DISCVRSO DIEZ & SEIS.

DECIMO PREDICAMENTO, Habito, ò Ornato exterior.

SIXTEENTH DISCOURSE.

TENTH PREDICAMENT, Habit, or External Ornament.

Habito en eſta Ciencia (como en las demàs) ſegun el Philoſopho, y ſus Exporſitores, viene en quanto a Latino Idioma, del verbo Habeo, que ſignifica Tener; lo qual ſe entiende en diverſos modos, y eſpecies: la que haze à eſta Ciencia la exprefſa el Philoſopho en eſta Categoria, diziendo, que Habere ſe entiende el accidente, que reſulta de lo externo al cuerpo, como armas, ò veſtido, declarandolo con mas preciſion, quando dixo en el miſmo lugar, que el termino Habere ſignifica aquel ornato, que cerca del cuerpo ſe pone, como lo es el veſtido, y Eſpada.

Habit in this science (as in others) according to the Philosopher, and his expositors, comes in terms of Latin language, from the verb Habeo, which means to have; this is understood in various ways and species: the one that makes this science is expressed by the Philosopher in this category, saying that Habere refers to the accident that results from the external to the body, such as weapons or clothing, stating it more precisely when he said in the same place that the term Habere signifies that adornment which is placed close to the body, as is the clothing, and Sword.

Deſte compueſto Hombre con la Eſpada en la mano, que es la ſuperior forma, que adquiere para el perfecto ornato, reſulta por queſtion importante en eſta Ciencia, ſi admite vna difinicion, como vn concreto accidental, conſiderado por ſubſtancia, y accidente; ò ſi el hombre ſe ha de difinir por sì, y el inſtrumento Eſpada por sì.

From this compound Man with the Sword in hand, which is the superior form that he acquires for perfect adornment, it results in an important question in this science, whether it admits a definition, like an accidental concrete, considered by substance and accident; or if the man is to be defined by himself, and the Sword instrument by itself.

Eſta dificultad no es agena de las Eſcuelas, ni de eſta Ciencia, pues ay quien lleve la opinion contraria, diziendo, que la ſubſtancia, y el accidente no hazen vno por sì. Fundanſe en ſu poner, que todos los concretos, en que la forma es accidente de algunos ſugetos determinados, ſe nombran antes por accidente como tienen los Metaphyſicos, Vazquez, Suarez, &c.

This difficulty is not foreign to the Schools, nor to this science, as there are those who hold the opposite opinion, saying that substance and accident do not make one by themselves. They base this on their position that all concretes, in which the form is an accident of some determined subjects, are named before by accident as the Metaphysicians, Vazquez, Suarez, etc. have.

Deſta mayor ſacan la menor, y dizen: Vno por accidente no puede difinirſe, ſegun el Philoſopho: luego los concretos accidentales no ordenan Predicamento, porque no admiten genero, ni eſpecie, ni ſon difinibles, à cauſa que no ſon vno, ſino muchos.

From this major premise, they derive the minor, and say: One by accident cannot be defined, according to the Philosopher: hence accidental concretes do not order a Predicament, because they do not admit genre, nor species, nor are definable, because they are not one, but many.

En tal aparato hazen preſa los que quieren, que el concreto, Hombre armado con Eſpada, no admite vnica difinicion, ſino diſtintas, difiniciones, vna del hombre, y otra del inſtrumento Eſpada, ò la eſpecie de arma con que ſe adorna, entendiendo por diſtintos en las difiniciones el veſtido, y Eſpada, como accidentes del concreto Hombre armado.

In such an apparatus, those who want the concrete, Man armed with Sword, do not admit a single definition, but distinct definitions, one of man and another of the instrument Sword, or the species of weapon with which it is adorned, understanding by distinct in the definitions the clothing, and Sword, as accidents of the concrete Armed Man.

A eſte dificultad ſe reſponde, que los concretos accidentales ſe difinen, pueſto el ſugeto en lugar de genero, y el accidente en lugar de diferencia, como hombre blanco, negro; deſnudo, veſtido; armado, deſarmado, &c. Deſta doctrina no diſsienten el Philoſopho, y Santo Thomàs, enſeñando, que en el accidente, ſi ſe toma en concreto, ſe difine el ſugeto en lugar de genero, como Pedro con Eſpada, que Pedro es genero, y el arma Eſpada es la diferencia. Si en abſtracto, ſe difine, pondiendo el accidente en lugar de genero, y el ſugeto en lugar de diferencia; v.g. armado con Eſpada es Pedro, donde el arma Eſpada es genero, y Pedro, que es el ſugeto es diferencia.

To this difficulty it is responded that accidental concretes are defined, placing the subject in place of genus, and the accident in place of difference, as white man, black; naked, dressed; armed, unarmed, etc. The Philosopher and Saint Thomas do not disagree with this doctrine, teaching that in the accident, if it is taken concretely, the subject is defined in place of the genus, as Pedro with Sword, where Pedro is the genus, and the weapon Sword is the difference. If abstractly, it is defined, placing the accident in place of genus, and the subject in place of difference; e.g., armed with Sword is Pedro, where the weapon Sword is the genus, and Pedro, who is the subject, is the difference.

De aqui ſe ſacarà rectamente, que el ſugeto, y la forma accidental, ſi bien no componen vno, como alma, y cuerpo, no por eſſo evitan, que reſulte vno difinible, reſpecto à la vnion del ſugeto, y forma; v.g. hombre con Eſpada, que aunque no ſon vno individual racional, à lo memos es vno, como ſugeto, y forma accidental, con que admite vna difinicion: Aſsimiſmo (aunque menos perfecta) la admiten vnitivamente el Reyno, el Exercito, &c. conſtando de mas diviſas partes, que hombre con Eſpada, en que tiene lugar la doctrina del Philoſopho, y Santo Thomàs, colocando el ſugeto por genero, y el inſtrumento accidental por diferencia; ò al contrario, ſegun ſe difine en concreto, ò en abſtracto.

From here it will be correctly derived that the subject and the accidental form, although they do not compose one, like soul and body, do not therefore avoid that one definable results with respect to the union of the subject and form; e.g., man with Sword, although they are not one rational individual, at least is one, as subject and accidental form, with which it admits a definition: Likewise (although less perfect) the Kingdom, the Army, etc. composed of more diverse parts than man with Sword, where the doctrine of the Philosopher and Saint Thomas takes place, placing the subject for genus, and the accidental instrument for difference; or vice versa, according to whether it is defined concretely or abstractly.

A mas concordancia, de que el hombre con Eſpada en la mano admite vna difinicion quidativa (como vn concreto accidental) y que el Philoſopho pudo entenderle en eſte Predicamento por vna difinicion, y no por diſtintas; haze la razon de Santo Thomàs, expreſſando: Que aunque el modo de ſignificar no ſe conſigue por el modo del ſer de las coſas; con todo eſſo, ſe conſigue, mediance el modo de entender: v.g. el hombre con Eſpada en la mano (que es el ſugeto principal deſta Ciencia) reſpecto del inmediato ſe de las coſas, incluye diſtintas partes, componiendo el concreto accidental de hombre, y armas: y con todo eſſo, mediante el modo de entender en la vnion operativa, ſe conſigue en eſta Ciencia, que es vno difinible.

In further agreement, that man with Sword in hand admits a quidative definition (like an accidental concrete) and that the Philosopher could understand it in this Predicament by one definition, and not by different ones; is the reasoning of Saint Thomas, expressing: That although the mode of signifying is not achieved by the mode of being of things; however, it is achieved, through the mode of understanding: e.g. the man with Sword in hand (which is the main subject of this Science) with respect to the immediate being of things, includes distinct parts, composing the accidental concrete of man and weapons: and yet, through the mode of understanding in operative union, it is achieved in this Science, that it is one definable.

Manifieſtaſe mas, porque hombre, y Eſpada, extenſivamente no obran por dos impulſos, ſino por vn impulſo, à que mira eſta Ciencia: luego admite vna difincion; ſi en concreto, en el ſugeto en lugar de genero; y ſi abſtracto, por ſugeto por lugar de diferencia, como ſe ha demonſtrado.

It is more evident, because man and Sword, extensively, do not act by two impulses, but by a single impulse, to which this Science looks: then it admits a definition; if in concrete, in the subject in place of genus; and if abstract, by subject in place of difference, as has been demonstrated.

Eſta conſequencia ſe deduce de la razon: porque el conocimiento abſtractivo, ſi bien, no ſe genera inmediatamente de las coſas miſmas conocidas, que componen el concreto accidental Hombre, y Eſpada; generaſe à lo menos por las operaciones, ò por los accidentes del miſmo concreto, à cauſa de que el conocimiento de la ſubſtancia de algun ſugeto ſe adquiere de la operacion del miſmo ſugeto; v.g. hombre con Eſpada reſulta conocerſe por tales eſpecies, que ſon fundamentales à la formacion de ente real: con que el compueſto Hombre con Eſpada ſe conoce como vno en conocimiento vnico, quanto al efecto, y operacion que tiene, pues indiviſiblemente provienen de hombre, y Eſpada: luego ſi la entidad de la realidad ſe percibe por el conocimiento de la operacion, y efecto: aquella entidad ſe conoce como vna, en que es vno el efecto, y operacion por vnico impulſo, reſultando, que en el compueſto vno de Hombre, y Eſpada (porque por modo vno procediente de vni impulſo, tiene la operacion y el efecto) todo el cauſante Hombre, y Eſpada ſe difine, como vno por modo de vno.

This consequence is deduced from reason: because abstract knowledge, although it is not immediately generated from the things themselves known that compose the accidental concrete Man and Sword; it is generated at least by the operations, or by the accidents of the same concrete, because the knowledge of the substance of some subject is acquired from the operation of the same subject; e.g., man with Sword results in being known by such species that are fundamental to the formation of real being: with which the compound Man with Sword is known as one in unique knowledge, as to the effect and operation it has, since they indivisibly come from man and Sword: then if the entity of reality is perceived by the knowledge of the operation and effect: that entity is known as one, in which the effect and operation is one by unique impulse, resulting in that in the one compound of Man and Sword (because by one way proceeding from one impulse, it has the operation and the effect) all the cause Man and Sword is defined as one in the way of one.

No obſta oponerſe, que en el compueſto de Hombre, y Eſpada, la cognoſcibilidad proviene de operaciones, y accidentes, que neceſſariamente por conceptos objetivos admiten diſtincion, y como tales ſe aprehenden: luego no como vno ſe conocen Hombre, y Eſpada, y aſsi ſeràn dos difinibles, aunque ſe conſideren vno por accidente.

It does not hinder opposing that in the compound of Man and Sword, the cognoscibility comes from operations and accidents, which necessarily by objective concepts admit distinction, and as such are apprehended: then not as one are Man and Sword known, and thus they will be two definables, even if they are considered one by accident.

Para la ſolucion ſe ha de ſaber, que el todo eſſencial, que incluye operaciones, y efectos (quanto al conocimiento en eſta Cienca) proviene de vn miſmo todo por modo de vno, y ſe concibe ente real por vn conocimiento comprehenſivo vnico, aunque por la razon de diverſas operaciones, y efectos ſe pueda diſtinguir en diverſos grados; v.g. el compueſto de cuerpo mortal, y de alma inmortal tiene aquellas operaciones, y efectos que ſe llaman vitales, animales, y racionales; y eſtas, reſpecto del cuerpo, y el alma por modo de vno, las conocèmos provenientes de vn principio, y todo en el modo efectivo, y operante comprehenſivo por modo de vno, las conocèmos provenientes de vn principio, con que ſe forma ente real vno: luego en eſta Ciencia en el compueſto de Hombre del inſtrumento Eſpada (que correſponde à lo mortal, caduco) por el alma racional (raiz del impulſo, y movimiento de todo el compueſto) ſe producen aquellas operaciones, y efectos vitales, que ſe llaman movimientos, Tretas, heridas, &c. las quesl, como provenientes de vn principio radical, ſe conocen por modo vno, que ſe llama Todo operante): de donde en eſta Ciencia ſe forma ente real vnico, y al compueſto de Hombre, y Eſpada ſe difine como vno, reſultando en eſta Ciencia ſer de inteligencia, y exercicio, que vulgarmente ſe nombre Deſtreza, y al ſugeto cientifico Dieſtro, ſiendo el objeto en ella la Eſpada regida cientificamente. Con que bien admite el Philoſopho en eſta Categoria por vno Habere gladium.

To solve this, we must understand that the essential whole, which includes operations and effects (as far as knowledge in this Science is concerned) comes from the same whole in the way of one, and it is conceived as a real being by a unique comprehensive knowledge, even though by the reason of diverse operations and effects it can be distinguished in various degrees; e.g., the compound of mortal body and immortal soul has those operations and effects that are called vital, animal, and rational; and these, with respect to the body and soul in the way of one, we know them as coming from a principle, and everything in the effective and operative way comprehensively as one, we know them as coming from a principle, with which a single real being is formed: then in this Science in the compound of Man of the instrument Sword (which corresponds to what is mortal, transient) by the rational soul (root of the impulse and movement of the whole compound) are produced those operations and vital effects, which are called movements, tricks, wounds, etc. these, as coming from a radical principle, are known in one way, which is called Whole operating): hence in this Science a single real being is formed, and the compound of Man and Sword is defined as one, resulting in this Science to be of understanding, and exercise, which is commonly named Skill, and the scientific subject Skillful, the object being the Sword scientifically ruled. So, the Philosopher rightly admits in this category as one Habere gladium.

Eſtas conſideraciones producen perfecto conocimiento de la Deſtraza por la vnion operante de hombre, y Eſpada, concreto accidental, que en eſta Ciencia, arte, y experiencia ſe llama Dieſtro, acomodandonos al termino mas vſado, y mas facil de entenderſe, y difinirſe, como vno comprehenſo, ſegun ſu todo: con que propriamente todas las operaciones, y efectos ſe explican, y entienden, como de vn difinido, y no como de diſtintos, porque extenſivamente, en quanto al obrar, no ſon diſtintos compueſtos, ò ſugetos, hombre, y Eſpada, ſino vn concreto accidental, que compone vno, y ſe entiende, y conoce como vno, y admite vnica difinicion en eſta Categoria, como expreſsò el Philoſopho, diziendo, que Habere ſignifica en el hombre eſtar ornado con veſtido, y Eſpada.

These considerations produce perfect knowledge of the Skill by the operating union of man and Sword, accidental concrete, which in this Science, art, and experience is called Skillful, conforming to the most used term, and easier to understand, and to define, as one understood, according to its whole: with which properly all operations and effects are explained and understood, as of a defined one, and not as different ones, because extensively, as far as the acting is concerned, they are not different compounds, or subjects, man and Sword, but an accidental concrete, which composes one, and is understood, and known as one, and admits a unique definition in this category, as expressed by the Philosopher, saying, that Habere signifies in man to be adorned with clothing, and Sword.

No obſta à eſta concluſion dezirſe, que en eſta Ciencia, quando ſe diſtribuyen las partes (por cauſar mas claridad) el hombre ſe difine por sì, y la Eſpada, la Dada, y las demàs armas tambien ſe difinien por sì con difiniciones vnicas: luego à hombre, y Eſpada no abraza vna difinicion por termino complexo, con que ſe retrocede à las objeciones antecedentes.

It does not hinder this conclusion to say that in this Science, when the parts are distributed (to cause more clarity) the man is defined by himself, and the Sword, the Given, and the other weapons are also defined by themselves with unique definitions: then to man, and Sword does not embrace a definition by complex term, with which we return to the previous objections.

Reſpondeſe, que eſta, y las demàs obeciones ſe excluyen facilmente; pues la cabeça, el braço, el pie, el movimiento, el compàs, la poſtura, la Treta, herida, &c. ſe difinen, como partes de vn todo, para conocer ſus infimos termonis en las operaciones, y efectos, no porque en la eſſencial difinicon del concreto no eſtèn incluſas las partes, ſino porque para el conocimiento diſtinto de vn todo, ſe neceſsita del de cada vna de ſus partes, que difinidas diſtintas, todas juntas no exceden del todo, en cuya vna difinicon ſe comprehenden, como la materia, y la forma en el hombre tiene diſtintas difiniciones; y con todo eſſo, el hombre ſe difine por vno.

The response is that this and the other objections are easily dismissed; since the head, the arm, the foot, the movement, the compass, the posture, the trick, the wound, etc. are defined as parts of a whole, to understand their minute elements in operations and effects, not because the essential definition of the concrete does not include the parts, but because for the distinct understanding of a whole, the understanding of each of its parts is necessary. The parts defined distinctly all together do not exceed the whole, and are included in its singular definition, just as the matter and the form in a man have distinct definitions; and yet, the man is defined as one.

De la miſma ſuerte el concreto accidental Hombre con Eſpada en la mano, ſujeto en eſta ciencia, en sì miſmo, y en ſu vnica difinicion, comprehende las todas ſus partes, que no exceden el todo, que ſe llama Dieſtro, en quien ſe incluye qualquiera infima eſpecie de armas, como adjuntas, aunque ſe difinen, y conſideran como partes del todo, que es vno, y vn difinido en la operacion, y el efecto, como ſe ha demonſtrado: con que no tiene lugar eſta vltima objecion, ni es ageno, ſino proprio difinir el todo como todo, y las partes como partes, que admiten, ſegun ſu ſer eſpeciales difiniciones, ſin contradiccion de la vniverſal del todo, que incluye ſus partes, ora ſea integrom, ora vniverſo.

In the same way, the accidental concrete Man with Sword in hand, subject in this science, in itself, and in its single definition, includes all its parts, which do not exceed the whole, which is called Fencer, in whom any minutest species of weapons is included, as adjuncts, although they are defined and considered as parts of the whole, which is one, and one defined in operation and effect, as has been demonstrated: so this last objection has no place, nor is it foreign, but proper to define the whole as a whole, and the parts as parts, which according to their being have special definitions, without contradiction of the universal of the whole, which includes its parts, whether it is integral, or universal.

SCHEMA DEL HABITO

Habito, Habere
- Del todo
  - Veſtido
  - Armado
- De las Partes
  - Sombrero, &c.
  - Eſpada, &c.

SCHEMA OF HABIT

Habit, Habere
- Of the whole
  - Clothed
  - Armed
- Of the parts
  - Hat, etc.
  - Sword, etc.