The Philosopher briefly touched on the precepts of the six final Predicaments, complementing the ten, in which he partitioned being (which in this science is real) without admitting Metaphysical and Theological concepts, which go to a higher understanding. The Predicamental Action is defined (according to the Philosopher himself, saying) to be the influence and path of the agent in the object.
Aristotle. From the Predicates, Chapter 9.
Aristotle. Metaphysics, Book I.
In this science, this Action is considered successive, and thus united to successive movement, insofar as formal action will be produced, insofar as it ends in the effect, or a movement is corrupted, so that generation and formation of another may result, because often (according to the intelligence, and active will of the agent, who in this science is the man with a Sword) in the operation a wound begins by a slash; and before consuming the action by executing it in the opposed opposite. Due to a new accident, or for another reason, it corrupts the movement of the Slash, which it began, and from that corruption, it passes through influence and successive path, to form a Thrust, which it instigates, in whose termination it achieves the effect, which gives the final being to the Action.
In the same way, in other Tactics, actions are achieved by the influence and path of the working agent, which, generating some movements from the corruption of others, it proceeds through successive path to the ultimate effect, and with all, generated and corrupted, it consumes the Action, which could not have been otherwise; for this reason, the Action is distinguished in Immanent, and Transitory; the immanent, which subsists in the same subject; and the transitory, because it passes to another.
By Action, which subsists in the same subject, the Tactic, the Wound, which as a real entity subsists in the intelligence and power of the agent, can properly be understood: and by the transitory one, the one that through operative execution passes through the exercise, and the effect to the opposed subject. From this, this definition is made for this science: Action is movement, which emanates from the power of the agent, and passes to perfect itself in the termination of the act, either by movement, or by discourse.
Definition of the Action.
Assuming, then, that the Tactics, which are made with a Sword, are through action, and movement; those that are made, without preceding voluntary movements from the opponent, are correctly called of the agent’s first intention; and those that are formed preceding movement, or movements of the opponent, are called of second intention: and both emanate in their consumption from the potential action of the Fencer, which is directed to perfect them in the termination of the act by one movement, or by various, according to the nature of the Tactics.
From the above, it results to understand the imperfection, or inconvenience of those who have had, and have, that even if different movements are made, which belong to more than the Tactic, or wound, that is formed, they are not reputed for more, than one movement, which receives the name of the active termination of the wound. And although this seems so in terms of the effect, because it ends in Cut, Thrust, etc., however, in scientific rigor, it should be understood with distinction: as it is demonstrated in its proper place, any Tactic is formed of free cause, or subject, with special movements, according to the positions, in which the fighters with Swords are found, this does not remove the possibility that the Action can begin by one Tactic, and end in another: which forces the consideration of the different species of movements, which often precede, not being precisely necessary for the formation; and without this knowledge, one would proceed without distinction, and knowledge of the corruption of some movements, and of the generation of others; and of when the actions are continuous, or are disjointed, and therefore in Fencing the Action is distinguished into two species.
How are active movements understood, and what are the properties of the predicamental Action.
One, which by the last movement ends in the effect; another, when, according to the accidents, or real concepts of the agent, by course of various movements, Curved, and Straight, the action is the influx, and way of the agent, which through the generation, and corruption of various movements, according to intelligence, and exercise, is directed in the Fencer until he consumes the act, which he pretends where the two properties have a place, which the Philosopher noted in Action of Contrariness, and More, and Less. Of Contrariness in the contrary formations of Tactics, Wounds, and Movements: of More, and Less, for what they admit of formality, and the act.
