, because all relatives and similar ones admit comparison, like in this Science all the point wounds (which they call Thrusts) and all the cutting wounds (which they call Slashes) and their species, like the Cut to the Cut, the Backhand to the Backhand, etc. The same in the Tactics, which admit relation, or analogy, from which you can draw out places of comparison, to form fundamental probable arguments in this Science.

7 That which is Definition, is extensively explained where its proper place was, and here it is only considered as a Topic for arguments, in which one must enter by the definition, which is rigorously antecedent to the question, because it is either the thesis, or hypothesis of the argument, and all of this Science, (just like in the others) have the Definition as their basis.

8 In Division we also refer where it was properly discussed; and here it is considered as a Topical place for the probable arguments, by the term that Logicians, and Dialecticians call Distinction; for example, Slash? I distinguish. Either it is a Cut, or Backhand, Half Cut, or Half Backhand. Tactic, and wound? I distinguish. Either it is of first intention, or it is of second intention, etc.

9 Etymology is a Greek term (as according to Cicero) it signifies Veriloquium: Correct way of speaking: this, as the same Orator explains, is properly a note of the thing that is preached. The word Etymology is composed of two Greeks, Etymos, which is the same as true; and Logos, which is locution.

The Philosopher named it Symbol, which means Origination. Favio, for more common phrase says, that the Scholastics call it interpretation, by the composition of words, from where the property of the term is interpreted. Topical places are extracted to argue by Etymology, inquiring the origin of the name. Such is seen in the common of this Science in the Thrust, whose etymology comes from Estoc, a weapon, that can only wound with its point, because in the rest of its form, strictly speaking it does not have cutting edges; and Slash by an armed instrument, which has cutting edges like a knife, from where the Greek calls the Sword Xiphius, and the Latin Gladius, both terms are generic for a cutting Sword is named Blade, from where Slash, and thus in this Science, other Etymologies are investigated, to form arguments.

10 Testimonies are worth as much in this Science, and others, as maxims, or sentences, or resolutions commonly accepted as true, or in such an authorized way, that they attest in the arguments, and one stands by them. Cicero divides this genre into divine, and human resolutions, or sentences, or maxims, drawing from all different species, which he subdivides into mediate, and immediate.

Those that touch this Science, are the ones that the same Orator divides into three generic Species: one, that touches on the authority, another on the will, another on discourse. Those of authority are those, which are admitted, as known principles, or by the common feeling of scientists, and wise men; in such a way, that authorized, they have acquired credibility, and as irrefutable they are used as true, and authorized testimonies. Those that touch on the will, are the opinions, that although probable, are not for that reason evident by demonstration, as was touched on, dealing with the difference between Science, and Opinion. Those that touch on the discourse, or reasoning, are those, to which reason assents, and are proven, like a Topical place; in such a way, that they can be placed as the major premises in the Topical syllogism, and also in its minor ones, with such certainty, that they produce true consequences, etc.

I have been unavoidably forced to shape this book (which includes the philosophical aspects of this Science) because it has been given, and is still referred to, as the Philosophy of the Sword; however, I acknowledge that in all those who have written, although they have qualified it as such, none have taught, demonstrated, or treated it as a science; they have instead overlooked its principles and foundations, which lead to the problems that any moderately ingenious person can notice. Many add to this the common question about the term Weapons, which is considered in schools as one of the seven servile Arts (as touched upon), and until now among ancient and modern Masters, none is found to have acknowledged the sword, the weapon-bearing instrument that common people call Dexterity, as a Science or Philosophy. This lies mainly in the responsibility of the wise (especially Spanish) who rightly affirm that it is a science, as it truly is one of understanding and practice, distinguishing itself like Logic and Dialectic. In strict scholastic terms, Logic is a science because it involves reasoning; and Dialectic is an Art because it consists of collected rules and precepts that compose the Art of dispute; and in the same way, the understanding of the sword, which involves reasoning, is a proper science, from which the exercise is produced, consisting of rules and precepts collected, in which it is the art of disputing the truth of this science with a sword in hand, and all together is the Philosophy of Arms, which in common terms is named Skill, and to the scientific Skilled: and this doctrine would be badly followed if, like its predecessors, it fled the difficulty, dealing only with what is Art, omitting what is Science, without demonstrating it, seeming blind, falling into the error that is criticized in the first; an inexcusable cause, that has obliged me with special studies and sleepless nights to demonstrate scientifically and philosophically the responsibility of such an issue, treating this science with method, order, and the formality of a science, following the Philosopher and his Expositors, entering through the most important foundation of Defense and Offense, which is made with the instrument Sword, from whose dignity and principle light is given, moving on to investigate its science, proving that it is of understanding and exercise, declaring of what species and in what speculative or practical way, and how from it Art is produced, which is perfected with experience, putting in order of Schools, what is Definition, what Division, what Universal voices, or Predicables of Porphyry? What, and how many are the Predicaments of the Philosopher? What is Substance? And what are Accidents in this science? What is the main subject of it? What is Essence, and Existence in man? And if they admit distinction? What is Potential, and Act? How is it considered? The man is defined and described in his whole, and in his parts. What does the Predicament Substance include? The partition of the real being in this science? What is continuous and Discrete Quantity in it, and in what do they differ? What is Relation and Analogy? What is Quality with its species and demonstrations? What is Predicamental Action? What is Passion, and Passive? What are the other Predicaments Where, When, Situation, and Habit? What is meant by Opposites, and Contraries, Similars, and Dissimilars? What is Priority? What is Demonstration? What are Science and Opinion? What are Topical Places? What are Dialectic Syllogisms? What is Argument and Topical Place? Reducing it to the ten most essential and proper to this Science, which are, to Causes, to Effects, to Subjects, to Adjuncts, to Dissimilar, to Comparison, to Definition, to Division, to Etymology, and Authority: all explained and understood in the priority and rigor of this Science of the Sword, gathering its Philosophy, so that from here onwards it can be recognized, treated, and disputed, understood, made to understand, and demonstrated as the Science of the usual and noble Arms, which are the Sword and its adjuncts, Dagger, etc., overcoming, as first, the difficulties that are manifested, and can be considered, having thus fulfilled such an issue, pledging, and opening the main door so that through it may enter those fans of the Skill of Arms, who profess, studying, and acquiring its Science for its true causes, in which wise and common people (I judge) will recognize my zeal, making an appreciation of this new essential, and forceful work (which until now no one has done) being as inexcusable as seen by examples; since neither the art is perfected without the science on which it depends; nor is the science useful in exercise if it does not produce art; this is seen in navigation, where the management of the Vessel, by route, and height, has its fundamental principles in Cosmography, which embraces as science the great construction, since it needs the Theoretical of the First Mobile, the Firmament, the Luminaries, Sun, and Moon, to recognize the elevations of Pole, the declinations of the Sun, the position, and movement of the fixed and wandering Stars, the Horizons, the Meridians, Zodiac, Equinoctial, Colures, Tropics, and other circles that are considered in the Sphere, including Astronomical Science, observing in the inferior Globe what is proper in Geography, to recognize the Coasts, Ports, Islands, etc. in their true latitudes, and longitudes, being all in the navigator, as principles for the Hydrography, recognizing the Seas, how the winds, bearings, and parallels are constituted, how they are considered, what they consist of, and vary by different places, the tides, and the currents, making use, as of subalterns, of Geometry, and Arithmetic, taking from all the scientific the right exercise of certain and safe navigation.

In the same way, the Philosophy of Arms can be considered, which is a Science of understanding and exercise, like navigation, in which that one understands and acts more perfectly, who knows more fundamentally the scientific, from which precepts and rules are drawn, that form art, corroborated with experience, which are the three cognitive powers admitted by philosophers, and have been touched upon for this Science, whose foundations have been outlined in this First Book, because without them, one would blindly enter into the Second. Just as the Architect would destroy the mountains, if he built them without their due foundations, because the consistency is not only in what appears to the sight, but in what is premeditated in understanding; so too the true Skill has its fundamental scientific principles, which are the bases of what appears visual, with which the necessary, not excusable, that this First Book contains, becomes evident, with which one will securely enter into what is demonstrable, which is given in the Second.

End of the First Book