Frontmatter

To whom can the Sword be dedicated with splendor, if not to the God of Armies? (1) To whom, if not to the one who came to overthrow the aerial Powers, with the most hidden cunning schemes, (2) evacuating the Principalities (3) from their allowed usurped domains? With a two-edged Sword in the mouth, and seven brilliant Stars, you let yourself be seen after the hypostatic union. (4) The variation not used of the instruments, qualifies the success of the sites. Light in all letters has been a Hieroglyphic of Science and Doctrine: The Sword, a noble instrument of defense, or revenge and varying the places, made the Skill show off its greatest marvels: for although the site of the Sword is the belt, of the light of Science the mouth; to render rebellious, Swords of two edges are made the lights: brandishing the rays of Science, for Science is the best Sword.

Scripture has no voice that does not fill the greatest scope of human subtle intelligence with mysteries: light is seen in the hands, and Sword in the mouth. Against the Prince of Darkness, the idea was cleverly forged. If the Sword were in the hands, it would defend, not teach. If in the mouth the splendor of the Stars, his doctrine would enlighten, but not defend: and the rays are moved away from the mouth, fleeing from the hands the steel; because the blazon of the one who prides himself on being Skilled consists in defending by enlightening, and in enlightening by defending, with the light of Science becoming a Sword that illuminates, and the Sword being a star that cuts; that the knowledge shines in the streaks of the adversary, and cuts the intentions that the enemy fabricates.

If the Sword were placed in the hand, in that mysterious portrait the Soldier would be seen, not the Master, separating the practical from the speculative. If the Stars illuminated the mouth; it would register to the description of a Master without the executions of a Soldier, making divorce the theoretical from the practical: and the Sword is arranged in the mouth, and the light of the doctrine in the hand; because the sovereign degree of Doctor is linked with the illustrious title of Captain General; for in the greatest battle you wielded the Sword with skill.

It was a challenge in which you defeated the devil and the world, relying on the sublime in the hidden marvels of the art with which he who fought so confidently was defeated, thwarting his schemes (achieved by the neglect of men) without resorting to power, nor majesty with whom the triumph is not so glorious, for the adversary is inferior; but in the attire of man, a fragile condition (and by weakness found in the first man) in whose duel, as nature, the enemy was judged to be superior.His malignity deceived him, blinding him with the custom of winning: and for more disgrace, according to Augustine, your Sword was not of steel, but of wood, admiring for the instrument in your crowned temples the laurels, and in it the greatest sensible confusions.

There, in the plain of Paradise, seeing man as your creation, and as yours, his adversary; devising tricks, with zero movements and wanting to test his malice to where his skill reached, guarding the Castle with all the military precautions, which you had given to Adam, and his successors; intending to enter as a spy, to choose a place and means to conquer the square.He came to capitulations with the besieged, which seemed advantageous, impossible to achieve, easy to promise in one who does not keep words, and Adam chose a means of proportion, which was not, because the compass was mistaken, from which originated the original stumble: for it was, inducing pride by a curved line, what grace had to achieve by a straight line: and thus judging the first man of the world to have subjected the Sword of his adversary (which undoubtedly he would have with a deviation) he found himself with a vertical wound, from which came and comes our lamentable pain, lost the forces, and the weapons: increasing with the challenge the glory of the insolence of the adversary, for lack of skill, the combatant was defeated in the first battle.

You felt in man how punished he was, and the art of fighting, noting the place, and the instrument with which he was left with the breaking of the clay so common; not appreciating the triumph, but learning with the same art with which he had won. You took the same weapons from the same punished nature, in which his confidence was chastised: for when he counted the triumph by the number of wounds that the body received, intense pains; he was tightening the form, to whom he took away the laurels, ending up in the conclusion without value, for the novelty of being defeated by nature, who had defeated him, gaining laurels that before paid tributes: for your Sword was not content with giving her freedom, without taking it from the same one who took it away. Not in vain the Prophet applauds you. He drags triumphs, avenging the offense of the one who committed it. It is justice that the Sword surrender, to whoever teaches skill. Even the lightness of the gift is made appreciable by one’s own esteem, not having any other better jewel to dedicate: soliciting that in your defense (being our defense) a Sword that teaches how to fight is seen, and a light with which the Skilled one, can and can defend himself; from the rising of the sun to its setting, may your name be praiseworthy.

REVIEW OF REVEREND M.FR, FATHER MANUEL de Villarroel, Doctor of Theology, Chair of Scripture, and General Preacher of the Religion of Saint Benedict,

By commission of Mr. Don Nicolás Alvares D Peralta, Vicar of this town of Madrid, I have seen three volumes on the Skill of Arms, their author Don Francisco Lorenz de Rada. Knight of the Order of Santiago, Marquis of the Towers of Rada, Chancellor Major, and perpetual Registrar of the Kingdoms of New Spain; and I confess, that the remission of the review struck me as novel, as is the matter of my state, and of my profession the Arms, fearing before leafing through the Book, the judgment in mine, which made Hannibal, hearing precepts, and rules of the Philosopher Phocion: but led by curiosity with the shield of the precept, I discovered all the argument adjusted with accuracy to rational and natural Philosophical principles, on which he erects the entire beautiful edifice of Skill, working with precision the principles of Mathematics.

Justus Lipsius; from Milit.Roman. said, that the supreme consisted in Science, in Art, and in Practice. The Philosopher in his politics reduced it to Dialectical terms, of Definition, Composition, and Resolution. Only the voices are distinguished: for the definitive corresponds to science, the composite to art, and the resolutive to practice. The Author comprehends all of this successfully in the three volumes: in the first the scientific in principles, in the second the artful in precepts, and in the last the demonstrative in conclusions and practical resolutions. The most difficult thing in the actual exercise of the Sword, is the observation of the precepts of science: that even if for another intention Cicero said: Silent leges inter arma (Laws are silent among arms). But in these volumes it reaches the non plus ultra with the tie of speculation, and exercise, explaining in what is done, and doing in what is said: passing from the generic to the specific, and from this to the individual: from science to the art from art to the operation, which is the intention; and all with scientific division, giving each other a hand the ones that were born queens, Letters and Arms.

A study without a rich vein, nor do I see what good a rough talent can do: thus one thing helps another, and conspires amicably

Horace said. Their divorce is always sadly lamentable.Spain mourns only Letters in the wise Don Alonso. France mourns only Arms in Charles VIII. It is necessary to unite them with Duarte, King of Portugal, who erected as his blazon the Lance surrounded by a Serpent. Courage is breath with faintness, if it does not have the skill of: science. Among the heroic symbols, none greater than that of Frederick III in the painting of an armed arm, writing in a Book, and the Epigraph: Hic regit, ille tuetur (This one rules, that one protects). With the precepts of the Books one learns to fight, with the Sword one defends the laws that the Books give: hence came the Proverb. Consfilum & auxilum, mens & manus, animus & gladius (Counsel and aid, mind and hand, spirit and sword). The splendor of the Sword is not risked in the hands of a scientist, rather for greater luster, science puts it in greater commitment. The Egyptians, in all mystery, learned in the academy of Memphis to paint Mercury with two faces, one aspect of an old man, another of a youth.In this age they expressed valor, science in the elderly, for the experiences of his age: and they united the extremes of science and bravery: because the greatest valor surrenders when skill jumps. What of our illustrious Solorzano case in his Political Emblems!

These are the double duties of Pallas and Minerva’s dual names
By the sword, wisdom prevails & wisdom protects swords:
These ones strike, she teaches those ones to strike back.

And Fortunatus:

With laws you rule weapons, and with weapons you guide laws:
Thus the path of diverse arts is traveled together.

No one better than our Author can boast of Mercury in such a noble glorious faculty: as Hippocrates said in arte: To discover something of those things, which have not yet been discovered, which itself is known, rather than being hidden, seems to be the desire and the work of science: achieving with ingenuity the subtlety in the application of principles, the novelty in the invention of demonstrations, and the inventiveness in the clarity of conclusions with a rational order, both in the speculative and in the practical: being able to say now of the Sword, what the other Politician of the Compass: I guide & I am guided: for there is no movement, or time in its operations, that are not governed when they govern.

Some of those who, as Seneca said, prefer to disturb the Republic rather than command, qualify bravery, not by strength in the arm. This vain opinion is dispelled by the blazon of Viliffes and the mockery of Ajax.

You carry strength without mind.
You can fight, choose the time of fighting with me,
Atrides chooses: you only benefit from the body,
We with the spirit. ― Also in our bodies,
Our chests are stronger than our hand: all vigor is in them.

Nature can make the brave, but not the skilled: and without skill, there can be no bravery. The experts will be victorious in any combat, even if they are outnumbered: for without skill, bravery is a rush that damages itself, and the larger army will account for more victims to Mars. Antigonus founded this when, on being told of the excessive number of opposing combatants, inexperienced in military art, he replied: There is not one Soldier among so many who serve. And confident in his skill, Scipion Africanus in a not different situation, said to those who counted the enemy hosts by thousands: How many do you count me for? A skilled man is worth many: in whose concept Lucan said: There were two fighters in the situation; an army, and a man;

Any page of this book is flattery for the Spanish spirit, as its mercantile genius is polished, encompassed within the bounds of the art of offense and defense, without the intrepid nature throwing itself to be wounded in order to wound, a caution charged by Vegetius: It is not a skill, he says, that in executing the intent with the sword, the opponent reaps it. It teaches not to carry the sword as an adornment or stumbling block, when for those unskilled, it often serves as an obstacle. It teaches, along with dexterity, the luster of those who honor and are honored with the sword. Not only to carry weapons, but how to carry them: I mean, only to deal with them, because a sword without dexterity is not a sword: and there’s little difference between the coward and the unskilled; as one and the other merely carry the sword to hold it, but not to wield it: with the Author aiming not only to recommend the instrument, but also its weighty and careful handling; because it makes men. I can say with Seneca in Epistle 84. Such a spirit should be, that there are many arts in it, many teachings, examples of many ages, but all in agreement. Finally, I have not found anything that could stumble the most scrupulous, as there is no proposition that opposes our Holy Faith, in whose defense directs his study, and consecrates the steel: or that contradicts good customs: for which I think it should be granted, and appreciate the license he asks: With all due respect to a better judgment. San Martin de Madrid, and July 2, 1703.

The Master Friar Manuel de Villarroel

LICENSE OF THE ORDINARY.

We, the Licentiate Don Nicolas Alvarez de Peralta, Deputy Vicar of the town of Madrid and its District, Judge in the Court of the Nunciature of these Kingdoms, and Apostolic Proto Notary, &c. By the present, and as far as it concerns us, we give permission for the three Volumes of the Skill of Arms, composed by Don Francisco Lorenz de Rada, Knight of the Order of Santiago, Marquis of the Towers of Rada, Chancellor Major, and perpetual Registrar of the Kingdoms of New Spain, to be printed and published, considering that by our order they have been seen and recognized, and they contain nothing against our Holy Faith, and good customs. Madrid, November twenty-fourth of one thousand seven hundred and three year

Lic. D. Nicolas Alvarez
de Peralta.

By his command
Domingo de Goitia

APPROVAL OF DON JUAN ALONSO, of Muxica, Captain who was of one of the Companies of the Regiment of His Majesty’s Guard, his Cavalryman, and Gentleman of the Mouth, and Lord of Aramayona del Muxica. M.P.S.

By order of V.A. I have seen, read, and observed the three volumes that Don Francisco Lorenz de Rada, Knight of the Order of Santiago, Marquis of the Towers of Rada, Chancellor Major, and perpetual Registrar of the Kingdoms of New Spain, has written on the Science of the Sword, and wishes to bring to public light. In all of them, I have found no period that contradicts the statutes of a well-advised policy, nor clause that opposes the Laws and Ordinances of these kingdoms, but rather many useful things for the public and particular interest; because the license he requests should be granted, otherwise Spain would lose the noble works of this Author, and the scholars of Fencing would be without the erudite efforts of such a great subject; Spain would lose the glorious vanity of having such a great Writer, the convenience of the ambitious of the Science of the Sword to enjoy his revelations; therefore, it is just to ask for the license, and it should be given: Salvo meliori, with which my commission expired. But the obligation of affection does not expire, firstly to his many qualities; and secondly to the role of Soldier, which we both have exercised, where the affection of a martial correspondence is contracted; and I confess with sincerity that I am extremely fond of him, for his many and superior qualities; I leave those of his known quality, in which his happiness was due to the fortune of his birth, with which the highest providence had the direction, that he himself could choose for its nobility. This, which does not matter, wanted his cradle to be illustrious, because provident (most of the time) wants high progress not to have unworthy principles: and thus, he who turned out to be so superior in matters of valor, science, and studies, it seems that he should not lack the circumstance of nobility, so that the number of his successes would be complete; His valor is well demonstrated by the positions he has occupied: From science and studies; these Books he has written: From valor; in the occasions where he demonstrated skill, which only the spirit illuminates; so that it can be seen, that what was learned in the rehearsal with the black Sword is represented in the theatre of the white ones: without valor, study is useless, since without it there would be no service in the occasion: of the sciences, or study, because without it there would be no fever in the occasion: Of the sciences, and studies, his Works will better demonstrate than my praises.

They arrived (for my happiness) his Books to my hands; and the admiration to my discourses; and although admiration in the phrase of an erudite, is the mother of silence, sometimes the voice bursts out, by the recognition of the greatness that is admired.

I will not dwell on authorizing (if I could) his proposed demonstrations, because if he demonstrates without fallacy, he makes evident what he says, and what is clear in itself does not need proof; nor will I delve into the counterpoint of his doctrines, for fear of what happened to the orator Onosander with Hannibal of Carthage, who entered to hear the orator, and wished for him to hear the soldier, and said: He who has not experienced his doctrine will know the Art poorly: for jobs that consist of execution can hardly be known with mere knowledge. This I have, for my love of Mathematics, in whom this most noble Science of the Sword has its foundation, or to whom these Sciences (according to the opinion of this Author) are subordinate.What I can say, without my judgment seeming flattery or boasting, is (for that correlation, consonance, or combination of some Sciences with others, and of them with the written word) that D. Francisco treads new orbits of this Science, or recent spheres of this Art, being the inventor of a Science and Art of an unthought-of System, and of a sphere not yet constructed, and that, as a new Columbus of the Sword, he supplies gulfs of difficulties in Dexterity, and seas of discourse in demonstration.To find the new world, in the Castle, which he points out surrounds the Swordsman with the Sword; in the System that he imagines, that he mentally constructs, his most acute genius represents invisibly, of whom we can say what of the most subtle Astronomers, that if the Celestial Systems they imagine are not thus, they could make others in that way, not lacking reason; and thus we will say of our Don Francisco, that if the Swordsman is not thus fortified with the Sword in the Cylinder that he assumes, he could be thus, without opposing the truth.

Although it seems that he stole models, sketches, or outlines from our ancient professors of this Science, it cannot be said that he who invented new courses, flaming parallels; various demarcations, different poles, would make use of the old Charts, nor of the ancient detours; although it is true that all seek an end, not all go by the same path.

Until now, the path was marked by the circumference of confusion, by the periphery of obscurity; however, in these works, enthusiasts and scholars will find new short paths to follow; and although it may seem that he diverges into the labyrinth of other sciences, and into the knowledge of different histories, which could be criticized, what is diffused is not learned with clarity, nor is what is concise good, if it is ignored because of obscurity. A short enigma that is proposed is more tiring than a lengthy explanation that is understood; and when it is a foreign concept, enclosed in the obscurity of a hieroglyph, or tiring because of an enigma, it is a secret without a key, and a treasure in the field, or the arcana of Ramon Llull, who says, he reveals the philosopher’s stone, and the more he hides it, the more he teaches it.

Here, then, those fond of this virtue, Eutropelia of the Science of the Sword, will find infinite volumes, and in them the most intricate concepts. There is no Art, or Science that does not subordinate it. Here, then, we see Plato defrocked, Aristotle refined, Saint Thomas attended, Copernicus refuted, Euclid revered, Archimedes observed, without another infinity of Authors that he handles, more as a unique Scholastic, than as an excellent Soldier, which he is.

Here, understanding will be satisfied with the sweet nectar of truth, everything tested by demonstration, without the vain error of fallacy, or the unworthy wrinkle of sophistry: In the end, in these Works, those zealous of this Science have fertile fields of erudition, beautiful hanging gardens of the Sciences, without having other volumes to dry up, or other Treatises to understand. And so, we all owe Don Francisco immortal thanks for such a universally heroic benefit; for the cultivation of agile swordsmen, at first glance, seems to have no more use than that of the individual professor; and this, which seems a unique particular convenience, becomes a universal public benefit; because who knows that the only way to save an individual from a danger, may not become a universal public convenience, because this one who risked himself, could be a swordsman of such high hierarchy in quality, and personal endowments, that his absence would be a common public loss; and when this one was nothing more than the lowest vassal, it was enough largesse, that through dexterity he saved himself, and his opponent with the conclusion of this Science, from the unhappy insult of a fall, a damage in which nature first suffers, from which an individual is taken, for whose preservation, many volumes would not be in vain; for the sole one, according to the doctrine of Saint Thomas, Christ came to redeem; if this is man in eternity, much will be the proportion preserved in humanity: secondly, the King loses a vassal, who, as father of all, it is the same as taking away a son: the People a companion; so everyone loses in the outbursts of fury: the species its individual, the King his vassal, and the People its neighbor: and if all this is taken away, saved, and removed by dexterity in the occasions of wrath, we can give, as I have said, immortal thanks to the Author, who gives rules against the errors of wrath, and against the absurdities of a fury.

From here it follows that if there were many enthusiasts for the Sword, there would be more inclined towards war, where its jurisdiction is exercised more, although in the immensity of fires that have been invented, there is little room for its exercise; however, the one trained to not fear one will generate spirits to oppose many, as it is easier for the one who does not fear one to dare against many, than for the one who has a natural horror of all.

To have Soldiers, the utilities of the Republic are evident, since peace is the effect of war, and in the cultivation of this, that is seconded, and the laws speak if the arms are silent (although they do not live without each other); Arts shine and Sciences glow, trades are encouraged, and jobs grow, Religion increases: thus, for everyone, this public display of the fatigue of this studious subject is useful. And this, in the end, is my opinion: Salvo meliori. Madrid, and November 3, 1703.

Don Juan Alonso
de Muxica.
SVM

SUMMARY OF THE PRIVILEGE

Don Francisco Lorenz de Rada, Marquis of the Torres de Rada, &c., has privilege from our Lord the King and the lords of the Royal Council to be able to print three volumes of the Science, Art, and Experience of Spain, as more extensively stated in its original, dispatched in the Office of Don Bernardo de Solis, Secretary of our Lord the King, and his most senior Chamber Clerk of those residing in the Council. In Madrid, on the 10th day of the month of November 1703.

ERRORS CORRECTED

I have seen these Books, titled Nobility of the Sword, whose splendor is expressed in three Books, composed by Don Francisco De Rada, Marquis of the Torres de Rada, &c., and it is in accordance with its original. Madrid, and June 9, 1705.
Don Jachin Benito
del Rio y Cordido.
General Corrector by His Majesty.

PRICE

Don Bernardo de Solis, Secretary of our Lord the King and his most senior Chamber Clerk of those residing in the Council; I certify that having been seen by the lords of a Book titled Skill of the Sword, composed in three volumes by D. Francisco Lorenz de Rada, Marquis of the Torres de Rada, &c., which with permission of the said lords has been printed, they priced at twelve maravedis each sheet of the said Book; which appears to have two hundred and eighty-nine, without beginnings or tables, which in this regard amounts to three thousand four hundred and sixty-eight maravedis. And they ordered it to be sold at this price, and this Certification to be placed at the beginning of the Book. And so that it is known, I signed it in Madrid on the tenth day of the month of June of the year seventeen hundred and five.
Don Bernardo de Solis

TO THE WRITINGS, AND ADMIRABLE DEMONSTRATIONS of the Skill of the Sword and Dagger, both in Spanish and Italian, brought to light by the most skilful and distinguished Don Francisco Lorenz de Rada, Marquis of the Torres de Rada, by Don Joseph Garcia Hidalgo Alvarez y Barruezo.

SONNET

Destreza has arrived at the last end,
Its accuracy reached the heights sought;
From theory to execution it’s brought,
With certainty and truth it does defend.
Now the author who came last is first,
With discourse and proofs so well wrought,
So geometrically designed and taught,
That in Rada another Euclid immersed.
With his teachings, one cannot ignore,
How to defend and how to strike,
In studying his works, one will explore,
And find amidst danger, how to thrive.
To the skilled executor, nothing more,
Is left to do, nor to contrive.

OF AN AFFECTION TO THE AUTHOR

SONNET

Your subtle arguments, shown with such grace,
Are, Skilled Rada, a sight of sheer delight;
In lines and angles, I perceive the trace
Of geometric axioms, sharp and bright.
But with your sword and hand so well applied,
The doubtful will admire, seeing the true,
For deceit and falsehood, they have died,
In sight of such elevated marvels anew.
What was once much, now appears as none,
Seeing your knowledge, your discerning mind,
Crowning the empire of the Sword, well done;
And since you’ve ensured its greatness, well defined,
With theory and practice, under the sun,
“Non plus ultra” to your skill, we find.

BY THE SAME AUTHOR, SO SKILLFULLY adept at wielding the sword, as well as writing about its use in a mathematical and philosophical manner.

D. Felicianus Gilber of Pisa Fernandez

DODECASTICHON

The Olympic laurel yields to you from the arena’s spear;
A blooming Palm adorns your palm.
What the compact [sword] covers, you reveal its secrets, Pyragmon;
You’re accessible, and Mars shows you a safe path.
So easily you reveal what’s in the sword and in the volume; how
Pallas Athena loves your warfare; cultivated Minerva cherishes [you].
Your right hand is as good in camps as it is in writings; it first
Occupies the place in the twin fortress of Pallas.
You prove your writings by the sword; you fix conflicts on the leaf;
In the matters of sword and leaf, you have sharpness.
You fight writing; you argue contesting: hence,
Undoubtedly, you shine like Caesar in both ways on the page.

FROM THE SAME TO THE AUTHOR. TENTHS

If the portrait of the valiant Macedonian could be made by anyone who experienced any fortunate event: whoever presents your valor here fearlessly, since you are, if not the first, a second, and without a third, Alexander with the Sword.

Seyano could well be the swift, ominous brute; and against the name, unlucky could be the Tholosan gold: but that which (oh Rada!) your hand wields the Sword skillfully; without luck on the left (which could not be a crown) will achieve, as in Bellona, the advantages of a Master.

It was taught by some, reigning in honorable peace; at all times glorious is the Skill of the Sword: doubled glory is acquired with the wonders of such Art, the one your valor shares, since you generously bestow it, burning in funeral pyres all the noise of Mars.

Who, then, will be idle, even if they do not feel encouraged by such a generous study? Let useless rest cease; let homage be paid to Pallas: and since you mark the exercise of the Sword; let us leave the vice of idleness, let us give wings to Steel.

And since in a public fair you generously flood the world with your doctrine, which is no less wise than it is serious: no one in such a noble matter; no one in such grave matters, folds the keys of money; because if he spends freely before, in the one who instructs and learns, the world will see what you know.

The Temple of Fame, open (reward for your deserved sweat) although divided in many, offers you all its doors. You find both paths of Arms and Letters: the entrance cannot be denied to you; since you know how to overcome it in sum, to the sheaves of a Sword.

To this Book, then, which carves an immortal Temple to your name, in which where man learns, one and another example is engraved: I contemplate it so happily, that in the leaves of eternity, your heroism elevates, through Lines that the World praises, from the Temple of Fame, to that of Immortality.

TO THE READER, HEALTH, AND HAPPINESS.

Polidoro, Virgil, and other worthy men dignify, how much they rejoice in common and public benefit.

The ancient philosophers, the more arcane they were, seemed to elevate their knowledge more, not divulging the height of their concepts, and the interior of their speculations: for this they used fables, hieroglyphics, terms, and means that their intelligence required, consistent study from which caused various interpretations, being a single truth of the Sciences.

Plato had Socrates as his master, and he distinguished himself by forming new ideas: what he esteemed as divine, he hardly explained it to acquire such renown. Aristotle, the great disciple of Plato, did not emulate Plato, but revealed himself to be opposed in style, in logic, in arguments reduced to more precision, to more categories, and distinctions; thus fitting the name of Philosopher by antonomasia: and yet they noted him as obscure, and he needed the comments of Theophrastus his disciple, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Averroes, and others, which were perfected by Saint Thomas: adding afterwards so many, and such learned men as in public schools multiply opinions, however those are valued, that with greater evidence convince with demonstrable reason to the understanding, as much as our limited human capacity admits, which being so, can advance more and more in Sciences, and in the Arts.

Its nobility is qualified, either by the superiority of the objects, or by the infallibility of the means by which they are investigated. By the object, the first degree is granted to Theology, to Metaphysics, to the grand construction of the elemental and ethereal regions, the structure and composition of man, a brief world in the physical, and great in the powers of the Soul, capable of reason and free will, with aptitude for successes and errors, merit and punishment, prepared for defense and offense, both in singular combat and in aggregation of many, operating with Mathematical Science: which, if not the most noble by the object, is superior in the infallibility of its means reduced to demonstrative arguments.

And if Philosophy embraces all subjects of nature; Mathematics includes all continuous and discrete quantity, and in it movements and operations; its division admits various species, the main ones are Geometry, Arithmetic, Astronomy, and Music.

Geometry is subdivided into Cosmography, Geography, Hydrography, Chorography, Topography, Geodesy, and Stereometry.

Cosmography comprehends from the first movable, to the center of the earth. Geography the part of its globe, whose surface is habitable. Hydrography the seas, and the waters. Chorography the Regions. Topography the Places. Geodesy the fields. And Stereometry the buildings, towers, hollow bodies, vessels, etc

Arithmetic has discrete quantity as its subject: it is subdivided into collection of numbers, subtraction, multiplication, and division; these are the first four species, from which the others are derived, as from the multiplication of one number by another, the area is produced, which if square, arises from the number being carried in itself, or in another equal to it, and if unequal, gives the length of the larger number, and the lesser the width: and to the square power is named “cenloz” and if the number is carried twice, once in itself and another in its product, the result is the solid, which they call cube, or “censo”, recognizing, and finding by the root the power, and by the power the root, which results from multiplication, subtraction, and division, and the same in the roots of various species, and their powers, with which the other terms, or names, are considered and recognized, from which the major art is formed, which they commonly call Algebra, or rule of the thing; and from one and the other, we proceed to the exact knowledge of continuous and discrete proportions, as Euclid teaches, and is done by sines and logarithms; and from all this follows the Symmetry of distances, elevations, and depths, and of plane and solid figures, spherical, cylindrical, and conical.

Astronomy is divided into two terms, or species, according to the authors have used differently at various times: in modern times the term, named Astronomy, includes the consideration of the movements, and the places of lunar bodies, and stars, their magnitude, and placement.

Astrology is considered the observation and judgment of the influences, aspects, and qualities of the Stars, and how they operate on the inferior elements, and bodies: and to the professors they operate in the Judiciary, Genethliacs, and Chaldeans, etc. Celio Rodiginus considers Gnomonics as a species of Astrology, which works in the knowledge of the shadows, caused by the lights of the luminaries through dense bodies, from which results the construction of clocks: and it is given as the inventor of this species to Anaximander, disciple of Thales of Miletus, as Diogenes Laertius reports.

Meteoroscopy is that species of Astrology, which inquires about the distances of the Planets, and Stars, the differences in their elevations, courses, and movements, according to various hemispheres.

Dioptics is that, with which are investigated the circles, and the intervals of the Sun, Moon, and Planets, caused by different aspects, of which Astrology makes so much use, in which is granted Astrolabe, with tympanums, and spider, is attributed to another Ptolemy (who they called Synesius) according to Andrés Diucio.

Music is divided into Theoretical and Practical; the speculative which is the Theoretical, is based on harmonic proportions, different from the Geometric and Arithmetic, that these are caused by discrete or continuous qualities; and Music of proportional harmonic numbers, as in the Double of the Diatessaron to the Diapason, which is like from 4 to 8 will be a harmonic proportional number, exceeds the first number 4 by 1.⅓; and it is exceeded by the number 8 by 2.⅔, which is the same Double; proportion in which the extremes 4 and 8 are, in which the excesses 1.⅓ 2.⅔ have.

The practical, or multivariate Music, is the one that through diversity of organs expresses and produces concerto, and harmony; and as the human voice exceeds in sound the other voices (not by nature, but by Art), it is reduced to compound proportions in the mind, where the harmonic concepts are the nerves, or index of formal harmony, which all together is called Music. This is what the Ancients signified in the fable, and from them the name Music was derived, as Andrés Diucio explains.

From such principles, making use of Geometry and Arithmetic as subordinate, the knowledge of machines, mechanics, military art, and the Skill of Arms, down to the most individual, Queen of all, which is the Sword, corresponding to the Sword, adornment, strength, and defense of man, used and esteemed by the Ancients and Moderns, with the qualities, and differences that will be shown among the introductions of these Books. As in Philosophy, Sciences, and Arts, the distinguished men in them, have sought to immortalize themselves with their writings; so too there are many who, driven by such glory, have written and brought to light various works of the Philosophy, and Skill of the Sword alone, and defensive and offensive weapons, which usually accompany it.

In Spain, imitating Plato in the dialogic method, the Commander Geronimo de Carranza wrote with the erudition, and eloquence that is notorious, titling his Book (which came to light) Philosophy, and Skill of Arms, showing in it his great talent, and knowledge he had of other Sciences; although as obscure as his contemporary in Italy Angelo Vigiano, who with the same Platonic method wrote on the same subject, forming trees to conceive the quality of the movements of the Sword, in parries, and blows: and both authors proceeded with such obscurity, that Carranza needed to refer to other Books, offering in them the individual precepts for perfection, and teaching of this Science: and as this work (which was expected) was not printed, nor is there any news of him leaving it in manuscript, the most essential of what was achieved by such a great subject is lacking.

And Don Luis Pacheco de Narvaez (like Aristotle to Plato) succeeded him, reducing to more precise and clear terms, with which he came to be greatly esteemed in the nations of Europe; and in Spain, for his merits, Don Luis (like the Philosopher of the great Alexander) was a worthy Master of our lord King Philip IV (who enjoys God’s favor), the Great, the greatest of the Monarchs of the Orb, who accepted the name of disciple of such a wise Master, as Botero demonstrates, and I (like Theophrastus) while not presuming wealth to comment on his writings, fulfill (at least) by writing in the same Science of the Sword, owing most of my encouragement to the affection that the writings of such a great man put in me: for having been born with a martial inclination, not completely disfavored by Minerva, nor viewed with bad aspects by Jupiter, and Mercury; I was barely eight years old when the name of the great Don Luis, whom everyone venerates as the Prince of this Science, struck my ears: this was the cause of awakening in my tender age such a passion, that it forced me to collect all his works, studying them with such fervor, and affection, that although I was not fortunate enough to be able to hear his live voice, I was favored by the same Planets as Don Luis; with these, and more than 28 years of study, that I have in his writings, and in those of all the other Authors, who have treated this Science, to whom I have examined the most hidden of their thought with all mathematical rigor, demonstrating it with my arm, and Sword for more than 20 years, both in this Court and throughout Europe, seeing if not the whole, at least a large part of what it cost Don Luis more than 50 years in the speculative and practical, in giving as he did, knowledge of the power of man in his parts, for the use, and perfection of the individual operations both ordered and disordered, deduced from his organization, and body composition, with rules, and observations so adjusted, that in order not to touch on his perfection, I refer to the much that in so many Books he did not leave taught; where the most curious will find, to his desires, always falling short of my praises in his praise, without admitting passion (for the affection his writings deserve) since the estimation is due.

I omit much (in order not to prolong this discourse) the repetition of the names and works that Italians, French, and Northern Europeans have published on such a great subject, each one applying themselves to the form and use of the Sword, according to their Nation, following various opinions in postures, and in movements, defending, and offending, that in order to compile them in a brief summary, large volumes are needed, as can be seen in Gerard Thibaut, a modern author, native of Antwerp, whose book is so large, and with so many prints, and so costly, that when it had nothing more than the decoration of them, it deserves worthy esteem, owing much to all those who have stayed awake to communicate the fruit of their labors, to find the perfect Skill of the Sword; noble instrument, frequent, and necessary to every honorable man.

And having seen so many authors, and through them recognized, that despite so much having been written about this Science (which it is), it has not been fully understood, as there are so many different opinions in speculation and action without complete satisfaction of Philosophers, Mathematicians, and practitioners, with only one goal in mind: self-defense, in offense against the opponent, in which by reason the means of achieving such should be so certain that they become infallible; since the Skill of the Sword is reduced to the combat of two, which is called a duel of Duela currency, which is commonly named two to two, according to the feeling of Paulo, and I to the intended argument thus.

In the Art of War (which is combat of many against many), the precepts, maxims, and method should be one. In the duel (combat of two), which is more abbreviated, the same reason applies, and even more strongly, due to the known equal weapons: therefore, in the Skill of the Sword (accompanied or alone), which is the main instrument of combat, the precepts, maxims, and method should be one. The greater is proven, recognizing in the Writers and Historians, the times, and the ways of warfare, which are ordered for combat, according to the weapons, persons, and positions; varying only as they are varied: the lesser is manifest, the consequence is inferred.

With this knowledge, we can qualify the Skill of the Sword (accompanied or alone) as a Science, in which the mathematical disciplines are subordinate, just as in Philosophy: from which it results that the Skill is a demonstrable Science, and most noble for the subject (which is the man with the Sword in hand) and for the certain way of proving, which is mathematical. This conclusion is true, and by it, and other foundations, I decide to take up the pen, without limiting the spirit of so many, and such learned ones who have written, since I follow the infallible means of mathematical demonstrations; both in composition, as in resolution, which are the two poles, or bases on which the Sciences rely; the former because it is a means of teaching, and the latter of achievement, and those who have deviated from these Mercurys, or courses, have lost the way, drowning in the stormy sea of various, and confused opinions, caused by the different thinking, and acting, without having achieved the infallible by the mathematically demonstrable, recognizing by Geometry the species of continuous and discrete quantity, which are reduced to line, angle, surface, and body, and the subject of Skill admits the same consideration: from which it follows that the means of proving Geometry, and the Skill can be one, insofar as both make use of the continuous, and discrete quantity, and of the mathematical entity, and demonstration that is produced from it.

The Skill is achieved through straight and curved movements, with the body, with the arm, and with the Sword; and these cannot be formed without the species of quantity: linear, angle, surface, and body. It follows, then, that Geometry and Skill admit certain demonstrable means: and if they are infallible in Geometry, they are also infallible in the Skill of the Sword, accompanied or alone.

That the movements of Skill, with the body, arm, and Sword cannot be performed without causing some of the species of quantity, is evident; because any point that moves, forms the trace of its movement: for example: The end, or point of the Sword moved straight or curved, necessarily forms its vertigo according to the species of its straight or curved movement; being mathematical, although not perceptible to the sight, the lines, surfaces or solids that are caused by the movement that only tears the air. But if these same movements were made and formed in dense matter, they would be physical and perceptible; from which it follows that if the thread of the Sword is moved, it must cause a flat or curved surface, according to the nature and trace of the movement: and consequently, if the surface is terminated, the movement of the surface or surfaces is demonstrable, by the definition of the cylinder that Euclid gives, saying it is a solid figure, caused by the revolution of a right parallelogram in circulation of one of its sides to the fixed one, until the moving one returns to the point where it began its movement.

And defining the right cone, he said it is the vertical point caused by the pyramid, whose base is a circle of a solid figure, caused by the revolution of a right triangle, on one of the sides that includes the right angle. Nothing in the exercise of the Sword is more proper, and its knowledge more necessary (in my opinion) than these pyramids, of which I have found no written Author in this Science of the Sword instrument, but in Don Luis in folio 26. line 6: of his New Science, where he names cylinders, and pyramids, etc. without applying them in all his works; being their knowledge as necessary as I said: and these figures being so well known by the Philosophers professors of the Mathematical discipline, and their speculation and demonstrations being very ancient; in which Menechmus, a disciple of Eudoxus, and contemporary of Amiclas, very familiar with Plato, is admitted as the inventor, of whom Proclus, and Diogenes Laertius, certify was the first, who put in demonstrable method the conic and cylindrical sections, found by Analysis (as reported by Andrès Diucio) illuminating them with superior accuracy Apolonius Pergeo, from whose Book the last ones were missing, which have been supplemented, and given intelligence to all by the Most Learned Reverend Father Claudio Ricardo noble, native of Burgundy, Religious of the Insigne Company of Jesus who in the most famous Imperial College of this Court of Spain has read Mathematics and brought to light such a useful, and lucid work, that has been printed in Amberes, as a crown of many that he has written: with which in the speculation we will find the most estimable, that benefits the purpose of the Science, and Skill of the Sword, with which the man can hardly make movement, that is not forming some pyramid, or portion of it, whose base many times describes the tip of the Sword, and the cut the surface; and in the centers of the arm, elbow, vein, and wrist are the vertex points; and in the intersection of the Swords, when an aggregation is made, and a contract of one in another; whose axis is imaginary.

At other times the hand describes the base; and the vertex point is considered at the tip of the sword, when it reaches a specific point on the opponent’s body (as will be explained in due course). The definition of the sphere also serves the intention, which (according to Euclid) is caused by the revolution of a semicircle, until it returns to the point from where it began to move; although this definition is more about the structure of the sphere than its essence. This leads to the definition of Theodosius, who said, it is a solid body, contained within a surface, in whose middle is a point that is named the center; from which all lines drawn straight to the circumference are equal. From one and other solid figures, sphere, pyramid, and cylinder, the learned Archimedes discovered and taught the most that we accumulate, deservedly earning, that as an insignia they placed one figure inside another, as Cicero refers.

These principles (so far little noticed in the Art of the Sword) are of such consequence and consideration that without them (in my opinion) the possibility of achieving them becomes quite impossible. This is corroborated by the common maxim of Philosophy which perceives understanding through the organs of the senses, or understands through some analogy of the visible. In the Art of the Sword, the former method is used, understanding through movements, which due to the speed at which they are made and formed, since the sword does not leave a visible trace where it passes, it is very difficult to comprehend with the sense of sight, from where it has to be transferred to understanding; because it cannot be proportioned with visible distinction what physically takes place and is seen due to the accelerated movements of the sword, as is experienced in the rigor of combat, as far as the act is concerned. And consequently, neither can the understanding comprehend, nor can it conceive a formed discourse, from which evidence results in the visible.

However, what is so inaccessible in the physical is supplemented by the means of metaphysical imagination, by the similarity of pyramidal, cylindrical, and spherical figures, or their portions; due to the similarity they have with the proper and contrary movements, no matter how vehement and accelerated they may be, facilitating understanding with mathematical demonstrations that make physical representation perceptible to the eye. In this way, they can come to understand the differences in movements that are made and formed with the Sword: thus more perfectly regulating defense and offense in man, who is the object of this Science.

For greater understanding, let’s take the first example of optics, which through the imagination of lines, angles, surfaces, and bodies metaphysically formed in the air, without being comprehended by the visual sense, produces marvelous effects in perspective; as demonstrated by Vitellion, and the Archbishop of Canterbury in the common work he left written, whose demonstrations confirm our intention: just as painting also demonstrates; with the value of straight and curved lines, light and dark, produced by the outlines of imagined bodies, according to visual proportions, placing them in such a way, that the result of their operation on a plane, deceives the eyes with illusions of light, that perceive apparent things as true. Therefore, sculptural painting was first before brush painting, as inferred from Pliny, and others in different places, conceding the first brush to Apollodorus of Athens, in the opinion of Juan Rungio Gripwaldense; and both methods were born from lines, surfaces, and bodies premeditated ideally for physical works; as also in the speculations of celestial movements, both of the prime mover, and of the other spheres and stars, their appearances, and courses, knowledge results from various figures, found in fantasy, and operated in demonstrations. As can be seen in Ptolemy, in the Great Construction, and in his Expositors, who imagine circles, caused by different stars, and points, and granting eccentric and concentric orbs, different equants, and epicycles, come to exact knowledge of the course of the Planets, aspects, distances, and eclipses, caused by the pyramidal shadows that the Sun produces for the earthly body, which is also seen in Gnomonics, which through the same means of conical shadows gave diverse designs of sundials.

In Cosmography, circles and triangles are also investigated, which distinguish and demonstrate the zones, climates, and places, from where the elevations of the Pole, the diversity of the artificial days, and everything else that includes the knowledge, and use of the natural and armillary sphere is derived, achieving the art of navigation by course and altitude in which there is no little to discuss with regard to the intention.

In speculative Music, from which the practice is produced (as has been touched upon), the harmonic proportions are found in the mind, from where we come to the knowledge of what are the harmonic proportional numbers between their extremes, from where in action the concept, and harmony is formed, just as also in the combat of the Sword, first it is known in the mind what is the means of proportion between the extremes, and what is the proportionate; with which a certain species of harmony in movements reduced to two compasses and proportions is achieved, in which the more skillful is more victorious. In this consideration it is worth noting the introduction, form, and sound of the war instruments, their differences, and compasses, found, and reduced to the Military Art in combat, ordinance, and fight, both in the singular contest, and its trials, jousts, and tournaments, in which skill is learned, as in the realities of duel, and war, recognizing that in one, and the other there is harmony.

Assuming this, it is not unreasonable and without discussion that the Skill of Arms is dealt with, inquired into, and achieved with the very means of the examples referred to; and that as Mathematics are subordinate, it chooses from them what is convenient for speculative and practical regulation, and movements of the arm, and of the Sword reduced to method, that straight and curved lines, circles, surfaces, and solid spherical, cylindrical, and pyramidal solids, means of proportion, and proportionate are formed in the air; and that by the proper order of everything, postures, dispositions, movements, and operations of the body are regulated and executed on the horizontal planes on which it moves, or elevates, imagining, and choosing such circular, or straight paths, as in calm, or stormy navigation, that conceding in the understanding, without perceiving with distinction in sight the wake of the Ship, serve as a guide in the great sea of the Skill of the Sword, in which although the whole seems almost incomprehensible; I will try to advance as much as I can, reducing power to determined acts, with such brevity, and clarity, that neither burdens the memory, nor disturbs the understanding; but facilitates it in such a way, that with average ingenuity, and agility, one can recognize, and achieve what with many years of studies, and experiences, exercise, and communications has been accumulated, to form this work with all perfection, keeping in it precepts, and rules of Philosophy, and Mathematics, proceeding by principles, arguments, and demonstrations, from the universal to the special, constructing this building to perfection, making firm bases the definitions, requests, axioms, hypotheses, and analysis, as accepted in Philosophy, and Mathematical disciplines, as well as the ones of Skill, conforming in terms with the most accepted in the Sciences, and Arts, to achieve the greatest clarity, in which I put special care, wishing to be understood, and to make myself understood, excluding the affectation of phrases, and exquisite words, because it is not in the sonorousness of words, and locutions the essential, but in the substance, explained with pure, chaste, and proper language, as the Philosopher teaches, noting the differences. Readers and students, receive my affection, which is to succeed, so that my greatest reward is your censure adjusted to reason, which I will appreciate as a teaching.

Farewell.

FIRST DISCOURSE.

ON OFFENSE AND DEFENSE

If one inquires in antiquity about offensive and defensive weapons, one will find, by force of reason, and from Sacred and Profane writers, that their use was occasioned by discord and war; the former admitting singulars, such as Gaius and Titius, duel or contest: and the latter extending to the fight of many against many, multitude against multitude.

Provident nature in plants, animals, birds, and fishes, granted them weapons for offense and defense broad field has discourse in individuals. Cicero noted it, Anacreon touched it, whose sense is this in our language;

The Bull strikes with the hard point,
The Horse has its weapons in its foot,
The Hare takes advantage of the swift course,
That provident nature gives them,
As well as to the Lion, fierceness, and teeth.
From the bravest to the most timid of animals, they act as they can, in offense and defense; why wouldn’t the same be found in man? Thus Lucretius noted, that in the primitive:
The ancient weapons were
Hands, nails, and teeth.

Marco Tulio elegantly confirmed it, speaking for Milon: This is not an exercised law, but a native one; we did not learn it, nor read it, but received it; for truthfully we seize and operate it from nature itself; as if our life fell into some traps, like between force, among the offensive weapons of thieves, enemies, it would be permissible for all our reason to save ourselves.

From this natural precept, Ulpian drew the common maxim, accepted by the Jurisconsults: it is lawful to repel force with force. Or according to Cassius: This right is compared to nature. From this results the permission in defense and offense, admitted by common laws; and in this part the precept does not hinder. Do not harm another, to which it is responded, is understood only in the manner prohibited by reason and justice, as it follows from Canon Law, to whose validation the words of the Pontiff Clement V are useful, declaring whether or not he incurs irregularity the one who in his defense gives death to his invader? Comparing it to the furious, he says: If the furious, or the infant, or the sleeper injures or kills a man, he does not for this reason incur any irregularity; and the same we declare in the one who kills another, not being able to save himself in any other way, because he injures or kills his invader.

From this principle to our intent, it follows to discuss the point of offense and defense, in which it is not a little disputable which is first, the offense, or the defense? Those who admit that the defense precedes, base themselves on the fact that man, as a rational being, first seeks a repair that will defend him: therefore he dresses against extreme cold and heat. That’s why he builds dwellings, opposing the inclemencies of the weather. That’s why he seeks to live in the company of others: that’s why he surrounds populations with walls and fortifications: that’s why he constructs Towers, Castles, and Fortresses: that’s why he arms himself before he fights: that’s why he first puts on the breastplate, and the other pieces of armor, and takes up the shield, before the steel is drawn, nor is attacked: Military Ordinances come before the onslaughts: first one learns, and practices the use of the spear, and the Sword, before executing the strike on the contrary; first nature, the Teacher of the Arts, arranged in the Elements, in the plants, in the animals of all species (beasts on earth, birds in the air, fish in the waters) with which to defend and repair themselves. Trees and fruits are defended with bark and peel; whoever looks attentively at the spike, finds it surrounded by sharp awns, which, like spears, surround it, sees the dense tunics, which surround the grain, constructing a safe dwelling for it. What branch, what flower, what fruit is there without defense, the thicker, or impenetrable, the weaker the pith, seed, flower, or fruit, which it preserves? The seed, which is essential for propagation, is always defended. The pear, the quince, the apple, the peach, the apricot, the pomegranate, the plum, the cherry, teach, demonstrating their prepared defenses: beasts, diverse in various skins (according to their natures) are dressed, and disposed to defend themselves; birds with feathers, fish with scales, and the most delicate with shells. The Elements in the opposition of qualities have their defenses. Therefore, primacy in defense must be conceded: hence it was appropriate that the Soldier, who lost his shield, should be given greater punishment than the one who lacked the Sword.

This concept admits an even more expansive discourse, if not entirely omitted here, at least limited. However, opening the door wide to the amplification of brave minds, many recognize offense as primary, granting it a preceding degree: its primacy is qualified because it is the principle of occasion, for without offense, defense would be in vain.

Man, because heat offends him, because cold bothers him, dresses and repairs himself. Because the temporal inclemencies harm him, he builds dwellings: against expugnations, he constructs walls and fortresses; against offensive weapons, he chooses and uses defensive ones; he uses a congregation of people to defend himself from an aggregation of: people he uses Military Ordinances to defend himself against Military Ordinances: and in the end, from the premeditation of the offense, the defense is investigated and produced. Therefore, offense has the first degree, the first antiquity, than defense.

Well, offense is divided into just or unjust: the just can be called correction, punishment, or satisfaction: the unjust, crime, grievance, or insult, in respect to equal or lesser. The angels, in the retinue of Lucifer, committed the first crime and were punished, not offended, because the offense was against the Supreme Highness, the Supreme Justice. The same happened to man, who committed a crime against his Maker, who corrects him, punishes him, and does not offend him. The trees, the plants, arm themselves against man, dressing in offensive instruments, sprouting thorns, and poisonous points: even the Rose, Queen of Flowers, produced thorns, all being executors against man. Offense and defense are correlative; and it is not a small dispute, which is more noble, assuming that offense does not become a crime.

This concept dies in the definition of one and another species, as Angelo Vigiano feels, saying: That offense is action, and defense is resistance; hence in Philosophy it is common, to be more the agent than the resistant; and by this maxim, offense is nobler than defense: because action comes from form, and passion from matter.

This is understood in proportionate action; in respect to the subjects, since action in abstract will always be nobler than passion; but in concrete terms it may sometimes be less: let’s take an example from elemental nature. The active opposing qualities, heat, and cold, are nobler than the passive ones, wet, and dry; although when combined they alter, so the passive ones can be active; because physical agents, in doing, suffer, just as water through humidity corrupts fire, etc. From this doctrine it can be deduced (speaking naturally) that offense is nobler than defense, as long as defense is considered mere.

Applying this to the purpose at hand, it is reasonable to question whether human artificial offense is nobler than human artificial defense? Not everything that is granted in nature is granted in art; for its explanation, we turn to the qualification of acts in offense and defense, in which virtue or vice can be found in both; thus, offense and defense can be just or unjust; and in such a difference, the offense may exceed the defense, or the defense may exceed the offense; and in this consideration, one or the other can be understood as noble, or vile.

For greater clarity, offense can be called impulse, and defense can be called repulsion; and in such terms, offense and defense can be proportional, not exceeding each other: from which it follows that both in offense and in defense, magnanimity and strength (related virtues, comprehended in a tight bond) are involved. For he is magnanimous who resists and defends himself against all the cases that occur to him, whether prosperous or adverse; he is neither vain in the former nor annihilated in the latter; he remains tranquil in both: just as the excellent pilot in the greatest storm, neither the tumultuous seas, nor the furious winds, nor the rocking of the ship, nor the confusion of the sailors disturb his spirit, nor does he abandon the governance of the helm and the sails: he attends to everything, anticipates everything, and in everything executes with accuracy: just as in the calm, he does not trust, does not surrender to rest, does not forget the danger: he acts with magnanimity in tranquility and in storm, breaking the waters, overcoming the contrasts, to lead himself to the port, without which he is headed. The same effects are proper in strength, for this reason the Doctor Angelico defined it, saying: It is a moderating virtue of fear and audacity.

These virtues (strength and magnanimity) are admitted in defense and offense, because the one who defends himself strong and magnanimous, persists in difficulties, and the one who offends against oppositions, seeks victory.

It follows, then, that offense and defense are equally noble as long as they are proportional to what is just and upright; just as they can also be vile, insofar as offense stems from unreason; and defense, if it turns into a cowardly flight.

From all the foregoing, it is deduced that offense and defense are equal in nobility, proportionate to what is just, as much as one offends and defends within decent limits, conceding that offense will be more generous when it is of such valor that it overcomes and does not pursue; and defense more praiseworthy, and a shield, when it is not only mere defense, but repulsion of the offense, offending the aggressor, as Angelo Vigiano well defined it.

From these principles (specific to individual contests) comes the reason for numerous conflicts between peoples, which is called war, since there is offensive war and defensive war: in the offensive, the reason for justice is qualified, from which the terms “just war” and “unjust war” resulted; and in the defensive, flight is not admitted; but repulsion, in which extensive discussions are offered, which are omitted, as they are not the subject of this discussion.

More to the point, one must investigate which is more natural, offense or defense? Since both are natural in their own right, as an effect produced by nature itself, understanding offense in the sense and acceptance mentioned above.

This is demonstrated in the Elements, in plants, in terrestrial animals, in birds, in fish, and in everything that is capable of quality, instinct, or impulse, to offend and repel their counterparts. The same is found in humans with greater perfection, for being rational animals.

From the perspective of defense, it seems more natural; and on the contrary, there are foundations for offense, in addition to those touched upon at the beginning of this discourse; to which it is added, that nature itself, since the first sin of man was committed, inclines, moves, and violently leads to offense due to the excess of passion; Job recognized this, saying: The life of man on earth is a battle.

Not only does this definition encompass humans: all life of the living is a battle, the predatory birds tearing through winds, just like fish in the seas, sustaining themselves through predation, offending each other, and even swallowing each other: The Eagle flies, the Swordfish cuts through, swiftly (according to their wings), the former through the clear air, the latter through the liquid Element, to offend, the former the birds, the latter the fish: The terrestrial beasts have an innate antipathy, maintaining a constant battle among themselves. There is a struggle in all species, making it difficult to determine which is more natural: in this, the high providence is recognized, which gave natural aptitude to offense and defense. The Elements do not cease their natural battle among themselves, sometimes they offend, sometimes they resist, sometimes they persist in the continuation of their fight, with offense always preceding, as Ovid said: Hot fights against cold, Dry opposes the wet. In the sentient beings it is the same. Each one recognizes its natural opposite, each one is impelled by instinct, and nature to offense, and even to treachery against its opposite, moving to offend, and to resist: and man, although reason corrects him, rarely overcomes himself, because he does not lack the inclination, taking more pride in being an offender than a resistor: differentiating himself, as in human qualities, that the choleric is opposed to the phlegmatic, the sanguine to the melancholic. Entire Nations, in general, are contrary to other Nations, as Histories show; and everything proves that in human warfare, offense precedes defense, by nature itself, with reciprocal action.

In light of this understanding, exploring their definitions by genre and difference, one could say: that offense is a natural offending impulse: and defense is a natural defensive and offensive repulsion. These definitions seem more proper (in my view) than those given by others, like Angelo Vigiano, saying: that offense is an action of violence, or violated: and in admitting such terms, the clear reason is destroyed, that there is a natural and just offense; just as it is, and can be defense in its own terms of natural defensive and offensive repulsion; since as has been demonstrated, offense and defense in their decent limits, are natural acts, produced by necessity in beasts; and reason; and necessity in man, who must act as a rational being, restraining himself to moral virtues, with which he makes offense and defense nobler: because in exceeding the licit limits, virtue turns into vice, as the Philosopher widely proves, just as the strong; exceeding in strength becomes reckless: and the prudent, if he is overly fearful, becomes a coward, the liberal becomes prodigal, and the measured becomes miserable. From which Celio Rodiginio recognized that virtue rests on two pillars, or elements; one, the hope of honor; another the fear of infamy (which he called penalties) by the authority of Cicero: and between these two terms operate offense and defense, which admit our definition, both of one and the other; and for both (perfected science, and the art the nature) instruments are found, which generically are named Weapons, because man is rational, and therefore nature did not give him offensive and defensive instruments; like the beasts: granting him greater perfection in the discourse, and in bodily movements, which together with the armigerous instruments, acquires superior means for offense and defenses; making him, according to reason, according to art, and according to science: and as this act is acquired by habits, and precepts, from antiquity the most political used contests, which they named, games, or exercises, being the most celebrated the Olympic; exercising in the races, and in bodily agility, operating between the two terms, or elements, hope of honor, and fear of infamy; or penalty

And out of care I omit here to explain individually how many species of offense there are, which are committed without weapons, which with bodily operations; which cause injury to honor, to Majesty, or to Office, which to the person alone. In this there is so much to discuss, and to dispute, and it admits entire books, not of my intention.

In the same way, I omit to deal with each species of Weapons, because the proper assumption is not general, but specific to the Sword alone; or accompanied, of which its principle, its dignity, its perfection, science, and skill in offense, and defense, noble, and decent will be investigated.

SECOND DISCOURSE.

ORIGIN OF THE SWORD, its qualification, use, estimation, and dignity, in various times, and Nations.

From which in the Judges, as noted by Pedro Gregorio, it is said that the girdle is because it grants them the faculty of jurisdiction, in which greater and lesser girdles are considered, for the greater or lesser power of the Sword, from which resulted the proverb, or term: Exercise, judges, in great girdles. And from such high considerations, Lampridius ponders the sentence of Alexander Caesar, who said. Never will you sell the honor of the right of the Sword, because he who buys, sells.

Dion Cassius writes of Octavius Caesar, that for the greater honor of the Provincial Praetors (corresponding to the Governors) he granted them, while exercising such preeminent Offices, to wear military attire and gird themselves with a Sword, representing in it the entire jurisdiction: and to the Proconsuls, and Prefects, and the others, who had limited jurisdiction, they were not allowed to gird themselves with a Sword, nor wear military attire. Giphilinus, in confirmation of the great prerogative of the Sword, noted against Parthenius, that being in the Chamber of Domitian (who granted him the honor of girding himself with a Sword) he treacherously killed the same Prince who had allowed it, thus multiplying the atrocious crime.

Herodian relates of Emperor Severus that when asked: What was the greatest honor Paucianus, Prefect of the Roman Courts, enjoyed? He replied that it was to continually carry a Sword at his side, as it was the insignia of the Supreme Dignity. Tritemius writes of Besançon, King of the Sicambri and later of France, that great deed against his own son Sedamo, because having promulgated the laws of Chivalry (which he observed rigorously) and Sedamo being accused and convicted of committing adultery, the King drew his Sword, and with his own hand, to give him the most honorable death possible, cut off his head, saying: It is not I, but the law that takes your life. For this action, he was called the Just, as he did not fail in legal rigor, nor allowed the executioner to carry out the punishment, nor was it done with a less noble instrument than the very same Royal Sword. The reason and antiquity of the ceremony of auguring and entering into the greatest applause the Kings and Sovereign Princes with the naked Sword before them, carried by a great personage, I will touch upon.

Bautista Ignacio argues that the practice of Kings and Sovereign Princes carrying before them the Ense (which signifies Sword, or Royal Rapier) unsheathed, symbolizes the increase of supreme power, which does not need the sanction of others for the effective use of high jurisdiction. To this point, it’s noted that the Duke of Venice, although carrying a sword before him representing the supreme jurisdiction of the Republic he governs, does not however have it unsheathed, but instead sheathed in a golden scabbard; signifying that he does not punish hastily on his own, but with the mature counsel of the Senators. In place of a sword, the associated Consuls carried before them

From this, Pedro Gregorio adds that the Sword and the Safe preceded the Kings, signifying that the highest power of jurisdiction lies within themselves, without associates. Thus, Romulus displayed before him twelve Lictors, who preceded him in the manner of the Etruscans, because twelve Peoples elected the Kings, and for each one gave to the King a Lictor, a royal insignia that he could wield the power of his Sword in each jurisdiction, in which Titus Livius and Dionysius of Halicarnassus agree.

And even earlier than the Romans, among the Persians and Greeks, the Sword signified supreme and royal power, as Quintus Curtius notes. The Chaldeans (a rank among the Persians equivalent to the Egyptian Priests) seeing that Darius at the beginning of his empire abandoned the form of the Persian sword and imitated the Greek one, prophesied that Darius’ empire would pass to the Greeks, whose style of sword he had chosen. Such must be its importance, so esteemed it is in the common consent of people, Princes, Kings, and Monarchs, that in all political nations, and at all times, the Sword has been, and is, the most noble, most distinguished, and most considered military and political instrument.

Thus, in the auguries and coronations of Emperors, Monarchs, Kings, and Sovereign Princes, the most esteemed demonstration is with the Sword, as can be seen in the Western Empire, which is crowned with the Diadem, Sword, Scepter, and Golden Globe, as Pedro Gregorio writes, referencing others.

Suetonius Tranquillus in the augury of Aulus Vitellius recounts that upon receiving him as Emperor, the military people, divided into troops and occupying the most important posts, unsheathed their swords and acclaimed him equal to Mars, and Julius Caesar: and Vitellius greeted them with great demonstrations, because the Sword is the insignia of supreme power, jurisdiction, and dominion in offense and defense.

Carlos Sigonio, describing the augury of Julian Augustus, says that having been acclaimed Emperor by the military, following the death of Constantius, he made an eloquent prayer to those in his retinue. As a demonstration of their loyalty to him to the last moment, they congratulated him with their shields embraced and their swords unsheathed, placing the edges on their necks. In imitation of this, the Rectors and Princes present at the act did the same as a sign of obedience and loyalty to the Imperial dignity.

Saxon Grammaticus considers the greatest act of fealty to their Prince for clients to touch the sword and to kiss it with humility and reverence, thus acknowledging the supreme power in their King, and the supreme obedience in themselves.

In the Christian Religion, the Supreme Pontiffs consecrate the Sword, which in great honor, with a Legate, they send to the Prince who fights against the enemies of the Holy Catholic Faith, as a symbol of victory, and as an incentive to greater deeds against Infidels, as noted in the Ceremonial.

This action is very ancient in the Church, as Hector Boecio notes, referring to the example of William, King of Scotland, to whom the Pope sent the sacred Sword in the year 1202, with a sheath adorned with gold and precious stones, and it was sent with a Legate. The same favor was done for Lord Juan of Austria by Pope Pius V, as a symbol of the naval victory he achieved with a significantly smaller fleet against the numerous Turkish one.

Not only in the auguries and honors of Emperors, Monarchs, Kings, and supreme Princes is the superior dignity displayed with the Sword, but it is also used to bestow the investitures of the highest titles, offices, and honors, as Ammonius, Godfrey of Viterbo, and others relate. Pedro Gregorio, by the authority of Otto Frisingensis, notes as a general rule that the symbol of the tradition of every Feud is the Sword, or the Standard, with such distinction that the investiture of the Kingdoms is given by the Sword: and thus, when the Pope solemnly gives the investiture of King, before the Gospel, the blessed Sword, which is on the Altar, he himself girds it on the King, as a symbol of the defense of the Church, and the punishment of wrongdoers.

And the investiture is given by the Banner, or Standard, when it is not of Kingdoms, but of Provinces, as the aforementioned authors and Pedro Gregorio Toledano note in his Syntagmas iuris, and here are omitted the many examples that the Histories offer, for what he intends to gird this discourse

In Spain, the investiture of Admiral is given, according to the laws and ancient laws, with the Sword, Ring, and Standard, as well as to the Vassal, and the Leader, and of the Rich Men was their insignia Sword, Banner, and Cauldrons granting them maintenance, as found in our laws, laws, and ancient Writers.

The knighting in all political Nations is with the Sword, which was watched over with the other arms; and in Castile, and Leon in antiquity the Knight was given a blow to the neck, and he gripped his Sword, with the demonstration of drawing it against the one who knighted him, in whose respect he contained himself; but now only the blows with the Knight’s own Sword are used, which is taken from him by the one who arms him; and once the ceremony is done, it is returned to the sheath.

The institution of Military Orders, whose admission and honor is associated with the Sword, is performed with the ceremonies of Knighthood, as stated in their Constitutions.

The Order of Santiago is named after the Sword, not so much for the qualified title, nor for the form of the Red insignia they wear on their chest, but for a special dignity and acknowledgment of the Military Institute’s obligations. In this regard, it is worth remembering that the Templars, among the constitutions of their Knighthood (highly esteemed during their time), the primary ones were to die for Christ, be the first to take up arms against Infidels, not to turn their backs having drawn the Sword, nor return to their quarters without their Captain. And if they were to be captured, they would offer no other ransom than their belt and Sword. They observed this precept so strictly that when Saladin captured a nephew of the Master, asking for more ransom than the belt and Sword, the Master preferred him to die in captivity rather than give more ransom than the belt and Sword, in accordance with his Templar Knight status, as related by John Villembrochio Dantiſcano.

The Teutonic Knights, a chivalric order, were known as Gladiators, because of their sword and the skill they professed with it, as Mnuster recounts. In conclusion, to highlight victories, it is common in Scripture to qualify them with the term, “ln ore gladij,” which is the same as “in the wake of the sword”; in Spanish it corresponds in the same sense to say: “He entered the strength with a sword in hand,” which means the same as by force of arms. By the way, it is worth pondering that in all times, in all nations, and in all symbols and paintings, the sword is, and has been, in the shape of a cross, which its guard has required, and not without great mystery, which is not of this subject.

Regarding the makers, shapes, qualities, and material of the sword, one could expand the discussion into a volume; but here it suffices to adorn, that of the sword that Ascanius gave to Euryalus, its creation was attributed to Lycaon Genosto, as Virgil describes.

Demosthenes, the father of the orator, was nicknamed “Makeropio”, derived from “Makera”, which in Greek is the same as “Sword”, because he had a large workshop, where very fine swords were crafted, having for its manufacture expert officials and servants, as Plutarch narrates. Suidas says that the Romans in the second Punic war, imitating the Iberian Spaniards, used swords with a point and edge, which they made for both hands.

Diodorus Siculus notes that the Celtiberian Spaniards, to manufacture swords and other weapons, stopped the iron (according to their ancient custom) making it into sheets, and hiding them in the ground, where the weaker parts were consumed over time, and from the most purified they made very fine swords, and from the less pure the other pieces of armor, so the swords came out so strong that no shield, helmet, or loriga could resist them. And Suidas notes that although the Romans in the war of Hannibal, reduced to a better measure, and form the swords, leaving those they used in old times, imitating the Spaniards; however, they did not achieve the purification of the iron, nor the goodness, nor the art in the tempering, and manufacture, in which the Spaniards exceedingly surpassed the other Nations. It is therefore recognized that in the manufacture, in the measure, in the perfection, and in the skill, nobody equaled the Spaniards, because the weapon sword is more ancient, and more proper to Spain and of greater esteem, and dignity, than in the other Kingdoms, and Provinces.

From all this it is concluded, that Sword is named with different voices (according to various languages) and it is the instrument, and weapon of the highest dignity, of the highest nobility, of the highest symbol, and of the highest esteem. Then its science, and its exercise should be speculated, known, and exercised by every Prince, by every noble, by every Soldier, and by every man of reputation, who girds a sword, in peace, or in war.

THIRD DISCOURSE.

INTELLIGENCE, AND EXERCISES, of the Sword, if it is a science, and of what kind

The modern Philosophers, with obscure knowledge, insist on the division of sciences, which concern the handling of weapons, in the preliminary questions of Logic, and Metaphysics, investigating as to the universal, its antiquity, properties, and distinction, which Aristotle, Saint Thomas, Saint Isidore, Hugo de Sancto Victore, along with the stream of Logicians, and Metaphysicians deal with, and with special curiosity Julius Caesar Scaliger, and Eugubino.

Regarding the antiquity of sciences; some want them to be derived from Adam, passed on by traditions, rather than in writing, thus passing from one age to another, to the Greeks, and from these to our times. Others, with Eusebius Berossus, and Josephus admit that the first sciences were derived from Adam, and later concede various inventors, as reported by Polydore Virgil.

Regarding the discourse and reason (in which the philosophers do not disagree), it is inherent to man, that his understanding is like a blank slate, in which nothing is shaped, because he is born without any knowledge; although, with the propensity to know, the desire being more insistent for the necessary, or for the useful: the former, which moves, not only for comfort, but for reason: and the latter, for self-interest.

Both are the origin of sciences, with speculation being first, from which the speculative or theoretical terms resulted, whose end is the contemplation of the truth: and from this first consideration, the active, or practical ones were produced, which have their proper end in the work itself.

These are subdivided into two more adequate terms, because the active ones guide the actions that are in the same potential agent, on the part of intelligence: and the practical, or effective ones, guide the operations that are external, or outside the same potential agent, because they pass to extrinsic works, like playing instruments, etc. from where Aristotle concluded, that sciences, some are contemplative, others active: those effective, by means of which man with understanding recognizes, perfects, and guides actions, preparing in himself what is necessary: these, by which in effect pass to the extrinsic operation.

The strictly philosophical divide contemplative science into Metaphysics, which focuses on the spiritual and the common being; Physics, which deals with the sensible, such as humans, etc., and Mathematics, which looks at quantity, subdivided into continuous and discrete: continuous by Geometry, discrete by Arithmetic. Astrology, which contemplates the number, movements, and magnitude of the Heavens; Music, the number, proportion, and harmony; Perspective, the visual lines that distinguish the various ways of seeing, due to the varying position of objects. These are more accurately mathematical means rather than proper mathematical sciences: hence, they can be reduced to Physics, these four species, Astrology, Geography, Music, and Perspective, which originate from Geometry and Arithmetic, just as to Metaphysics are reduced the speculative, active sciences, which direct interior actions, such as Logic, and Dialectics: and those that touch on Moral Philosophy, widely discussed by Aristotle in his Ethics and Politics.

From these common principles, as parts of the active sciences, resulted the Arts, which distinguish humans in the common animal genus (as touched on by Pedro Gregorio) directing towards the necessary and useful in human society, either by voice, by letters, or by works: by voice, by the congruous means of words in various languages, which explain concepts: by letters, in Rhetorical and Oratorical eloquence, either for permanence in writings, or for communication with the absent, letters being elements that, in right arrangement, stand for words, forming syllables, dictions, periods, etc., from which History and Poetry, etc. achieve perfection. For these works, philosophers classify the seven liberal and noble arts, which are included in the common Latin verse:

Lingua, Tropus, Ratio, Numerus, Tonus, Angulus, Astra.

Lingua, signifies Grammar: Tropus, Rhetoric: Ratio, Logic: Numerus, Arithmetic: Tonus, Music: Angulus, Geometry: Astra, Astrology.

The first three, which are called trivium or trivial, look at and are directed to eloquence, and explanation of concepts.

The last four (which are the quadrivium) are directed to continuous and discrete quantity, and all seven earn the reputation of Liberal arts and science.

To these, the Logicians add another seven Arts, which they call servile, included in this verse:

Rus, Nemus, Arma, Faber, Vulnera, Lana, Rates.

Rus signifies Agriculture: Nemus, the Hunt, or Art of Hunting: Arma, Arms: Faber, Architecture: Vulnera, Surgery: Lana, Woolwork, or Art of Weaving: Rates, Navigation.

They tend to call these Arts servile, because they serve the body, just as the Liberal ones serve the soul: and both are considered worthy in a noble person: and to both, they add the mechanical arts, which are the operators in different species, widely and specifically discussed by the Philosopher.

Those who materially look at the term Arms, like Friar Pedro de Oña in his Logic, and other moderns, understand by the term Arms the Gladiator, or Laniſta Art, which they judge to be the skill of the Sword, without considering that the term Arms is a material generic, and not specific, as will be proven in its place, demonstrating that the understanding and exercise of the instrument named Sword is not only a Liberal Art, but also a science; making use of Logic, as the science of sciences, for being the investigator of the true and the false, as Boethius and Saint Thomas teach, and all the current philosophers; although some moderns, like Fathers Pereyra and Fonseca, want the investigation of sciences to touch on Metaphysics, because the metaphysician is like a craftsman, from where the investigation is consequently. But in this part, we follow the most received opinion of Boethius and Saint Thomas, and others, with Averroes, who calls Logic, the common instrument of all sciences. But the dispute here is not about that, but whether it is a science or art, and what kind, the understanding and exercise of the Sword.

Proceeding, therefore, radically, we consider the cognitive powers, which Celio Rodiginio named (taking the term from pure Greek) in science, art, and experience, recognizing them as analogous to each other, and all three species are proper to the understanding and exercise of the Sword, as will be demonstrated in these discourses.

Aristotle teaches that to discourse in the sciences, above all things, one must distinguish the equivocal terms, thus avoiding confusion in the terms, because the division of the sciences is recognized by the variety of instruments, and ways of knowing; that is, by the organs and means by which science is acquired, reasoning by topical places, by demonstration, to cause and effect, or vice versa. Where it is argued in the understanding, and exercise of the instrument Sword, it is also investigated by the same means: therefore, the understanding and exercise of the Sword is a science: the major premise is proven, because in the conclusion, the terms are Syncategorematic (that is, as Saint Thomas explains) consignificant, which are imprinted in the mind, in relation to the instruments and organs. The minor premise is noted: then the consequence is valid. To clarify further: the science of the Sword is distinguished in Docens (Teaching) and Vtens (Using), that is, intellectual and practicing. The teaching, which is Docens, is separated from the things, as intelligence is. The Vtens, or practicing, is that which is joined with the instruments. Therefore, the science of the Sword is both teaching and practicing; teaching, that is in Docens: and practicing, that is in Vtens.

Although in this division it seems that there is a place for the difficulty that philosophers present, noting that one dividing member is not formally whole of a division because one thing is not another. Then one dividing member is not formally the other, as Saint Thomas, Cajetan, Scotus, and Scaliger prove with effective reasons. Valduíno makes the example in Logic, by the division of Docens (Teaching) and Vtens (Using); and understands by Docens, that which measures; and by Vtens, that which is measured. From which it appears that the understanding of the instrument Sword, as far as it is Docens, can be a science, because it is measuring; but the practicing, which is Vtens, will be art, because it is measured.

But the difficulty is answered, that the understanding, and the demonstration, which is the same as Docens and Vtens, are one single acquisition, knowing by different organs, which are in themselves integral in a subject, as from Logic by Platonic doctrine, it is considered to be the first of all sciences, because it makes, reasons, and argues about the being, and the subject; the being and the subject are one aim, or final object: then Logic as Vtens, as well as Docens, is one single science; and the same consequence results in the understanding, and exercise of the instrument Sword, which is Docens and Vtens

But for the purpose, I argue thus: Science is a habit of the intellectual power, which considers the subject in its entirety: the understanding, and exercise of the Sword is a habit of the intellectual power, which considers the subject in its entirety; therefore, it is a science.

But I argue more clearly thus: That faculty is proper science, in which two requirements concur; one, that by certain, and first principles (certain, and evident) known, the terms are known; another, that from such knowledge certain, or evident conclusions are inferred, by certain, or evident consequences. In the understanding, and exercise of the Sword, then, such requirements concur, so strongly, that they are by themselves manifest to the understanding, because with its explained terms (without other proof) the understanding assents to the certainty of the conclusion, by the certainty of the consequences; from where a certain evident habit of necessary thing is caused by its known causes: therefore, the understanding, and exercise of the Sword is properly science.

A more evident argument is as follows: That faculty is a proper science in which two requisites concur; one, that through certain and primary principles (which are certain and evident), the terms are known; another, that from such knowledge certain or evident conclusions are inferred by certain or evident consequences. In the understanding and practice of the Sword, these requisites concur in such a way that they are manifest to the understanding by themselves, because with its explained terms (without other proof) the understanding assents to the certainty of the conclusion, by the certainty of the consequences; from where a certain habit is caused, evident of a necessary thing by its known causes: therefore, the understanding and practice of the Sword is properly a science.

Let the minor of this argument be a corollary: that is certain, or evident knowledge of necessary thing, investigated by its causes, which is acquired by mathematical demonstration. The understanding, and exercise of the Sword, then, is investigated by causes with mathematical demonstration: therefore, it is science, as a habit that is produced evident of necessary thing, investigated by its causes.

This is confirmed because the understanding and exercise of the Sword, as far as it is a teacher (Docens), mathematically demonstrates that it cannot have a true antecedent and a false consequence, although the topical syllogism produces opinion, and the sophistical error. In the mathematical argument, then, whether it is a problem or theorem, no fallacy is admitted, because its proof is demonstrative, and not by tropics and sophistics: therefore, the understanding and exercise of the Sword is a science that admits evidence.

From the perspective of the object (which is man in his entirety, and in his parts) understanding, and acting with movements known by their causes, from which the understanding and practice of the Sword demonstrate inherent passions, it is also proven to be science, as it clearly results from the common doctrines of Aristotle, Saint Thomas, Boethius, Cleanthes, Rodigino, and the Arabs; Algazel, and Alpharab, and others, proving, that Logic is science, and part of Philosophy, for the same reasons, which occur in the understanding and practice of the Sword.

Nevertheless, there are such sophistic minds that strive to assert that the understanding and practice of the Sword is not science, but Gladiatorial Art, and they argue thus

By the principles of secondary intentions, neither knowledge is given nor acquired. The understanding and exercise of the Sword are principles of secondary intentions: hence, the understanding and exercise of the Sword is not science, but Gladiatorial Art. This is demonstrated by the fact that the use of a thing is not the same thing, nor the use of the operation, but the operation itself: thus, neither will the use of science be science, and consequently, the exercise of the Sword, which is Vtens, will not be science. Moreover, the understanding and exercise of the Sword are reduced to the use of a physical instrument, to demonstrate the passions of the subject; and what is the principal cause (which is the instrument) is the one to produce science or art: then the understanding and exercise of the Sword (which is the causal instrument) is not science, but Gladiatorial Art. Furthermore, they justify themselves, assuming that between the principal agent and the instrument, which produces a similar effect, thus in the species (which is the instrumental), in truth it is not the same in the effect, which simulates the principal agent, to whom it should simulate, not the instrument. For example: it is explained in the generative power, which generates man, which is similar, not to the same generative power (which is instrumental), the same is seen in the artificial, because the statue is not similar to the saw, nor to the hammer (which are instruments), but it is only the likeness of the existing art, which was in the mind of the Craftsman, from where it is argued thus.

Science is according to the act of the scientist, chosen for the same science by its principle, which generates science. The Sword, then, is the chosen instrument, which instrumentally demonstrates its effect: therefore, its understanding and exercise is not science, nor can it generate it, much less in its own instrumental exercise.

The term Arms; which is generic; includes, and encompasses all species of its genus; and the term Arms is not of the seven Liberal Arts, but of the seven servile; and thus the Logicians, by the term Arms, understand the Gladiatorial, as carried by Oña, and others. The understanding and exercise of the Sword is a species of Arms, included and understood in its genus: therefore, it is not science, but Art of the servile, and not of the Liberal.

In these five acumen, many others are compiled, which are gathered from various writings and opinions, both of logicians and those who discuss what is commonly and vulgarly called Destreza or Fencing, which logicians reduce to the term Arms, not to its proper meaning, but to the Gladiatorial Art, where they are clearly deceived, as will be proved in its place, first responding to the aforementioned contrary arguments, which are the most sophistical and subtle of all I have read and communicated.

To respond more clearly, it is noted by the doctrine of Scotus that science is acquired by any adequate method, which is a means of knowing. Thus, the same Doctor resolves that Logic is called science because it commonly teaches and can be applied to various things, through which it reasons, argues, and proves; because the way of knowing can be common in application. Assuming this, we respond against the first contrary argument, denying the lesser, and saying that the understanding and exercise of the Sword is not acquired by the principles of second intentions, but by the radical causes teaching and practicing (which is the same as Docens and Vtens) that are adequate means of science. The understanding and exercise of the Sword, then, are not principles of instrumental second intentions, but of first radical causes, which are adequate means of knowing, Docens, and Vtens: therefore, the understanding and exercise of the Sword, Docens, and Vtens, is science and not Gladiatorial Art. Along the way, it is noted with the Philosopher Alexander, and others, that Lemus refers to, that before all things, in any science it is absurd not to first know what is the method with which one proceeds in it, to which cause it was shown at the beginning of this discourse, and its place will be demonstrated.

The major premise of the second argument is false, understanding it universally, because the natural entity (e.g., man) says a greater entity than that of its material cause, as Father Oña concedes because it is a perfect entity in its own species, as is also the object in the material cause of science, being matter about which science is exercised, from which it is not inconvenient, that science exceeds the entity in operation. The understanding and exercise, with which it is not the same operation: then it is science the understanding and exercise of the Sword, because it is Docens, as well as Vtens.

For further clarity, it is noted that the true and proper object by itself, although it does not cause science (because it does not influence it, but the science in the object) but says that the object is the cause of science, because it is specified by intrinsic order, for any knowledge (in a certain way) is measured by the known object, because it is the adequation of the object by the understanding, as philosophers feel: therefore, it is not absurd, that from such a cause, and measure of lesser entity is measured (in a certain way) the greater entity, and with this distinction, it is easily recognized, that although the understanding and exercise of the instrument Sword (for being an object) by itself does not cause science, because it does not influence it, but the science in the object; but it will be said that it is the cause of science, which is specified by intrinsic order; for any knowledge (in a certain way) is measured by the known object with which it is adequate: therefore, it is not inconvenient, that from the material object (which is of lesser entity) is caused science in the understanding (which is of greater entity) with which all the sophistry of the second contrary argument is convinced.

To the third, it is responded that the scientific act is resolved to be in it some principle by itself noted (as is common in all science) so in the understanding, and exercise of the Sword will be the first principle by itself noted the same instrument Sword, and its knowledge will be its first principle by itself known; however, the Sword will not be the same science, since the physical instrument does not fall under the scientific habit; because the knowledge of the instrumental principles does not fall under the scientific habit, as this does not need another regulating instrument but regulated. The instrument Sword is, then, the regulated instrument of the understanding and exercise of man, the main subject capable of science, to which only the Sword is a causal instrument, with which the passions of the subject are demonstrated, which is Docens, and Vtens: therefore, the understanding and exercise of the Sword (which is the instrument) although it is causal, as it has been said, is science, and not Gladiatorial Art.

In response to the entire apparatus and syllogism of the fourth opposing argument, a distinction is made between the instrument with which the effect is performed and the first agent (which is the science that regulates the same operation). From this, it follows that science is not just the act of the scientist, but the very science, in the likeness of which the act is directed and the instrument is chosen. The Sword, although it is the chosen instrument with which the first agent instrumentally directs and performs the effect, is not, however, the same science, nor similar to it, just as the saw or the hammer is not similar to the science existing in the idea of the scientific agent. Therefore, the understanding and exercise of the Sword, moved and directed by the understanding, arm, and hand of the scientific agent, is science, because science is not regulated by the act or the instrument, but the instrument and the act are regulated by the science.

The fifth contrary argument is answered conclusively by distinguishing the term Weapons, which is generic in terms of the pieces that make up all Military Weapons, as widely and skillfully demonstrated by Pedro Gregorio Tolosano; and specifically those corresponding to the Gladio, or Sword. In this regard, in terms of the manufacture of all weapon pieces, their species are included in their generic category Weapons, and their manufacture is indeed an art, and one of the seven servile arts; but for that reason, the term of the same Weapons, nor the Gladiatoria, as poorly explained by Father Oña, speaking like a pure scholar, but not as a military scientist. The same absurdity is confirmed in the term Rates, by which the same Author (and others who follow him) understood the Art of Navigation, erring in the lack of knowledge; because the term Rates, as a generic, only includes the species of Vessels, whose manufacture is one of the servile arts; but for that reason it does not include the science of navigation, which in itself is the most scientific part of Cosmography, which is subordinate (to what the common misunderstanding calls the Art of Navigation), being, as it is, a most noble science because of its causes. The understanding and exercise of the Sword, then, is not of the manufacture of the Weapon instrument, but of the science acquired in the understanding and exercise of the agent subject: therefore, it is a science, and not one of the seven servile arts; rather, it is the most noble science, as proven by the following reasons.

Firstly, because that science is most noble which is desirable for its own sake, like the Ethical, or Moral sciences, because they direct towards virtues; the Political, Economic sciences, because they direct towards the perfection of sociable life; and Medicine towards the health of man, etc. as can be inferred from the teachings of the Philosopher, and Saint Thomas, and many others: therefore, the understanding of the instrument Sword is desirable for its own sake due to the qualities referred to in the previous discourses, and those that any average intellect recognizes: therefore, it is a most noble science.

Sciences are also characterized by their subjects, and the subject of the understanding and exercise of the Sword is most noble, because it is man known in his entirety, and in his parts, and movements by power, and practiced act: therefore, the understanding and exercise of the Sword is a most noble science by the subject. Similarly, sciences are characterized by their own end. The understanding and exercise of the Sword, therefore, has its own end in defense and offense in man: therefore, it is the most noble science for its own end to which it is directed.

The certainty of the means with which an argument is made and knowledge is acquired is a great qualifier in sciences, as the Mathematics are estimable, and most noble because of the certainty of the means with which they argue and demonstrably prove, as philosophers concede. Therefore, the understanding and exercise of the Sword argues, acquires, and proves its knowledge by means of mathematical demonstrations: therefore, it is a most noble science because of the certainty of its means.

That science, as Aristotle says, is more qualified in its totality, which teaches the subject and object more intimately, and demonstrates its effect with greater certainty, than the one that only teaches the object to exist; but not being so demonstrable in its effects, as the Philosopher concludes. Therefore, the understanding and exercise of the Sword both teaches and demonstrates with certainty the subject, object, and their effects: therefore, it is one of the most noble and qualified sciences in its totality.

As a corollary of such a maxim, the same Philosopher considers the science that most infallibly manifests its certainty, like Geometry, Arithmetic, and Music, to be superior in its totality. Therefore, in the understanding and exercise of the Sword, the same demonstrations occur, because Geometry, Arithmetic, and proportions are subordinate to it: therefore, it is one of the most superior sciences in its totality

I avoid ostentatiously adorning this point, due to the brevity with which I proceed; however, it should not be omitted whether the understanding and exercise of the Sword is one science, or diverse. It can be proved that it is one science, in which Aristotle’s definition is admitted, to which I adhere, with the most concordant of his Expositors, saying: That is one science, which is of a single genus, and which is composed of its first principles in its parts and effects considered by themselves. The understanding and exercise of the Sword is of a single genus, which is composed of its first principles in its parts and effects considered by themselves: therefore, it is one science, and not diverse sciences.

The consequence is proved: The diversity of sciences is in the diversity of genres, and of their first principles, and in that the first principles of one are not demonstrated by the first principles of the other (as is inferred from the same text of the Philosopher) and the principles, when in themselves are diverse in the demonstrable to which they are directed, are not of the same genus: and they are of a genus, when they demonstrate it by themselves: although there may be many demonstrations of a same genus, but not by means of an order, but by means of diverse orders, as everything is looked at under one reason, Sub qua, as the Commentators of Aristotle widely explain, most of them, and those of most authority, agree on these principles. From which it follows that the unity of science is considered in three ways, either generic, or specific, or numeric, as Master Zumèl discusses, with the common current of the Logicians, with whom I say:

Generic is a science, with respect to the union in the same genus, although from distinct and diverse parts; even though they differ in essence and nature, they agree in the definition of the superior. Exempli gratia: Man and Lion (whose common reason is the comprehensive definition of Animal) are one genus, in as much as they are of the same reason; but such generic unity, although in the union of the genus is one science, is not therefore in the species; because it is called specific unity in the science, whose definition is proper, and adequate to a common essence of nature; so, they only differ in accidents, as Porphyry taught in the example of many men, who by the participation of one species are defined by one man in relation to it; and this in as much as the species is one specific science.

Numeric is that science, which according to some singular thing (although it is diverse in itself, and can be in any other singular thing) as in its entirety can be considered one, looks at diversity, according to a formal reason, as in the collection of numbers, whose sum is one, indivisible in itself, because the whole is no more, nor less, than the collected numbers; even though in another singular thing it can be considered division (as in the parts, or numbers of which it is composed) but not in the collection itself, which in it will always be one, with respect to Numeric science; and so in other considerations, as results from the doctrine of the Philosopher, who considers Grammar a science, although it is a collection of many voices. In the broad sense, all agree in one reason, which includes the mode of proceeding by demonstration, although by different modes of arguing: therefore, in as much as the understanding and reason in which they agree, demonstrating all the sciences, they unite among themselves: therefore, it can be said that they are one science in this consideration, as Mirandulano admits.

To our purpose, following the teachings of the Philosopher, Saint Thomas, Scotus, Zumel, and others, we will maintain that the truth and unity of science result from the abstraction of the object, which is acquired by the habit, which they call Scientific; and this, is not only achieved by the reason and species of the object, but requires facility and ability on the part of the acting power, to properly arrange the species to judge correctly by the ordered demonstration, as is required in the understanding and exercise of the instrument Sword, which being one science, needs facility and ability on the part of the acting power (which is the scientific man) to arrange the species for correct judgment, by the ordered demonstration in offense and defense, by a demonstrable science.

Those not very versed in Philosophy, presuming by sharpness of intellect, find it difficult to concede the life of science in the understanding and exercise of the Sword: and they say, that this is a material instrument of different genus, species, and number, than man: and so, the understanding and exercise of the Sword is not one science, with respect to man, and with respect to the instrument.

This enthymematic argument in appearance, the common people find it effective, but it is very fallacious, and sophistical, noting what the Philosophers call intention, and extension, in which Aristotle, and his Glossographers discourse, concluding, that intention is the power, or active quality in a subject individual, or compound, as in our purpose it is man with the Sword in hand, which for the understanding and exercise is a compound only the man armed with the weapon Sword.

And as the Father Oña shows, by intention the Philosophers understand, when in a subject, or part of it there is some quality, as heat, or movement: and extension, when the heat, or movement extend in another part. Exempli gratia, extension is when degrees of facility, or movement, are added with respect to another common consequent, as is the instrument Sword in the hand of man, who governs, and moves it, from where science is communicable, as in a whole heterogeneous, whose similar parts are degrees of facility, with respect to a same conclusion; and dissimilar, with respect to different conclusions, which nonetheless are called parts of a species, or of a compound, as is given in intelligence, as in movements, which look with diversity to an end, and understanding regulates them by a reason: thus the man with the Sword in hand should be considered, whose movements are governed by a single active power, which acquires, and works in understanding, and exercise with a single science, and extensive movement: Ergo habemus intentum.

Intellectual habits, unlike simple qualities (like a point), have different components and therefore are considered complex. This is because, instead of being confined to a single individual or matter like the human body, these habits involve a complex interplay of factors, enabling more flexibility and scope in our actions, whether towards a single conclusion or multiple ones. These actions don’t precede the act itself; instead, they are the product of the act. For instance, in using a sword, the intelligence and practice involved determine the outcome, whether it’s a single wound (a conclusion) or multiple ones. The actions aren’t produced before the act; they’re produced by the act itself. Thus, the ease of one action over another falls under the same category because they all stem from the same reasoning, embedded in a scientific principle or active power.

Nevertheless, as a crowning of this discourse, it remains to see whether this science of understanding, and exercise of the Sword, insofar as it looks at its object, is a real being, or a being of reason.

According to philosophers like Aristotle, Saint Thomas, Scotus, Durandus, and others, the concept of being can be divided into four types: substantial (the most perfect), accidental (less perfect), generative, and negational or lacking. All four types can be understood through reason. Aristotle further clarified that being can be real or existent in the mind. The latter is conceptual or rational, while the former is physical reality. In simpler terms, a being of reason refers to knowledge we gain through understanding, whereas a real being denotes the actual, physical manifestation of truth according to science.

Assuming so, avoiding controversies, and questions, in which Logicians, and Metaphysicians dilate, the following conclusions are formed to the purpose. The object specifies, and terminates the science: the understanding, and exercise of the Sword is a real object, for being the same Sword governed correctly: therefore its being is a real being, and not only a being of reason, because it is not limited to its term.

Demonstrable understanding is the greatest physical perfection of science, and thus is a real being: the understanding, and exercise of the Sword is demonstrable mathematically, because Mathematics is subordinate to it: therefore it is a real being.

Real science involves specific changes in the subject it’s studying. For example, the visual ability at a particular distance can accurately identify color and shape. In the same way, the skill and understanding of using a sword can be considered real science as it involves specific actions in relation to the object (the sword). So, the knowledge and practice of using the sword is a genuine entity. I’ve kept these discussions brief, and could have added more detail, enough to fill a book. But, I’m satisfied with showing that the understanding and practice of using the sword is a notable science in its own right. It’s unique, specialized, provable, and valuable both for its own sake and for the object it studies, which is a real entity

FOURTH DISCOURSE.

ART AND EXPERIENCE of the sword

On this basis, which allows for extensive adornment (omitting it for brevity) we content ourselves, having proven that the understanding and exercise of the Sword is most noble science. We reserve for this place the demonstration of the terms, Art, and Experience, from which perfect knowledge of the formal truth of the understanding and exercise of the instrument Sword can be achieved. The result of all this is what is commonly held as true Dexterity, which Geronimo Carranza called the Philosophy of the Sword, with demonstration of its definition; and Don Luis Pacheco de Narvaez, science, for its common principles of being investigated by its causes; and the Italians, French, and Northerners grant it as Art, without saying what kind; whether Liberal, or servile, noting only that it can consist of rules and precepts, as is gleaned from Angelo Vigiano, Tibaut, and Pedro Gregorio.

From these confusing lights, through continuous efforts, studies, and operations, I have come to inquire what is Science, what is Art, and what is Experience. Enough has been demonstrated about science, so I will proceed to the rest.

It is common in all good Philosophy, that from science comes art, because it is nothing other than a collection of precepts, reduced to method and order, which is granted in Logic, and Dialectic, which look to an end, which is reasoning, and the argument for inquiring the truth: Logic is science, and from it is produced Dialectic, which properly is art, collected from various rules and precepts for arguing: and as in Logic, and in Dialectic, different circumstances are considered, with which the former is science, and the latter is art, this one produced from that one; also from the science of Teaching, and Using, of the understanding, and exercise of the Sword is produced the art, with which its formal operation is disputed.

Plato, through the etymology of the terms, Logic, and Dialectic, explained their difference, suggesting the former as science and the latter as art. As he noted, Logic comes from Logos, which means probable reason; and Dialectic (according to Diogenes Laertius) comes from the Greek word Dialegiste, which means altercation in question and answer, from which Plato defined Dialectic, saying it is the skill of disputing, questioning, and answering.

According to my intention, the same can be considered in the science and art of the Sword. Because the teaching and practicing science, reasoning for real being, achieves the probable and demonstrative reason of the understanding and exercise of the Sword. In this part, it can be universally considered science. But in the operating use of the Sword, which is reduced to rules and precepts, strictly produced from science and opinion, it will be only art, as exemplified in Logic and Dialectic.

For example, Aristotle granted Dialectic to be part of the Topics, that is, the Art of discussing the probables, thus he said, Dialectic is a discursive action, which is concluded from the problems. From this, the same Philosopher taught, “It is useful to confirm the principles of sciences by problems;” and he himself concludes that “It is the Philosopher’s task to treat theorematically through necessary discourses: and the Dialectic through problems.” From this, it is resolved by Aristotle himself in all his works, that Dialectic is Art, which disputes or debates through problems. I apply, then, in the science and art of the Sword, when reasoning theorematically Teaching and Using, it is science; and when operating by precepts and rules collected by the probables, it is art.

But there may be a curious one, who raises the objection that is touched upon in Dialectic, which I have taken as the cause of the example, and will say: Aristotle, either deals with the syllogisms of Dialectic as a whole, or in its parts. If of syllogisms as a whole, it touches on the Analytics: therefore, Dialectic will be part of the Analytics, or the Analytics will be called Dialectic. And arguing to the point: or does the art of the Sword deal with its intelligence and exercise as a whole, or in part? If in its entirety, it will be the same science, or the science will be the art: it cannot be part, as it is clear.

In greater clarity; the counter-argument is answered: Aristotle called parts of the Analytics part of the Dialectic, not because in true reality it is part of it, but because out of necessity, for the perfection of Dialectic, it uses its absolute terms, with which it extrinsically leads to the consummation of its end, acquiring parts of the Analytics, but not because it is part of them. An example is found in Aristotle himself, who says: The analytic parts, and civil science, are parts of Rhetoric, not because in true reality they are its parts, but because extrinsically Rhetoric needs them, to lead itself to its consummation, and end.

And by the same analogy in the Art of the Sword, it makes use of the reason and means of its science, from which it is produced, just as Dialectic does from Logic, to achieve its greatest perfection, working by the rules and precepts of science and opinion: not because art is science, nor science art, nor opinion one or the other, but because to lead the Art to its consummation, it makes use of all the means, sciences, and disciplines it needs, just like Geometry and other parts of Mathematics, not because the Art of the Sword is part of Mathematics, nor Mathematics part of the Art of the Sword, but for the same reason that the Philosopher exemplifies in Rhetoric, with respect to the Analytics and civil science.

According to the Platonic doctrine, received by all Philosophers, in every dispute it is necessary to define what is being discussed, so we will say: Art of the use of the Sword is a habit with which man, observing rules and precepts, produced from science and experience, acts effectively in defense and offense.

This definition is more proper and quidditative than descriptive; as can be recognized, the genre is the habit in common, observing rules and precepts, which generically fits every Art: the difference is, to be the precepts and rules, produced from science and experience, that direct man to act effectively in defense and offense, of which Aristotle can be seen in book 6 of his Ethics, chapters 4 and 5.

It is proven by the definition of the definition that Aristotle gives, saying: The definition is a statement that explains the essence of what is defined; see St. Thomas in the same place, Cayetano, Alexander of Aphrodisias, and the current of the Scholastics. Cicero, agreeing with Aristotle, said: The definition is an explanatory statement, because there is a defined subject.

Both definitions of the definition are equivalent to the same concept, because it is the same to explain the essence of what is defined, as to explain what the subject is that is defined. The common objection that is put forward in schools is to say that neither one definition nor the other explains whether it should be long or short, from which the Moderns do not rest, pretending to hallucinate more, as will be touched upon in its place: summarizing here by the most concordant, that the definition of the definition is, to be a statement explaining the nature of the thing defined, included in the shortest ambit, which satisfies the objection; so Father Oña compiled it, saying, a definition is a collection of the properties of what one is, which is not found in another.

Assuming this, imitating the old common style, it is also necessary (in the art and experience of the Sword) to define the instrument, and generically it will be said: An instrument is that which, intervening, makes the action and exercises the office, as the instrument of seeing are the eyes, the instrument of cutting wood is the saw, the instrument of the Orator is the voice, articulating words, and placing periods, with the qualities, that Quintilian, and Rodolphus Agricola, who defined the speech by the effect, according to the reason of the argument, that explains to be speech, or instrument, that convinces the adversary, and leads him to the consequence of the leading. This can be applied to the instrument Sword, governed by a collection of rules and precepts, in such a way that, convincing the contrary, it forces him to the consequence of the leading.

This (according to the doctrine of the same Rodolphus) is achieved by two means, which are, disposition and controversy, just as with Dialectics, by the disposition of arguments, and dispute, which also admits the term Contest, like that of Swords.

It is doubted (with all that) whether the instrument Sword belongs to the Art, or to the Artisan? To this it is said (with the Philosophers) that as the instrument is of the Art, and of the Artisan; the same judgement is made of the instrument Sword, which is also of the Art, and of the Artisan.

The consequence is proven by the authority of Quintilian, who carries the common understanding, that the instrument is the intervening party, with which the action is perfected; and that one alone is the Artisan, to whom the instrument belongs. But if it is said that one is the reason for the instruments of Art, and another for the Artisans; the solution is easy for those who understand the terms, Qui, Quo, and Quod: Qui, is the Artisan: Quo, the instrument: Quod, the intention, or effect, which all compose a whole physical in concrete accidental, perfecting the action the agent Qui, by the instrument Quo, which is the Sword: from which it follows, that the instrument is of the Art; because in the benefit of the Art, the Artisan, and the instrument are directed to an intention. Therefore, the instrument Sword, governed by the man, who is the Artisan, by the rules, and precepts of the Art, composes no more than an accidental concrete, which is formed, or results from the Art.

For example, the bridle in the horse is an instrument with which the whole compound (although of different bodies) arm, hand, agility are a cause for victory: so in the accidental compound, man, and Sword; The skill, or ability used, cause victory: therefore the Sword, as an instrument, is of the Art, and of the Artisan. This will suffice for now as to the Art, since from the pointed out, one can discourse with extended adornments, which will perfect those knowledgeable in the exercise of Arms, for what they are Art.

As for experience, the field is no less expansive, where we will pick some flowers. Flavius Vegetius, a highly erudite author, and rightly esteemed in the science of war, recognized as a principle, or certain axiom, that in all fights, whether many against many, or singular (which all are embraced by the term Omni Prælio) not so much untrained forces, but art and experimental exercise, achieve victory: therefore the mere speculation of Arms is not sufficient, if art and experience are lacking, since the ideal is useless without operation.

What does it matter if he who prides himself as a Geometer, because he is adept at the placement of lines and figures, seeming to him that Geometry is subordinate to the intelligence and exercise of the Sword (as also to Physics, Metaphysics, and Philosophy) makes propositions that seem demonstrable to him, with the rule and compass, if in the operation of the Sword he lacks Art, and experience? Let the most speculative know that for the perfection of intelligence and exercise of the Sword, all the three cognitive powers, Science, Art, and Experience, are necessary; for as Vegetius himself concluded: Although the science of fighting increases audacity, because no one fears to do what they know they have experienced, nevertheless, in the contest of warlike actions, the small number of trained soldiers is more prompt for victory, than the rude and unlearned multitude, who are always subject to flight and wounds. The proof is given by Flavius himself, saying: That there is nothing that does not become easy with constant meditation and use.

From this, it can be inferred that science, art, and experience must coincide in what is commonly called the true Skill of the Sword: and to such a degree is the experimental operation imperative, that to achieve it, various methods were used by valiant Nations; particularly with the instrument of the sword and shield: this (as described by Flavius Vegetius) was made circular, from wicker, with double the weight of the ordinary ones used in the armies: and in place of swords, at the beginning, they gave new soldiers, called Tirones (and our common term, ‘greenhorns’) clubs, which were like wooden swords, also double the weight of the common ones; and so that they could be taught from their own experience, they set up wooden poles, shaped like swords, each one six geometric feet high, with the pole being movable towards the part of the Tirone. In this way, a pole was attached for each one, and against it, as if it were another adversary, with the shield and club (which served as a sword) they trained, finding themselves in opposition, trying to hit either the head, face or sides, teaching themselves to enter and exit, and to experience all movements of the feet and legs, defending, attacking, and retreating, as if the pole were another enemy man, executing all impetus, and all art in fighting, with such meditation and caution, that they recognized and experienced how they had to strike, without being offended.

Vegetius himself notes that this practice of using poles was not only extremely useful for soldiers, but also for gladiators, who required the highest skill in swordsmanship. He emphasizes that no man has ever been recognized as invincible in the arena or on the battlefield without having practiced with the pole.

Great example! It’s a grand disillusionment that conclusively convinces those who presume that they can fully understand the art or the science of the Sword without agility in action and experiential learning! In whose effects alone, lines, figures, circles, and conical sections, premeditated in the imagination and described on paper or print, are of little value. While a knowledgeable and experienced person achieves a collection of rules and precepts that form the art, they also recognize with disillusionment and evidence, that formalities of lines and conical sections, etc., that pure mathematicians describe on paper or in prints, are not useful among the actions of defending and offending in execution against another human adversary. Rather, they rely on other methods that, although originating from geometric ones, are performed with the sword and arm, adapting these terms to the understanding and practice of the Sword, varying the centers and positions according to the movements compelled by the operation; and this with such speed that neither the sight perceives them well, nor always do they align with the imagination: and if this is necessary against a pole, how much more against a rational adversary? And how much less useful will be theorems and problems of precise lines, circles, and figures, especially when they do not fit the operation itself.

From science and experience, the rules and precepts of art are perfected and gathered, and lacking any of the three cognitive powers, one will barbarically presume to grasp the understanding and exercise of the Sword (which is commonly called Skill) that to achieve it among the Romans, they not only relied on experimental practice with the pole, but also noting (as Vegetius himself points out) when it is important to know how to strike more with the point than with the edge.

Furthermore, in the type of exercise that the Field Doctors (who Vegetius signifies with this name as experts in the science, art, and experience of the Sword) called ‘Armatura’, they examined the Tirones, recognizing that in all battles, those trained in the Armatura fought better than the others. From this, he draws the conclusion, confirmed with estimation, saying: From this it must be understood, how much better the trained soldier is than the untrained one, and learned in the Armatura, and how much they precede their comrades in the art of fighting.

And he adds: The discipline of exercise was so severely enforced among the elders that, as for the Doctors of Arms, they were rewarded with doubled annonas (which were military rations): and for the soldiers who made little progress from such exercises, in place of wheat, they were given barley, compelling them to accept it, and they could not return to enjoy wheat annonas until in the presence of the Prefect of the Legion, and of the Tribunes, and of the General Prince, they could demonstrate that they knew everything they were obligated to in Military Art. And he concludes with such emphasis. Nothing is more stable, happier, or more praiseworthy in the Republic than an abundance of skilled and learned soldiers: it is not dressing in gold, silver, or shiny stones that inclines enemies to reverence or grace; but only the fear of the weapons by which they are defeated. Thus, I say with Cato: Errors can be corrected, but not in the crimes of battles, which do not receive amendment, because in them those who ignorantly oppose perish, either fleeing from the victors or showing themselves to be inferior.

We can already see the causes and examples, worthy of commitment in the studies and operations of intelligence and exercise of the Sword, that for everyone is noble, useful, and necessary; also being a great honor for the Nation, a significant ornament in public order, a great strength in the Army, and a great reputation in weapons, as the Sword is preeminent and a significant cause for victories.

In this consideration, the Ancients, even in their rudeness after the Universal Flood, in need of defense and offense, not only premeditated ways to introduce science, art, and experience into fighting with different warlike instruments, making men agile, but they also encouraged them with rewards, honor, and fame, dedicating places and times for such exercises. This resulted in the diversity of military exercises, in wrestling, running, jumping, spear throwing, and other bodily exertions, with honorary rewards, crowns, and other decorations, from what they called the Olympic Games, into whose terms they later substituted contests, as from some and others, large volumes can be formed. Here I have omitted what is not of my subject, referring the curious to Pausanias, Athenaeus, Suidas, Caelius Rhodiginus, Natal Comite, Strabo, Herodotus, Ravisius Textor, and the extensive Johannes Villembrochius Dantiscanus. It is found in the cited authors, and in ancient and modern historians, that at various times, nations, and provinces, there were contests of arms with judges and prizes (in the manner of the Olympics) which Pausanias talks about: and to our purpose, we find the one that was most anciently instituted, called Grave Armatura, which was of the Sword, the shield, and the warlike tunic, as is recognized in Flavius Vegetius, by the term Armatura, and of this Villembrochius says that it was later instituted, accepting the course of the Infantry, because they considered it useful for war; and the first victorious in such a contest of the Sword, was declared Demeratus of Hera, crowning him in the manner, and rite of the Gymnic contests, in which the prizes were only crowns of leaves from different trees, or plants, with honor being the true reward of virtue. Hence the famous saying of Tigranes, son of Artabanus, who upon hearing from the Greeks that skill, dexterity, and valor in the handling of arms, was received with only crowns of Celery, Olive, or Laurel; when Papeo Madronio was persuading Xerxes to wage war against them, he exclaimed: Oh Prince, against what men do you induce us to fight, who do not agitate contests for money, but for virtue?

With this end in mind, Alexandro in his Genial Days advises that the Gladiatorial Games (that is, of the Sword) were instituted to instruct youth in Arms, thus becoming accustomed to not fearing the congress of enemies, this exercise being all the more honorable, and all the more proper for the nobles, as they are more dedicated to warlike actions by obligation.

So Xenophon notes about Cyrus, in a great action, that he took away the bows and arrows from his soldiers, leaving them only the sword, shield, and breastplate, so that they would fight more skillfully and bravely: and to this end, he introduced among the soldiers contests with such weapons, acquiring in them intelligence, exercise, and skill, rewarding the victorious with valuable gifts, and remunerating them with dignities.

Suetonius Tranquilus relates of Julius Caesar, that he valued the Skill of Arms so highly, that in the game and exercise of the Sword, he would not permit his recruits to be taught by common Masters (who were called Lanistas) but rather he obliged the Roman Knights, and the very Senators skilled in Arms (who for this reason were called Doctors of the Armies, according to Vegetius) to teach the Military in their homes; for this purpose he made public requests in his letters, encouraging them to acquire the science, and skill of the singulars, so that they could thus communicate it.

From this principle could arise the consideration of Valerius Maximus, who, making memory of the Military competitions, highlights that Publius Rutilius Consul, and Gaius Manlius, his colleague, valuing the exercise of Arms (and especially the Sword) brought to Rome, from the School of Gaius Aurelius Scaurus, the most exercised Teachers of the Gladiators, so that with their science, art, and experience, in defense and offense they could teach to avoid contrary wounds and execute their own; because thus, mixing virtue with art, and art with virtue, the former would provide the strong impulse, and the latter the knowledge to the former, resulting from both the cautious brave operation.

The insistence on the terms Gladiators, and Lanistas, so used in the Ancients, and so little understood by the common people, who, confusing the exercises, actions, and people, do not distinguish the honorable from the reprehensible, nor the contrary; for this purpose, it is necessary to investigate in the depths of good letters what is essential to our intention.

Seneca, writing to Lucilius (speaking of the Gladiators) makes mention of three species, and without distinction, considers all of them reprehensible, naming them, Ordinaries, Equals, and Postulatics, for whose verification, some rely on Festus, and Ulpian, also confusing the term Postulatics with Supposititious, by the verse of Martial: Hermes is also supposititious.

But Celio Rodiginio, great inquirer of the ancient voices, against Seneca, and the rest of his opinion, considers as Ordinary Gladiators those who were in the first place experts of the Gladiatura, and who, instructed in their appearance, and rite, produced the Gladiators, who at the will of the spectators, constitution, or custom used to exhibit. And he makes an example in the Jurisconsults, and Ordinary Consuls, concluding: Because Suetonius called it a just and legitimate spectacle of the Gladiators, by the formula, and ordinary rite given.

And to greater evidence, he proposes the Ordinary Judge, who by his right, or of the Prince exercises entire jurisdiction, as also to that one to whom is committed the university of causes, and that by the College is chosen, and by the Superior is confirmed, who is named Ordinary, and the same the Legate in the Province over decree, in which Celio admits two types; some, who have administration; and others, who do not have it; as also there were two Ordinaries of the Militia (as in the History of the Emperors, dealing with the Empire of Tiberius, writes Flavius Vopiscus) as it was used in the Cavalry, where there were Ordinary Consuls, which is all from the same Celio.

The same author understands “Postulaticios Gladiatores” to be those who, due to the requests or petitions of the people (beyond ordinary obligation), out of kindness or concession by the Prince, provided some Gladiators for extraordinary events. This is what Suetonius Tranquilo implies when he says that, in addition to the ordinary obligation of the Questors, the people always petitioned and were granted the power to have more ‘Pares Gladiators,’ who brought about a new, courtly spectacle. The same Suetonius explains this more clearly in his description of the extraordinary spectacle of Gladiators.

Celio corrects the lesson in Seneca, who reads ‘Pariarios’ for ‘Pares’. He argues against Seneca’s understanding, as Seneca considers ‘Pariarios’ to mean ‘Proxenetas’, which is the equivalent of Mediators or Conciliators in purchases, sales, disputes, etc. He also notes the custom that when Emperors went to war, they staged spectacles of Gladiators and ‘Venaciones’ (wild animal hunts). The Gladiators fought before the image of Nemesis, believing this would dispel the force of fortune, or so that the soldiers would dismiss their fear of giving and receiving wounds.

Pliny, when discussing the spectacles of the Elephants, reports the culmination of the Gladiators during the time of Claudius and Nero. Celio Rodiginio, grappling with the difficulty of what the culmination of the Gladiators could be, concludes (citing an author he calls ‘most learned’) that these were the veteran Gladiators who, due to their art and daily practice, needed to rest. If you agree, they could also be called ‘Rudiarios’. Prisciano, the interpreter, named them as such - those who, upon receiving a staff or bar, leave the Gladiator life and receive public sustenance. Cicero alludes to this when he says to one, “You have been such a good Gladiator, why did you receive your staff so soon?”

Celio concludes that Gladiators were called ‘consumed’ when they were recognized for their science, art, and gladiatorial experience (which is the same as being skilled with the sword), like soldiers who were dignified by their deeds; they were called ‘consumed’ due to the strength of their merits.

Thus, Julio Frontino notes that after Curcio defeated the Sabines, by Senate Consultation they expanded his lands, as to the seasoned soldiers, although he was content with the ordinary portion that was granted to veteran soldiers. So, not all who practiced gladiatorship were blameworthy, but distinct among themselves, according to their occupation and skill.

Thus, different types of Gladiators are found, regarding the common weapons (as noted by Juan Ravisio Textor, and the Theater of Human Life) were those they called Reciarios, Sectores, Mirmilones, Hoplomachias, and Thraces. And they generically named the Masters of all these Lanistas, which corresponds to public Masters of Arms, because they had public Schools in the squares, or fields: but there were others, who in their houses taught the science, art, and experience of the Sword.

Those who were public Lanistas, taught the Fiscal Gladiators, and others, who sold to the Munerarios for public Venatory and Postulatic spectacles, and those who for pay, or for public ostentation fought under the Sun in the arena.

Munerarios was properly called those who were the exhibitors of the Fiscal and Venatory Gladiatorios for public spectacles, which corresponded to those called Agonethas by the Greeks: apart from the Lanistas, there were other persons skilled in meditation and exercise of the Sword, very different, and so they called them Sciamachios (because as Celio Rodiginio explains) they knew and taught the science, art, and experience of the Sword, not in the squares, nor to the common Gladiators, but to the Milites, as sensed by Plutarch, from where Juan Ravisio Textor, explaining the term Sciamachia, the exercise, said, that under a roof they feigned a shadowy fight, not a real one, like that of the Lanistas, but teaching the Art of the Sword in all its ways of attacking, and retreating, striking, and avoiding the wounds, as well as where with the point, where cutting, they had to execute the blows: and so they taught their disciples, so that on all occasions, now in the dust, now in the injurious contest they would better assure themselves, and with more art attack the enemies. The curious see, and note the words of Textor himself, which being so broad, although proper of the intention, are omitted.

This place expresses our intention, demonstrating how different were the Lanistas, and common Gladiators, who were produced for public spectacles, to those who nobly taught and learned the intelligence and exercise of the Sword, to defend themselves, and offend their opponents in honorable occasions: from which, learnedly, Celio Rodiginio, recognizing the distinction, reproves those who, like the commoners, confuse the terms, rudely understanding by the Sciamachia, which is the perfect Skill, and meditation of the Sword, what they call Fencing, which is very different, as the same Celio points out, calling semi-learned people those who confuse such distinct terms; in whose consideration he disputes the terms, and the exercises, and applies to the Sciamachia the history, and the statue of Glaucus, a man distinguished in virtues; and especially in justice, and in the meditation, and operations of the Sword (which is commonly called Skill) and thus, those who professed it (in contrast to the Lanistas) had, as a noble insignia, the painting of Glaucus, according to his statue, as Celio refers, where with more breadth the curious will find all satisfaction.

And although those famous in the intelligence and exercise of the Sword, generically (by the instrument Gladio) were called Gladiators, and divided their species by the weapons they used (as noted above) from the Retiarius, Secutores, Murmillo, Hoplomachus, and Thracians. Because in public spectacles these kinds of weapons and exercises were admitted, it does not mean that those in Sciamachia, who learned them with greater perfection and for better purposes, did not use the same weapons, finding among all of them extremely noble and famous men, as will be proven by the memory of worthy examples. It is assumed, for clearer understanding, that the Retiarii fought with a net, which they hid under the shield, and with it, in the conflict of the fight, by throwing it, they entangled the opponent, and these also had the name of Murmillo (so called, because they were opponents of the Retiarii, and they had as insignia on the helmet a fish, as Turnebo says) and they were differentiated from the Secutores, in that using a shield, armigerous tunic, and Sword, some, and others put on helmets, and the Retiarii hats, as Ravisio Textor and Carlo Zerotino touch on, making use of Juvenal’s verse: He did not hide his forehead with the cloak, nor did he move the trident. Herodotus tells of Phrinon (whom he qualifies as a very clear Captain of the Athenians) who was so skilled in the kind of Gladiator Retiarius, that in a singular contest with Pithaco Mitiline, in the greatest conflict of the fight, with the net, which he hid in the shield, he threw it at him on one side with such skill that, enveloped in it, Pithaco was surpassed by Phrinon, and he honorably defeated him.

Juvenal also mentions Gracchus, a famous Retiarius:
Even when Gracchus fought, he didn’t move his shield.
They called the Gladiators who used swords in the Thracian style ‘Thracians’, a skill that was highly esteemed in antiquity; they are thus placed among the others, and Spartacus the Thracian is mentioned for his renown, as Cerotino and Textor say, he was famous.

For further verification, I will compile some notable examples of experts in the science and art of the sword, to whom the Ancients gave the name Gladiators, not because they were Fiscal, Venartorian, or Postulatic, but because of their practice and skill with the instrument of the sword.

Suidas says of Polydamantes, that Artaxerxes gave him great rewards because in a public contest he alone fought with three very strong Persians, and killed them all; such is the value of experienced skill.

Eliano celebrates the skill and strength of Dioxippus, a soldier of Alexander the Great, who, challenged by a Macedonian soldier named Coragus, killed him in a one-on-one duel.

Josephus appreciates Sabino, a notable Gladiator, who because of his knowledge and skill, Emperor Gaius appointed him his tribune and made him the prefect of his army.

Solinus and Pliny make a point of admiring Tritanus, a Samnite gladiator, of whom Varro affirms that he not only had transverse muscles in his chest but also in his arms. This natural constitution gave him such strength that with a light touch he could overcome any adversary, perfecting his physical aptitude with exercise and knowledge. It’s also said that he had a son very similar to him, who, being a soldier of Gnaeus Pompey, killed his enemy with one finger.

Leaving aside many other examples of notable and famous men in swordsmanship, we’ll conclude with the famous Vito and Bachio, who were equals in skill and audacity. Having always been victorious against their adversaries, they challenged each other to a duel. Neither won the victory; both died in the arena, giving rise to the saying, Vito against Bachio. as noted by Erasmus and Carlo Cerotino.

Ersenio and Pacidiano, whom Cicero and others called the most noble Gladiators because of their science and skill with the sword, always emerged as victors. Neither was defeated by the other even though they fought, giving rise to another saying to signify two excellent equals, Ersenio with Pacidiano.

No less notable was Eschines, who, like Ersenio, fought with the same Pacidiano. They made peace during the combat, recognizing themselves as equals, as Cerotino notes.

In antiquity, it was allowed when two experts in the sword entered into a duel to compose themselves, remaining honorable, either because they both learned from the same Master, or because they were notable in skill and valor. This can be inferred from the case of Eschines and Pacidiano, as expressed by Celio Rodiginio and Cicero.

And what adds great and distinguished consequence to all this is the most exemplary and admirable case found in history, particularly in honor of Spain: the case of two distinguished Spanish knights, Rui Paez de Viedma and Payo Rodriguez Davila. During the reign of King Alfonso the Eleventh of Castile, having challenged each other (according to customs), the King granted them a field in the Arena of Jerez de la Frontera and was present at the fight. They entered the arena and fought continuously for three days from sunrise to sunset, retreating each night to their respective tents set up within the arena, where they were treated for the wounds they had inflicted on each other, and given bread, meat, and wine for dinner. The following day they returned to combat with the same courage, fighting ceaselessly until the afternoon of the third day, when the King himself separated them and made peace, declaring them equal in skill, courage, and loyalty, recognizing them as distinguished knights, worthy of military exploits, in which they earned renown. He declared them both free from the obligations of the challenge, like both victors, as is extensively referred to in the history of the same King and in other books and noble records. It is noteworthy that in such duels, the Kings were present with a golden rod in hand, symbolizing supreme justice, and the combat was carried out with swords. The last example of this was the challenge that took place in Valladolid, attended personally by the great Emperor Carlos V, who separated the fighters by throwing his golden rod at them, and declared them both good, with the circumstances that Don Fray Prudencio de Sandoval relates.

From all this, it can be clearly inferred how significant, illustrious, and noble the science, art, and experience of the sword is; and the distinction there was in antiquity among its professors and masters, and which were deplorable and which were noble and esteemed. This justifies the resolution of Pedro Gregorio Tolosano, who, discussing the gladiatorial spectacles of antiquity, said that exercises of arms and fights should not be understood absolutely, but with moderation, because some look at the interest, or price, and others at virtue: those are undoubtedly depreciated; these do not admit infamy, even in athletes, as noted by Ulpiano, and Alexandro de Alexandro. And it is consistent with the doctrine of Plato, who confesses: No man achieves renown if he does not engage in honest exercises from childhood.

Thus, no one is more suited to nobility than the understanding and practice of the sword, as all civilized nations adorn themselves with it, arm themselves with it, and honor themselves with it; this is especially true today, where common gladiators are completely excluded, resulting in the proverb, They advised in the arena, because they fought there in public spectacles, or as fiscal officers, or as those excluded by the Lanistas; and even among these, composition was accepted (as noted earlier) for having learned with a master, as Quintilian also points out.

Also excluded since antiquity is the combat that was introduced at banquets, as Nicolas Damascene reports: the Romans used gladiatorial spectacles, not only in public theaters but also at dinners and banquets in the rite of the Tyrrhenians, from whom they learned, choosing up to two or three Gladiators (those they called Pares) for their skill; and these, after being satiated with the dishes and drinks, fought fiercely each seeking victory, even if they killed their opponent or opponents; and this action was considered very festive, as Atheneus also writes about the Celts.

Not only in banquets did they introduce gladiatorial contests, but they also offered a beautiful woman as a prize to young men, for whose love they would fight spiritedly; seemingly taking imitation from irrational animals, as per Ovid’s observation, who said: I saw two sturdy bulls fighting for a beautiful cow, who was present, infusing vivid valor.

And this rite went so far, to encourage the skill of the sword among the youth, that in their wills, some left that for such beautiful women, they would fight with swords, and give themselves to the victorious as a prize. This custom lasted until the Roman people themselves abolished and prohibited it, as Carlos Cerotino expresses.

The use of gladiatorial contests and combats was also so widespread that they were not only introduced at public festivals and banquets, but also at funerals. The Roman Republic and other nations had public masters at great prices for so many and various types of Gladiators, who (according to Juan Villembrochio) they generically called Lanistas, very different from the Sciamachios, imitators of Glaucus, whose painting (in the style of his statue) they had in their houses, where they taught those dedicated to war. For this just cause, the premeditations and exercises of the sword were instituted, so that the educated youth would become accustomed to not fearing hostile fights, as Alexandro and Celio Rodiginio noted. Celio gives Theseus as the inventor of Pancratium, in memory of the victory he obtained from Minotaur, and understanding by Pancratium that fight, in which the skill of the sword was not aptitude, also attributing to him the palaestric exercise, in which the main practice was of swords, hence the masters of such combats were later called Doctors of the Palaestra in court.

And if we were to discuss all types of contests, whether Olympic or others, introduced for the agility of men in different weapons and movements, all for the purpose of human defense and offense, it would be necessary to write entire and large books, which for not being my subject, are omitted.

It is understood that in place of Sciamachia, there has remained meditation, operation of intelligence, and the practice of the sword, where those with knowledge, art, and experience reach their excellences, having virtue as their main reward. Even the Doctors of the Armies, Tribunes, and Consuls, who strive to achieve a true understanding of the noblest and most honorable instrument wielded by men for the defense and honor of the kingdoms, can be correspondingly recognized.

And those who commonly, even if not through all their principles and cognitive powers, at least through acquired and experienced rules and precepts, engage and practice the teaching of the sword, deserve the honorary title of Masters in Arms. They gain more esteem, the less they frequent and appear in public squares.

FIFTH DISCOURSE.

LOGIC OF THIS SCIENCE: of the Definition, and Division

Philosophers, logicians, and dialecticians consider the definition and division as principal terms to all science. With the understanding of these, one can better engage in the predicables, predicaments, categories, etc., in which the understanding becomes accustomed to guiding towards demonstration, acquiring what is probable or evident, which is the aim of all science, art, and discipline. This is also recognized in the understanding and practice of the sword, where the terms: Definition, Division, etc., are necessarily integral parts of the argument and demonstration.

It is commonly touched upon in schools as a difficulty, which comes first in order: the Definition or the Division? They consider that if they refer to different things, the division is first in the order of nature, because by the division of the superiors the definition of the inferiors is investigated: e.g. by the division of the substance the definition of the animal is sought; and thus, the division is first, before the definition, because it is first to divide the highest genus than to define the species.

On the contrary, if the definition and the division refer to the same thing defined, the definition is first before the division in natural order, and of doctrine; e.g. if the animal to be defined is considered, the definition is first, then the division. The reason is clear: the definition is a certain composition of the thing defined, and the division, indeed, is the resolution: and according to the order of nature, it is first composed, then divided, and resolved.

It is commonly touched upon in schools as a difficulty, which comes first in order: the Definition or the Division? They consider that if they refer to different things, the division is first in the order of nature, because by the division of the superiors the definition of the inferiors is investigated: e.g. by the division of the substance the definition of the animal is sought; and thus, the division is first, before the definition, because it is first to divide the highest genus than to define the species.

Therefore, when talking about the precepts of defining and dividing, the principles of defining should be disputed first in terms of doctrine and dignity: in terms of doctrine, because the concept of division cannot be properly understood without the definition: and in terms of dignity, because the definition explains the essence of what is defined: just as in the science of the Sword, the essence of what is defined in it is not explained by the division, but by the definition in the first place, as will be demonstrated; and here for the sake of brevity and clarity, we present the naked conclusions without the disputable apparatus, and various opinions of authors, because, as it has been said, our aim is not to show off, but to explain what is necessary for our endeavor, trying to stick to what is necessary in what is written.

Aristotle teaches that there are not many quidditative definitions given of a defined subject, just as there are not many essences, because if there were, its supreme whole would not be definable. From this, Scotus concludes that there are not many definitions of an absolute (of which the definition indicates its being). From this, it is argued: the definition is one absolute, etc., therefore the definition of Definition must be one, and not many.

For this reason, the same Philosopher defined the definition of the Definition, saying: It is a sentence that explains the essence of the thing. In this substance, Philosophers and Rhetoricians agree in different phrases, from which we deduce the definition of the definition, being: It is a sentence that explains the essential nature of what is defined in the shortest possible number of words.

We say that it is a sentence because it is not a simple word; if you were to say, the Gladius is a sword: it is a sword, it would not be a definition, but a simple or identical proposition. In a sentence, there are more words; one perfect, which consists of one word, such as White man; another imperfect or compound, which does not consist of one word, but many, such as Man is an animal participant of reason; and so, although it is a sentence, it is not only a definition but a definition and the defined, because for the definition, the genre and difference are enough, which is explained by Animal participant of reason; the word man is not part of the definition, it is the defined.

Therefore, the definition should not be obscure or ambiguous, but lucid, clear, and proper, so Quintilian said: The definition is a sentence of the proposed thing, proper, lucid, and comprehended in brief words. From this, Aristotle named it Oros, with Quintilian explaining that it signifies Term, in allusion to the boundaries in the fields, which are also named Terms, because they include what they comprehend, distinguishing one from another.

Boethius considered fifteen types of definitions, not by essence, but by the manner of composition: the Modern Scholastics are content to divide the definition into two modes; one, definition of the thing, which is that which explains it, according to its own being, and essence; and this they call Essential, and they divide it into causes, and effects, etc. Another mode they name definition of the name, because it explains what the name signifies: and they consider it in five modes.

The first, when an obscure word, name, or term is demonstrated by another clear, intelligible one, like Fretum, which is a narrow or strait of Sea, placed between two continuous lands: Zero Movement, which signifies a certain way of acting with the Sword.

The second mode is when the etymology of the name or term is explained, like Parricide, the one who kills his father: Triangle, that figure which consists of three angles: Cuchillada, that wound made with the blade of the Sword.

The third mode is when it is explained by analogy, or metaphor, like Adolescence, is the flower of age: The mind, in the soul, is what the eyes are in the body: Estocada, for that wound made with such a form of Sword, which has no cutting edges on the blade, like the Estoque, to which it alludes by analogy, or metaphor.

The fourth mode is when it is explained by example or comparison: for example, the brute animal is like a man in sensitivity and in movement, etc. The Cut and the Reverse resemble each other in delivering a cutting strike.

The fifth mode is by negation, such as virtue is to avoid vices. God is not a created substance, He is not finite, etc. The Reverse is not a Cut, and even less a Thrust.

These principles moved the Philosopher to consider the division of the definition, in that which looks at the reason for the thing defined and in that which looks at the name, so he said: The definition of the thing defined is that which is the means of demonstration, either by the nature of the subject defined, or due to causes, and this is called essential. The definition of the name is that which is not a proper means of demonstration, like definitions from offices, elected, etc. of which Aristotle speaks broadly, and the Dialectics discuss.

There are three types of definitions different from each other, not by essence, but by the mode of the definitions; which are a means in the demonstration; the first, which is by genus and difference, is raised with the name of essential by antonomasia: the second, although it is also essential, is called ‘sought from causes’: the third is the description, because the defined is explained by passions, or properties, like ‘Man is a laughing animal’: which is only property, and not constitution: the same is the Equilateral Triangle, Vertical Cut, which are essential definitions of a mathematical figure and of a cutting wound; because all, and the like, manifest the intimate of what they define: all three are embraced by the Definition, which explains the essence of the thing defined by that which is intimate in it itself: and in the one in which these qualities concur, it accepts the term or qualification of essential.

For understanding this, it should be noted that there are some considerations that are accidental, meaning the subject defined can exist without them, and others are such that without them the subject cannot subsist. In those that are so accidental that without them the subject can exist, they do not provide essence to the definition, such as being seated or standing; sleeping or waking; these considerations, and the like, do not take away the subsistence of the subject, or the thing defined; for the man standing or seated; in stillness, or movement; sleeping or waking; subsists in all his being, and is defined without them. There are others that are not accidental, but essential, because without them the subject or thing defined does not subsist whole, such as wings in a bird, which is not physically complete without wings; but with all this it can be defined, and understood by Genus, and Difference proper to the subject.

There are other considerations, without which, neither the subject can exist, nor can it be defined or understood: these are properly called intimate, like rational animal, wound in its lowest species, which are the lowest considerations in the subject; because man cannot subsist or be known without them; nor the wound, but by its lowest species, in which its lowest and intimate difference is explained, like Stab of Quarter Circle, where the term Stab is genus, and Quarter Circle is the lowest and intimate difference: the same can be said in every defined thing, just as the Triangle does not subsist in its figure without three angles; and more essential, if it is declared by its lowest, intimate difference, Octagon, Isosceles, etc. because Genus is that which includes different species: and Difference is that which separates, and represents the intimate properties of the Species; and therefore we resort to the intimate, and lowest differences of the subject, that separate it from the other species, which are included in the genus, from which it is understood what the Philosophers commonly say, that the genus must be constituted from the matter, and the difference from the form, in which what properly belongs to the genus is known; and what properly belongs to the lowest, or intimate difference in the subject, to form the essential definition; e.g. Vertical Cut, Diagonal Cut, etc. which are defined, and known by their lowest, intimate difference, with respect to their lowest genus, which is why it is considered, that there are also very general genera, that include, and embrace in themselves other genera, as in the science of the Sword there are very general genera wounds, movements, which are capable of including in themselves other genera, not so general, as in wounds, slashings, stabbings, which are genera for other lower genera, such as Cuts, Backstrokes, etc. and so in movements. For example: in the straight line of a category, or predicament, descending from a high genus to a lowest species, it will be said wound: or is it cutting, or point. Cutting? Slashing: Slashing? Cut, or Backstroke, Backstroke Diagonal, or Vertical. And ascending, it will be said Diagonal Backstroke: then slashing. Slashing? then cutting wound.

The same method is considered in Philosophy, as if we were to say: Vegetable, only man, brute, and plant, etc. and these general and more general Genres in the definition require more considerations, going from a highest Genus to a lowest Species, or conversely, ascending from the lowest Species to the highest Genus of its predicament, as will be demonstrated in its place: noting here, that there are highest Genres, or principles, that do not admit essential definition by Genus, and Difference, because the simplest Genus or principle does not admit Difference in itself, like the point, which is the principle of quantity; but it is not quantity, because it does not have parts, and thus lacks difference: but not for that reason is it indefinable (since everything finite, be it highest Genus, or principle, is definable) but due to lack of Genus, and Difference From Causes, or by description: thus Aristotle compares the essential Definition to the number, because just as with the number, if something is added or removed, it changes the species; e.g. in the ternary, if one unit is added, it becomes quaternary; and if one is removed, it becomes binary; so also in the essential Definition, if something is added or removed, the definition is inverted, or passing from a less general genre to a more general one, or vice versa, as Logicians and Metaphysicians broadly dispute: the same is experienced in the science of the Sword, in which removed or added an intimate, or lowest Difference, inverts the Definition, as has been pointed out, and is evident.

The second mode of essential Definition is From Causes, or by one, or by more, or by all: for understanding this, it is assumed with the Philosopher, his Expositors, and the current of the Schools, that there are four causes, material, formal, efficient, and final, and we place them in such order as to nature, that first is the matter, then the form is introduced, and then the efficient and final cause are considered, always recognizing that natural agents, making, suffer: because only God is the first efficient cause, and so Cause of causes, Creator of prime matter; and the others that are considered, are physical causes, and subsequent: e.g. in man, it will be said, that he is an animal, whose physical matter in the first was the slime of the earth, and in propagation the prolific matter: in the formal it will be said, that he is a rational soul, which gives him being, and form, produced, by the efficient; and it will be said of man, that he is an animal, consisting of a human body, and a rational soul; and in this definition, the body is matter, and the soul is form, and by supreme efficient we recur to the essential principle, which is God, who in the slime of the earth, disposed, inspired the rational vital form, from which the essential end of man is to achieve the end for which he was created, and by all causes it can be said, that he is an animal, consisting of a human body, with a rational soul, created by God, the principal efficient cause, who created him for the most perfect end he should aspire to, which is to see and love Him in Beatitude.

In the rest of the sciences, causes are investigated according to the order of nature, and through it, an essential definition of what is defined is formed. Similarly, in understanding and practicing Swordsmanship, being a science, definitions are found by causes and they are also essential, as will be demonstrated in its place when dealing with the causes of this science.

The third form of essential definition, which can be demonstrable, is description; and although this is not as quidditative as the one resulting from genus and difference, or causes, it does not lack essence, as it explains it in a brief sentence, which describes it in such a way that it is a means for demonstration, and thus it is defined, saying: Description is a brief sentence that explains what the definable thing is through some or some of its properties, or by the collection of many accidents, and proper of the subject.

By some of its properties, such as when a man is defined as a laughing or admiring animal, or all together: because admiration is a property of man, and laughter is also, and the subject of admiration is laughable, and the one who is laughable is admirable, which are properties of man, and sufficient to define him by description; but it can also be done by the collection of many accidents, like a two-legged animal that lacks feathers, which are accidents, that each are properties of other animals; because birds are two-legged, and fish lack feathers, these accidents do not occur together as properly as in man, without having a place for the Ecce homo Platonis in the featherless rooster, as Achilles Bocchio tells. In the science of the Sword, many definitions are made by description, such as of the Sword itself, which is an instrument of two edges in proportional length and width, consisting of a sharp point, and such ornament at its beginning, that provides defense to the hand that guides it, and gives it aptitude to impede the opposing instrument, to which it has to oppose. And so, other described definitions can be formed.

Aristotle, recognizing the precepts of many to find the correct definition, gave the following: the first rule is that it should be distinct and clear, and this precept is violated in two ways; the first, if the thing to be defined is included in the definition, such as saying: The rational is an animal partaking of reason, Dialectics is the skill of arguing dialectically, where the subjects rational and Dialectics are what is being defined, which should not be included in the definition, as for this, the genus and the difference are sufficient, and essential, and on the same defined subject, like saying: A stab, or Vertical Slash, where the same mistake is committed.

The second error is if an obscure, ambiguous, or homonymous voice is included in the definition, such as saying: Generation is movement from non-being to being; such a definition is faulty, because Movement is an ambiguous word, and does not form a distinct definition; obscurity is committed when obscure words are used in the definition, such as saying: The earth is the nurturer of the living, the error is committed in the word Nurturer, which is metaphorical with respect to the earth. Obscurity is also committed in improper ways of speaking, such as: The Law is the image of those who are just, which is an improper phrase for the definition, from which unusual words are also excluded.

The second rule in the definition is that it should not be greater or smaller than what is being defined; this means that it should not apply to more than what it defines, because what is extraneous is faulty in the definition, which will be greater when it expands to more than necessary, with redundant terms: and smaller when it lacks some term necessary to the understanding of what is being defined.

The third rule is to match the subject, or thing being defined, with such property that the intimate of what is defined is understood; in such a way that what suits it, suits the definition; and what suits the definition, suits what is defined reciprocally, as is recognized in the accepted definition of man as an Animal participant of reason, which suits the definition, and the subject: all this the Philosophers explain briefly, saying, that defined, and definition are convertible.

The fourth rule is that in the definition there should be nothing superfluous, which will be recognized when, if any word or particle of the definition is removed, it remains sufficient, as in saying: Rational, admiring, and laughing animal, which is superfluous, because even if the words, Admiring, laughing, or the like are removed, the definition remains sufficient, saying: Rational animal.

The fifth rule is that what is defined should be recognized if it is capable of genus and difference, so that the essential results, because lacking true genus and difference, one will have to choose by causes, or by description, and this is achieved by ascending and descending along the straight line of the categories, as will be demonstrated in the Predicaments.

Aristotle found two means of investigating the Definition, one through composition, another through resolution, because the first order is to compose rather than to resolve.

For the composition, the genus must be sought; and once found, it is divided by contrary differences, and from these the proper and immediate ones of the thing being defined are chosen, excluding the repugnant ones, proceeding in this way until a proper sentence can be formed, suitable to what is being defined; e.g. in man, the highest genus of his category is sought, which will be Substance, and this is called the highest genus, from which it is derived: therefore, the substance will be divided into its differences, which are, corporeal, and incorporeal; and because the incorporeal is repugnant to man, what suits him is chosen, which is corporeal, and it will be said: Man is a corporeal substance; and because the intimate difference of man is not achieved with only being a corporeal substance, one proceeds to the immediate difference of the corporeal part, which is, being animated, or inanimated; and as the inanimated is repugnant to man, what suits him is chosen, which is to be an animated corporeal substance: but as the animated can be sensible, or insensible; and the insensible is repugnant to man, what competes with him is chosen, which is, being sensible, and it will be said, that he is a sensible animated corporeal substance; and as the sensitives differ in participants of reason, and in those lacking reason, and it is repugnant to man to lack reason; it is convenient for him to be a participant of reason, for which reason the intimate difference that competes with him will be chosen, which is, being a participant of reason; and from this difference, and from the immediate proximate genus, which is animal, the essential definition by genus, and difference, found by the composition of the Predicament, or category of substance, will be formed, discoursing along the straight line of the Predicament, because in the parts of the definition such an order must be observed, that the genus is placed first, and then the differences, and among the general ones, the least general ones are chosen, until the most intimate to the defined is found. And by this method, everything that admits an essential definition by genus and difference is investigated, finding what properly competes with the definition, according to the definition of the Definition, as will be demonstrated in the science of the Sword in its predicament, or category.

In creating a definition based on causes, you compose it by finding the properties that are unique to the subject being defined, investigating until you find the most specific or most intimate differences that result from the causes.

When creating a descriptive definition, you examine the specific characteristics of the subject. You then describe the subject or the thing being defined in a brief scope using the most unique characteristic or a few equivalent ones. It is important that this description should not apply to any other subject or thing but only to what is being defined. That is why Porphyry says that the strictly proper predicate applies to every single one, and always. The examples mentioned earlier can be applied to this principle.

Focusing solely on the essentials of Division, we will try to limit ourselves to what is necessary for its understanding, avoiding an ostentation of debates and various opinions of which so much has been said that it forms volumes. Among the vast writings, we choose what is inexcusably relevant to our task. But before we delve into the intrinsic definition of Division, note that this term, taken broadly, is homonymous. When considered in particular, it is distinguished by enumeration and partition, because division originates from various types of wholes, which should be the primary consideration and discussion.

There are many types of Wholes, and among them, because they serve our purpose, we select two: one, what is called a Whole Integral; the other, the Whole Universal. The Whole Integral is one that consists of its integral parts, like a house, which consists of foundations, walls, and roofs, etc., and Skill, which includes complete perfection. The Whole Universal is what is predicated of its parts: like an animal, which is a universal whole with respect to man, lion, horse, etc. because a man is an animal, and a horse, and a lion.

Between these two types of wholes, there are three differences: the first is that the Whole Integral is not directly predicated of its parts, because it would be false to say, the wall is a house, or the foundation is a house. However, the Whole Universal is rightly predicated of its parts, as if one says, the man is an animal, or the horse is an animal, or the lion is an animal, which is a true conclusion. The second difference is that the Whole Integral is posterior to its parts, and the Whole Universal is anterior. The third difference is that the Whole Integral, even if it perishes, some of its parts can remain, while in the Whole Universal, the parts are destroyed when the Whole is destroyed.

Thus, in the science of the Sword, the whole integral can be called the whole Skill, which is composed of different integral parts; but because in the Integral, the definition can be made by the Whole, and not by the parts rightly; and in the Universal, it can have differences, which are referred to (all are applicable to the science of the Sword, which is commonly named Skill, which needs so much of distributive divisions from the most general, and common, to the less common, and more special) it will be recognized, that the kind of Division is the partition, or enumeration of degrees, or numbers, etc.

Division is in two ways, by name and by entity, like Thrust, Cut, Reverse, which make division by name, and by thing, with the addition, which makes the Division more individual, constituting it in the lowest species, like Vertical Cut, Diagonal Cut, Thrust of Quarter Circle, that by the addition of the lowest difference, they not only achieve the difference that individualizes the species, from which it results that the Division is subdivided into two terms, Name, and thing, which are explained thus.

Division of name is, when the name is shown, which can be in two ways; one, when the voice is homonymous, and it is distinguished in its significations, like Cut, which without addition, is a homonymous voice, which includes various species of cutting wound, signified with only one term, or name.

Another Division is found in the amphibolic sentence of the name, when it is distinguished and divided in its true senses, as in the Delphic Oracle, asked: Quomodò vincendum? Responded: Hasta Romanos, which can signify contrary senses, understanding, either ‘The Romans to be defeated with a spear,’ or ‘With a spear, the Romans are victors.’ And in the science of the Sword, Cut, Avoidance will be amphibolic, which can signify such a sentence contrary precepts, as if they are constructed, dividing the significations, one could understand Cut as one, and Avoidance as another: and if they are made of one signification, they will understand one Cut against another Cut, placing them, disjoining the A. And these amphibolic, which are usually committed, either for lack of explanation, or for affecting brevity, should be avoided in the science of the Sword, in voice, and in writing: and we point it out, so as not to omit the complete explanation in the terms.

Division of the thing is, when it is distributed in its parts, which is done in three ways: the first, by essential division: the second, by accident: the third, by partition. Essential division is subdivided into division of the genus, and division of the species by the genus, like Animal, which admits division into man, and brute; by the species, man into Peter, John, etc., the brute, into lion, horse, etc. However, it should be observed that the division of the genus by differences is not completely different from that which is divided by species, because in truth the genus is not divided into differences, as in parts, but as in species by names of differences, like the difference of rational, the one of brute, etc. Hence the very division, which is made of the genus animal into man, and brute, is the one that constitutes the difference of species.

For our purpose, such divisions are recognized, caused by the distribution in parts, respecting the genus to the species, as in the proximate and remote genera of wounds, that a Knife cut looks at the genus of cutting wounds, which by the force of distribution, are divided into also generic species, and these into the lowest differences, which make the meanings more individual with the additions, Vertical, Diagonal, etc.

The above is proven with two reasons; the first is that in every good essential division, every divide must be understood, and repeated in the dividing parts, as in animals, some, who participate in reason; others, who lack it: then the divide Animal Genus must be understood, and repeated in the dividing parts; e.g., Some animals are partakers of reason, some lack reason. From where the animal participant of reason, is not only difference, but the very species of man; and also animal lacking reason, is not only difference, but the very species of the brute, because the division of the genus into species, by name of species, and another by name of differences; and one, and another in an equivalent essentiality. The same reason is valid in the science of the Sword, as has been demonstrated in the preceding example, which, being so clear, is not duplicated

The second reason is that the whole should be predicated of its dividing parts, therefore it is not predicated of differences, as Aristotle taught: hence, the division of an animal into those possessing reason, and those lacking it, is not a division of the general into differences, but it is in species by the name of differences. This is why Boethius was moved to say that the genus must be divided into species by the names of species, not by the names of differences.

For our purpose, note that the essential division (which in another way is usually called division of the genus) is called essential because the whole divided is of the essence of the dividing parts, as in the highest genus, ‘Wound’, in all its parts, it causes essential division into the lowest genera of wounds, to the most specific species of them.

The second essential division is by accident, considered in three ways: the first is from the subject to accidents, and in this all the divided, subject, and dividing parts are accidents; for example, of men, some are white, others are black, others are not entirely white, nor entirely black; and in this way, the subject and parts admit accidents, not separated from the essentiality, just as in accidental movements, some are violent, others are slow, others are between slow and violent, which can be called natural, and all are admitted and divided, without separating from their essentiality.

The second way is the division of accidents into subjects, in which all the divided is accident, and the dividing parts are subjects, for example, the habits of the mind, some are situated in the soul, others inherent in the body, as far as their accidental operations; so that a division of accidents into subjects can occur, in which the divided can be an accident, and the dividing parts subjects, which can be experienced by the expert in the accidents of combat.

The third way is the division of accidents into accidents, in which all the divided, and dividing parts are accidents: as in the actions, one is erroneous, another is correct, the former due to ignorance, the latter due to study, and practice, as in this science of the Sword, that acting in the conflict of combat by its proper and contrary actions, where the division is forcibly from accident to accidents, being all the divided, and dividing parts accidents; because the combat is reduced to operations, which are accidents, and these operations, some are done correctly, others with error; those that are done correctly, result from the understanding, and practice of the Sword; those that are mistaken, are caused by ignorance of this science, or the art; which is produced from it, or the experience with which it is perfected.

The division by partition is double, considering one of the whole integral into homogeneous, or similar parts, which admit the name Whole; as when water is divided into its parts, and air into its own, any part is water, and any part of air is air, and any part of movement is movement.

Another division is by partition, and this is considered of the whole integral into heterogeneous parts (that is, dissimilar) which by themselves do not admit the name of Whole, as in the house divided into foundations, walls, roof, etc., and the wall is not a house, nor the foundation is a house, etc., and in the structure of the body, the arm is not the head, etc. Thus, in the science of the Sword, which is all composed of dissimilar parts, as in types of movements of the body, arm, and Sword, dissimilar among themselves, by their divisions, and differences, regulated with such proportion that, together with the other parts that contribute to the actions, they perfect this science, which the common people call Skill.

To conclude what pertains to the Division, we take from much that has been written on such a wide subject, the following rules. That the Division be made into nearby parts, and not distant ones, because the animal is not divided in the first term into Pedro, Juan, etc., or into horse, or lion, etc., nor the wound into Diagonal Cut, or Vertical, etc., but first is the division of animal into human, and into brute, and then into its lowest differences, as wound in the first term, or genus, of cut, or point: in the second of cut, into Slash: in the third Slash, into Cut, Reverse, etc. and in the lowest difference, Vertical Cut, etc.

The second rule is that, just as the dividing parts, each one taken by itself, are smaller than the whole divided, and all of them collected together should compose the whole, so it must be with the integral division, like the whole genre of animal divided into man and beast; because man considered by itself, has fewer terms than animal and beast; but man and beast in collection fall under the term Animal, because the term Animal divided, is either man or beast, and any man or beast is an Animal: similarly, a Sword-stroke, is either a Cut or a Reverse; and Cut and Reverse together, fall under the generic term Sword-stroke, because any Cut or Reverse is a Sword-stroke.

The third rule is that the dividing parts should be opposed to each other, as the entity and the reason that oppose each other: e.g., Animal, one is a man, the other a beast, which are opposed to each other, because it is not possible for a subject to be both man and lion. And in terms of reason, as with actions, some are honest, others useful, others enjoyable, and are divided into the genre action; e.g., the practice of letters is honest, insofar as it is considered a virtue; and being a virtue, it can be useful, as it helps to achieve some useful end; and being honest and useful, it can shine and cause delight, as proven by the Philosopher.In the practice of the Sword, in terms of reason and entity, the dividing parts are opposed to each other. In terms of reason, because the understanding theoretically divides actions to investigate in what they differ and in what they oppose, achieving through such division its knowledge by intimate and ultimate differences: and in terms of reality, which is reduced to effective operation, it regulates the dividing parts, like the Thrust, the Cut, the Reverse, which are dividing parts of the genre Wound, and descending to their intimate and ultimate differences, qualifies in what the Cut is opposed to the Reverse, in what the Vertical is to the Diagonal, etc.

The fourth rule is inferred from Cicero, who says that it is not appropriate for a part placed under a Genus to agree with another part, which is placed under the Genus divided; this is, it is not appropriate for the dividing part, which is contained under a Genus, to agree with another dividing part: because it will not be a good division of animals, one Human, another Beast, another Lion; because Lion is already contained under the dividing part Beast. Thus, Plato taught that the division should consist of two parts, because if it consists of many parts they have to be reduced to two, by negation, or privation, as in this division of animals, some terrestrial, others aquatic, others flying, which are reduced to two parts, by negation, distinguishing, either it is terrestrial, or it is not terrestrial; either it is aquatic, or it is not aquatic; either it is flying, or it is not flying; and Boethius follows this sentence, arguing thus: The Division must be made by opposite parts: are they opposite? then two: then the Division must consist of two opposite parts. But Aristotle seems to refute this opinion, and rightly so, forming a broad discourse (which the curious can see), that if the Division had to consist of only two parts, it would result in the multiplication of the Divisions; e.g., virtue is divided into justice, strength, prudence, etc., and by Boethius’s doctrine, it would necessitate multiplying the divisions, saying: Justice? its opposite is injustice, and so on in the others, which would cause inconvenient laboriousness in the division.

It is not obligatory, nor necessary to reduce the Division to only two opposite parts, as Boethius implies; for his opinion can be understood and saved with the term Repugnance, even if the species are many and different from each other, as in beasts, lion, horse, bull, etc. These species, due to their repugnance, are divided without the need for negation, as can be inferred from the doctrine of Aristotle, which we follow in the science of the Sword, where the Genus Injury is divided into various differences, which are divided by the term Repugnance, such as the Cut and the Reverse in their lowest species. The same in movements, in postures, etc. which can be divided by their repugnance without inconvenience, without resorting to negation, or to two singular opposites; with which we have sought to encompass what pertains to the Division, its understanding, and precepts in relation to the science of the Sword, providing for greater clarity, not only philosophical examples, but ones specific to this very science, judging that in this way, more demonstrably with both, the discourse will comprehend, that in this exercise the precepts of science have a place and are necessary: and with such foundations we will come to the demonstrations, and topical and mathematical arguments, which will produce what is probable, and the evident from the understanding, and exercise of the Sword, which is commonly called Skill, and to the one who achieves it, Skilled; and accommodating ourselves to the most common, we will use, in many parts the same terms, Skill, and Skilled, and we will pass with such attention to the explanation of the words, that name Universals, or Predicables.

SIXTH DISCOURSE.

LOGIC OF THIS SCIENCE: Universal voices

In schools, questions are raised, whether these Universals, or Predicables are voices, or entities; or if they signify entities, and voices? Opinions concur, recognizing that the most received in Universities, is to call them voices, because Logic, and Dialectic are considered as debate, which is achieved with words, speaking: and speaking, signifies voices, and things, with which the term is suitable to one, and another sense, as it is proven by Cicero, and expressed by Saint Augustine, that the curious can see, from which the overcoming of the difficulty is derived.

Given that the Universals can signify voices, and things, omitting the lengthiness of the questions, in which the Logicians dilate, the essential that makes this science will be sought to be girded, following the most received in the Schools, and most in agreement in the serious Authors.

With such resolution, three divisions are found in the voices, noted by the acuity of Logicians, and Metaphysicians: the first, and most generic is in simple voices, and in compound voices. A simple voice is that which does not consist of many sayings, and a compound voice is the one that is composed of many sayings.

It is said that a voice will be simple, the one that does not consist of many sayings, because it can consist of some, and be simple, signifying a single singular.

On the contrary, a voice will be compound, which although it adheres to few expressions, signifies many singulars, or many things; e.g. Thrust, Slash, insofar as they signify a singular species of wound, thus being a single expression, and because of the specific meaning, they are simple voices. On the contrary, it is a compound voice that is constituted by a number of expressions, and signifies various things, like Cut, and Reverse, which are species of the genus Slash, and signify various things. But it should be noted that there are compound voices by the number of expressions, which are simple by the singular they signify; e.g. Diagonal Cut, Vertical Cut, which are compound voices as to the number of expressions, and simple, by the singular meaning, that this happens, when the Genus, and the Difference join in the composition.

Another division is considered in two other modes, resulting from the voice, and the term, like synonymous voice, and homonymous voice. A simple synonymous voice is one that signifies many singulars in a same generic reason, like Thrust, Slash. A homonymous voice is the one that signifies various things with a single voice, which in vulgar is called equivocal.

Another distinction is considered in common voice, and in singular voice: a common voice is properly generic, because with a predicamental term it signifies various singulars, such as Thrust, which is a common voice to puncture wounds: and Slash, to cutting wounds. A singular voice is the one that is assigned to a singular species, like Cut, Reverse, Thrust. Other differences are found in Logicians, and Metaphysicians, which are more suitable for other sciences, than for that of the Sword, where the proposed ones are sufficient.

According to Porphyry, and his expositors, the voices (which they call Predicables, or Universals) are reduced to five, which are, Genus, Species, Difference, Proper, and Accident, as has been said.

Scotus, in proof of the production, and number of these voices, resolves (by authority of Porphyry) that they are five, and no more; although, placing them in different ways, considering that the Universal, either signifies substance, or accident. If substance, in whole, or in material part, it will be Genus: if formal, it will be Difference: if in all substance, it will be Species, which tells the being of the immediate individuals to the Genus: if accident, either it is convertible, or it is not convertible? If it is convertible, it is Proper; if it is not convertible, it is Common Accident, and thus the fifth Universal: and concludes, that as it is not possible (to our understanding) to signify what is said of many, except by these five ways, the Universals are no more than these five.

It is recognized by the doctrine of the Philosopher that in three ways two things are said to agree, or to be of the same reason; this is understood in Genus, in Species, in Number: Because that is said to agree, being of the same genus, which is contained under the nearest Genus; such as Cut and Reverse, whose nearest Genus is Cut, which includes the wounds of cut. The nearest Genus is called that, between which, and the Species there is no other intermediate genus, as you see, that between the Genus Cut, and the Species Cut, and Reverse, there is no other intermediate.

Agreement in species is said, when under a same lowest Species, singular species are contained, such as Diagonal Cut, or Vertical Cut, etc. which are singular species of a same lowest Species, which the Logicians call Individuals.

A singular lowest Species is, when the Species cannot be Genus, but precisely it is contained in its very species or singular, like a Quarter Circle Stab, which cannot be Genus, nor Species in common, but in singular specific.

Agreement in Number is understood when one and another thing agree numerically, which can be in five ways: one, when they agree in the same name, and number, such as First Intention Stab, Second Intention Stab, which agree in the generic name, Stab, and in the number for First Intention, and Second Intention, which although they differ in the lowest Species, they agree numerically.

Another, when being different names, they agree in one meaning, like Diagonal Cut, Diagonal Reverse, although the names, and species, are different, they agree in one meaning, which is Diagonal.

Another, when the definition and the defined are of the same number, like defining the Cut, it will be essential, saying: That it is a wound caused by the edge of the Sword, which agrees with Cut, for being due to the blade, and not to the point, with which the definition and the defined agree in the essence of being a cutting strike.

Another, when the Property and the subject agree in one enumeration, as the subject, and the property, that in this science, the subject is the man, and the property to wound the opponent, by movement, or movements, which are proper in the man, or violent, or natural, etc. which can agree in one enumeration.

Another, when agreed in the same accidental number, like combatant against combatant, who agree in the accident of the Sword, with which one and the other are armed, etc.

Just as it agrees in Genus, Species, and Number; so also it differs in the same three ways, because to differ in Genus is when the nearest genera are different, like Stab, Cut, etc.

Difference in Species is when, although they agree in the proximate or remote Genus, they differ in the Species, like Cut, and Reverse, which agree in the genus Cut, and differ in the species.

In various modes of agreement and difference, a certain order or analogy is found in diverse proportions. Because those things that agree in Number are said to agree maximally; those that agree in Genus, are said to agree less; and those that agree in Species, are said to agree medially.

In various modes of agreement and difference, a certain order or analogy is found in diverse proportions. Because those things that agree in Number are said to agree maximally; those that agree in Genus, are said to agree less; and those that agree in Species, are said to agree medially.

Conversely, those that differ in Genus differ maximally; those that differ in Number, differ less; and in both modes, those that agree or differ in Species, differ or agree medially. Like Stab and Cut, which differ maximally by differing in Genus; Vertical Cut and Diagonal Cut, which differ medially by differing in Species; and Cut and half Cut, which differ less by differing in Number from whole to lesser movement.

With the previous principles in this Discourse, the understanding of each of Porphyry’s Predicables, necessary in this Science for the Predicaments of the Philosopher, is facilitated. From his doctrine it is inferred that the Genus is considered first due to the continuous generation that is produced from it. Porphyry defined it, saying: Genus is what is predicated of many different Species: e.g. Stab. The term in Genus is caused by the instrument with which it is executed, considering it as the material cause of the wound, which is made with an Estoc, a type of Sword, which lacks a blade. Therefore, the generic name of Stab is given to all wounds made with the point of a Sword, including such a Genus all wounds, executed with the point of a Sword, reduced its term to the Estoc, because with it you do not wound by cut. Likewise, for the instrumental material cause, all those species of wounds that are committed and executed with a short instrument, moved by the efficient cause of the man’s fist, belong to the genus Dagger Strike. Therefore, the instrument suitable for such generic movements is generically called a Dagger, even if in the lowest species it has another name, like Knife, Dagger, Almarada, etc.

The Genus is considered in two ways, which are Supreme and Interjected, which is the same in common speech as interposed or intermediate. Supreme Genus is understood as That which is such that it cannot be a species. Interposed or Intermediate Genus Is the one that between the Genus and the Species admits the interjection or intermediate of another lower Genus, and this is called remote Genus; e.g., wound is a remote term, because what it produces is the first division into lower genera, such as Cut and Stab, etc. Thus, from the Genus Cut (which is intermediate), the division results in lower genera, which are Slash, Reverse, etc. and these produce species, such as Diagonal, Vertical, etc. up to the most specific.

The questions raised by Logicians and Metaphysicists, whether the meaning of the Genus is material or formal; or if the Genus in common has a material meaning; or if the relation of the Genus is one with that of the Species, or the same nature of the Genus, as to its definition; or if this is descriptive or causal; and if it is descriptive, if the most proper is that of Porphyry: in what way are the Genus and Difference considered and separated; and if the Genus is in potency or in act; and if it is predicated of the Species, as part or as a whole; or if of one or if of many Species: how it is the principle of the Species, and what is the definition of the defined in relation to the Genus? Thus, a multitude of doubts and questions, which the curious can see in the Expositors of Porphyry and Aristotle, and in Logicians and Metaphysicists, from which a volume can be formed, and a catalogue of Authors can be made, which would occupy a lot of paper.

Expositors of Porphyry divide what he discussed about Species as a Universal into eight contexts. Here it can be recognized that this is a homonymous term, because it admits different meanings, since the word Species, taken from Latin, is used in Spanish for a form that is species-like, which is equivalent to Perfection, along with other meanings noted by Ambrosius Calepinus and Passeratius.

Dialecticians and logicians define this term as that species which is placed under an assigned Genus. This definition is consistent with that of Porphyry, who said: Species is that which is included under the Genus, which is predicated of them. And more commonly by the same Porphyry: Species is that which is predicated of many differences in number. And more descriptively: Species is that which, under the same genus (upon which it does not transcend another), is placed at the lowest level, such that no other species is given under it. From all this it follows that the Genus and the Species are relatives, and they mutually define each other, because the knowledge of one depends on the other due to their relationship.

Porphyry places the Species immediately after the Genus because it commits to it, as in this science, where Wound is the highest Genus, above which no other ascends, and its immediate Species is Cut, etc., and its mediated in number, Slash, Backslash, etc. From these principles another definition is formed, saying: Species is that which is predicated of the different in number. By this definition, one inquires what the entity being sought is, like Slash, if it is Diagonal or Vertical, etc., Thrust, if it is of Quarter Circle, etc., searching for the lowest species through the different in number.

The understanding of the Species is divided into intermediate and lowest, because an intermediate one is, being a Species with respect to another Genus, it can be a Genus with respect to another Species; and such are all intermediates between the highest Genus and the lowest Species; in this consideration, those that refer to the lower ones are Genera: e.g., from the Wound in highest genus, its intermediate Species will be Cut, or Thrust, which with respect to the supreme Genus Wound, are Species, Cut, Thrust; and with respect to a lower Species, the Cut is a Genus, and the Thrust is a Genus, as can be demonstrably shown, forming a category from the highest Genus to the lowest Species, which does not admit another after it. This is essential in this Science, in which many questions debated in schools are omitted.

The term Difference is placed as the third word, or Universal term among the Predicables of Porphyry (which in Greek is pronounced Diaphora, a term that is ambiguous and signifies divide, cut, arrange, distance, differ, differentiate, all of which are meanings that result from the verb Differ.

Porphyry understands the term or word Difference in three ways, which are: common, proper, and most proper.

The common Difference (according to Porphyry himself and his Expositors) is that which, by accident, denotes separation from the subject or subjects, demonstrating, for example, how one thing differs from another, or in the same, slow or violent, these are differences by accidents in a subject, to wait or to attack, which are also admitted in combat in different subjects when they fight: and these differences, which are perceived by the physical act in the operation, are physical differences, like metaphysical ones those that are perceived in the understanding by speculation; and because both types are caused by accidents, they are called Differences in common.

According to Porphyry, Proper Difference is the inseparable accident with which one thing or subject differs from another, such as proceeding by cut the Cut, and by point the Thrust, which are inseparable accidents that manifest a proper Difference.

The most proper Difference (according to Porphyry and Saint Thomas) is that which shows the distinction and difference according to essence or species; e.g. man and lion; Cut and Thrust, which in essence and species differ most properly, even though they are included in the Genus; since animal includes man and lion; and wound includes Cut, and Thrust; and they are distinguished and recognized in essence and species by the difference.

The other five distinct definitions noted by Porphyry are deliberately omitted. Logicians and Metaphysicians elaborate on these in various questions. The curious can see these extensively in works by Porphyry, St. Thomas, Scotus, etc.

The term Proper (according to the opinion of Porphyry and his expositors) is the fourth Predicable in order of nature, because it approaches the very nature of the Species, as a property that is considered in it in four ways.

The first, according to some accident, applies to every individual of some species, like wounding by moving a sword diagonally, or vertically, etc. This is an accident that applies to the individuality of the species of the cutting wound, whether it is a slash or backhand, etc.

The second way is when some accident applies only to the individuals of some species, like Skilled, not Skilled, which, although they apply to man, the subject of this science, and those who learn, use, or profess it, not for that reason are all in it skilled, nor all not skilled.

The third way is when some accident applies to every individual of some species; but, nevertheless, it does not always apply, like Thrust of the Quarter Circle, which is an accident that applies to the individuality of such a Thrust; but not always to the individual of the point wound, which can be in another lowest species.

The fourth way is when some accident always applies to every individual of a species, according to aptitude, but not according to necessity, as happens to man in all passions, in which he has a permanent aptitude in potential, but not in continuous action, such as moving, and moving the instrument with which he works, in which he is permanently potential, but not in continuous action.

From here, it is noted that the second and third modes are understood by the act, not by the natural potential, but by the acquired one; and in the natural, it pertains to the fourth mode.

This term, or fourth Predicable, is essentially defined as follows; Proper is that which applies to every subject, only, and always, and reciprocates with that thing, or subject, of which it is proper.

However, it does not belong to the internal essence because the Proper is partially distinguished from the Genus by the Difference, which pertains to the Species in the internal essential part, with which it reciprocates.

Proper is distinguished from common Accident in that the latter does not reciprocate with that which is a common accident, but the Proper does reciprocate with that of which it is proper. From this, it is inferred that the Proper results in a certain way flowing to the nature, and essence, of which it is proper. For this reason, the Proper separates from the common Accident because the Accident does not belong to the pure essence of the thing, of which it is an accident; but the Proper proceeds from the same essence, as from the essential principles of the thing, or subject, of which it is proper.

These conclusions are the most appropriate for this science, so other species and questions that pertain more to Philosophy, Physics, and Metaphysics are omitted here. In these disciplines, it is debated in what way the Proper is generic, or infimum, or interjected, or transcendent: as those curious can see in the Expositors of Porphyry.

Accident. This fifth universal was defined by Porphyry in three ways. The first said, Accident is that which can exist or not exist without the corruption of the subject.

This definition is subdivided into separable or inseparable accident from the subject: That is an accident which can exist in a subject; in being, and in not being of the same subject. And by negation it is defined: That is an accident which is neither Genre, nor Species, nor Difference, nor Proper, although it is always in some subject.

Metaphysicians and Logicians expand on this Universal term, explaining the definitions of Porphyry, raising various questions, from which what most applies to this Science is selected, where in terms of movement, it is considered as a common Accident, which can exist, and not exist in the subject of the Skilled, or the non-Skilled without corruption of the same subject, because the operation is according to the differences of the movement’s accident. And separable and inseparable accidents from the subject are also considered; because some are inherent in it, and these are not separable; and others, which are not inherent in the same subject, are separable, as the Expositors of the first and second Definition extensively explain.

However, there are accidents that, in intellectual cogitation, transform into other accidents that are produced by operation, in respect to the accidental nature; for example, in the case of a cutting wound (which is a Slash) and in the case of a puncture wound (which is a Thrust), the Physical agent considers them in relation to their inseparable accidents, which are inherent in the very species of the wound, which the Right-handed determines by first intention; but in the course of combat, such a foreign accident occurs on the part of the opponent, that the Right-handed in intellectual cogitation transforms the cutting wound, which he decided to commit, into a puncture wound, which he executed by second intention, the cutting wound being accidentally transformed into a puncture wound, just as he could also transform the puncture wound of first intention before executing it, into a cutting wound, executed by second intention. Everything will be demonstrated in its proper places, resulting from all this, that in the perfect act by Common Accident, the Accident is neither Genus, nor Species, nor Difference, nor Property, but another fifth Predicable term, which is divided, and diverse from the Predicamental Accident, because the Predicamental Accident looks at what is not Substance, and the Predicamental is the opposite, because it is considered in the substance, dividing into the nine Accidents, which admit categories by the partition of being: it should be considered here, that the Predicable Accident, and the Predicamental Accident differ in various ways, because one is considered A parte rei, (which is according to its real being) and the other (according to its objective being) which is said, and diverse from the same substance, untransformable from accident to accident, in respect to intellectual cogitation; and this alone is Predicable, and Universal term, and the other categorical A parte rei, included in the partition of being, which is dealt with in the Categories of the Philosopher, in which more light is entered, having knowledge of the Predicables of Porphyry, which has been discussed in this Discourse, as useful, and necessary for this Science of understanding, and exercise of the Sword, choosing what is necessary, and excluding what most properly applies to Physics, and Metaphysics, as is disputed in the Schools.

SEVENTH DISCOURSE.

PREDICAMENTS, OR CATEGORIES: of the Metaphysics of this science

From this results, by this true doctrine, that in the science of the Sword, the subject’s potential by itself is ordered for the act, and in the same subject (which is man) the potential is for the accident, like matter for the form, because the accident, and accidents, which result from the operation in this science, have for their subject matter that in which the accidents subsist, which result from the work: for this it is necessary to know what substance and accidents are in this science, according to the partition of being into the ten Predicaments, or Categories, without getting entangled with Metaphysicians, on whether they can be more, or are less than those posed by Aristotle, whom we follow, looking only at what is necessary for our purpose. In this science, the Categories are very useful (as in others), because to define, it is necessary to inquire into the true Genus, and this cannot be achieved except by the formation of the Predicament, ascending from the lowest Species to the highest Genus, or forming a concept, or being of the highest Genus nearest or remote, to come to knowledge of the defined Species with the utilities that are experienced in all sciences, and will be demonstrated in this one, seeing how the matter is produced for the argument and the demonstration.

The meanings of the Greek term Categories are diverse, because Orators have it for Accusation; but philosophers choose words, or terms, to facilitate their understanding of the difficult, and they are allowed to draw to the use of sciences, terms, or words, invented of old, or forming them anew, to explain themselves with them, and by them, as Ciceron did; and it is seen in Aristotle, that the term Category uses it in three meanings: The first, Attribution: The second, Predicaments, or Highest Genres of Substance, and Accidents: And the third, Series of Genera of Forms, and of Individuals. For this science we will use the term Category in the second and third meaning; including all the essential principles of this Science.

Some people doubt what is disputed in the Categories, or Predicaments; because some carry, that of entities; others, that of voices; others, that of notions; and most have, that of everything, voices, notions, and realities. In this consideration, we agree, as most suitable for our intention, explaining what is Reality, what is Voice, and what is Notion; and thus, we define that entity in subject, or in species, is that which (according to its essential and proper attributes) is signified, and understood: like the man, who is an animal participant of reason; and thus corporeal substance, animated, sensible, etc. Voice is that term, or word, with which we name some subject, or species, like man, to signify the rational nature: Peter, John, etc. to explain their individuals. Notion is that apprehension, perceived by the understanding, which gives it intelligence, in a formal concept of something, by which it comes into its knowledge; and this definition, although descriptive, is proper to the Notion: and the apprehension perceived by concept in the understanding, is divided into first, and second Notion.

The first one is that naked apprehension in the understanding, which is made, without attention to what the sense perceives, as when man is considered in the most essential essence, or any other subject, or Treta, or Wound, etc. according to its essential essence, without respect to the perception of the senses. The second Notion is that apprehension, or consideration, that is caused in the understanding from what the senses perceive. From here come the First and Second intentions in the science of the Sword, which are correlative, to the notions: and also results the formation of the Categories, or Predicaments.

Avoiding the hassle of the questions, if the Categories are six, as Plato wanted; or are ten, as Aristotle wanted, whom I follow, I put the ten of the Philosopher, which are, Substance, Quantity, Relation, Quality, Action, Passion, Where, When, Position, and Habit.

Entities can be placed in Categories in three ways, either by themselves, or by others, relatively. What is placed in the Categories are Genera, Species, Individuals, because the Category is the order of the Genera, of the Forms, and of the Individuals.

Individuals are placed because they are the foundations of the second substances, such as Genus, and Species, therefore it is said to be placed in the Categories that which is not only by itself, but by the reason of its whole, and therefore physical and natural parts are also placed, like matter, form, soul, and integral parts, such as in man, head, hands, feet, etc. as parts of his whole, just as in Fencing, Movement, Compasses, Tricks, Wounds, etc.

Material principles such as point, unity, number, time, movement, term, and quantity are also placed, and it is usually referred to as an increase in the Category of quantity, as in the science of the Sword distance, movement, and species of continuous and discrete quantity are increased.

Negations and defects are placed reductively in the Categories, such as not man, not Pedro, etc. blind, deaf, mute, etc. that is admitted in the Category of Substance, and Accidents, and in that of the Sword, not Cut, not deviation, etc. It should be noted that the entity of reason is understood in two ways, because, either it fits to real essence, or it does not fit to perfect reality, but forms Chimera, or Hypocentaur: and these entities of reason, without real object, are not properly admitted in the Categories. But there are other entities of reason, which are adequate to such forms, that can be admitted in the Categories, which is all explained by the Logicians with the voices of the entity of reason, with or without foundation; effect of reasoning reason, or reasoned.

The questions of the entities of reason of the first and second mode touch in their speculation to the Metaphysicians, and to our intent only the partition of the real entity, which is more proper of the Science of the Sword, where most times the entities of reason are instructive, with respect to the practicing part, to which intelligence looks: this, teaching by the formation of real entities; and that, by the exercise, which produces the right operation, resulting from both the rules and precepts that form the Art, and from everything the perfection with experience.

In this Predicament the subject, and object of this science is demonstrated, which is the man, armed with such an instrument, like the Sword, which is chosen for defense and offense against another man with the same precaution, reduced to combat, which admits the term Duel, which comes from Duorum bellum, which without restraint, is said by the Latins, Duellum, which is, to battle; and so, to Belona Varron called her Duellona, as can be seen in the Authors of the margin. In the vulgar it is improperly received the term Duel for challenge in genre, or species, or be it of two, or more number, and in this part it is to be abhorred: in the proper signification all Rights permit it, because it only looks to the defense and offense lawful of two singulars, with equal Swords, to get agile, and to exercise the lawful defense, and offense.

The Entity (As has been pointed out) is divided into ten supreme Genera, which is the first the Substance, whose dignity precedes that of the other accidental Predicaments, in which is the partition of the entity; because the Substance in first signification is taken by the essence, and with such a term it is placed in the Categories, with respect to the Accidents, as superior to them. In second meaning the term Substance is taken for everything that is not accident. In third meaning it is received by finite, perfect, and lowest substance, that which is not part of another, such as, Genera, Species, and Individuals, which are not parts of others.

Aristotle divided substances into two, some he called first, and others second, defining them thus: First substance is, that which is not in subject, neither is said, nor predicated of subject. It is not in subject, because substance is by itself; and it is not said, or predicated of subject, because it is first individual substance. Second substances are Genus, and Species, in which the first are contained, according to essence, like Animal in man, who individualizes according to his essence, and is contained in the Genus, or the Species: from which it follows, that the Substance in essence, does not admit definition by Genus, and Difference, because the supreme Genus does not admit over itself another Genus.

Aristotle noted six properties in Substance: the first, not to be in subject, this property belongs to the first Substances, insofar as they are not in subject, nor are they said of subject: and to the second, insofar as they are defined by the first, because they participate in them, not as in subject, but are said to be in the first substances, because they contain their nature.

The second property applies to Differences. and to universal Substances. It is so proper of Substances to agree in name and difference with the first individual Substance, from which they derive; such as Man, which is said by name and difference, Peter, John; because in one way and another, animal participating of reason is produced.

The third property is of the first Substances, to signify something: this is, by nature, certain, and defined, existing by itself.

The fourth property is, that it does not admit contrary; this is, that in that Substance there is no contradiction of another Substance or Accident, because two contraries in substance are proper accidents; and so, they cannot be Substance. And if the Elements are said to be contraries, like water, and fire, such contrariety is not because of the Substance, but because of the qualities, from which the contrary Elements are so called, not because of the elemental substance itself, but because of the qualities, which are contrary.

The fifth property of Substance is, not to admit more, nor less; this is, when the Substance is said of its inferiors, it is not said more, nor less: e.g. when it is said of Peter, John, etc. In the Science of the Sword it is the same in Substance; e.g. Wound as to individual: such as to say by Cut, or by Reverse, or by Thrust, or by Half Cut, or by Half Reverse, which is not said (as to individual) more wound, nor less, than the specific, which is terminated from its individual term.

The sixth property of Substance is to subsist the same in number, although it admits contrary affections, like Peter sitting, Peter walks, is hot, or is cold, or is sick, healthy, etc. And in this Science, Natural Movement, Slow, or Violent, or Mixed Movement, although they admit contrary affections of their mutation, they subsist in their number, substance, and movement.

In the rest that is arguable, I refer the curious to the Metaphysicists, Logicians, and Dialecticians, in which various opinions and subtle sharpness are found, most of which are foreign to this Science, and so I omit them. In this Category, I demonstrate from the supreme Genre, which in the created does not admit another above itself, signifying it with the term Substance, discussing until the lowest individual, subject, and object of this Science (which is man), giving him to know in his whole, and in his parts, so that his regulation is also known, as this Science supposes, from where the art is produced, which with experience is perfected, and all together is what is called Skill.

For supreme Genre, created, the term Substance is placed: this is divided into corporeal, and incorporeal. The incorporeal subdivides into Angel, Demon, Soul separated from body, or in it, vivifying it: the corporeal produces body, which is placed in the straight line: Body is divided into mixed, and simple. Mixed produces Mixed in the straight line: simple body subdivides into ethereal, and elemental. Ethereal subdivides into Heavens, and Stars; elemental into the four Elements, Earth, Water, Air, and Fire. The Mixed in the straight line is divided into animated, and inanimate. Inanimate subdivides into perfect mixtures, and imperfect ones. Perfect ones, into stones, metals, etc. imperfect ones, into meteorological impressions, rain, snow, hail, clouds, lightnings, thunderbolts, comets, etc. Body animated produces in the straight line Living: Living is divided into sensible, and insensible: insensible vegetable subdivides into plants, into fruitful trees, or fruitless trees, herbs, some fruitful, others fruitless, etc. The sensitive, or sensible produces in the straight line Animal. Animal is divided into participates of reason, and lackin reason. Lacking reason are in multitude of species, birds, terrestrial brutes, aquatic, amphibians, etc. Animal participates of reason produces in the straight line Man in perfect form. The term man includes both sexes, male and female, from which individuals, Peter, John, etc., propagate, as everything is demonstrated in the series, or Category, which here, goes by demonstration.

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This category results in the man (according to his whole) being a created, animated, corporeal, mixed, living, sensitive substance, an animal participating in reason, and all the composite rational man: for human procreation, male and female, who as far as the body produce by generation, individuals, Pedro, Juan, etc. like they are.

In wanting to show the perfections of man, one could form a volume, and volumes, discussing his efficient, material, formal, and final causes: His states, happiness, lapse, and penalty, which theologians consider: in the first innocence, and grace, with what infused knowledge? with what supreme, dignity? in the second state of guilt, how naked, delinquent, and condemned. Let the pondering of David suffice, saying to the Creator: I will see the Heavens, the work of your fingers, the Moon, and Stars, that you founded. What is man, that you remember him? or the son of man why do you visit him? You made him little less than the Angels, crowned him with honor, and glory, and constituted him over the works of your hands. You subjected everything to his feet, the sheep, the ox, the universal species, who graze the fields: the birds of Heaven, the fish of the Sea, which breaking the waters, make a path through their waves, etc.

The Great Basil eloquently said, embracing the extremes: What is man, in respect to his Artificer God? And what is man, in respect to the dust from which he was formed? He is, with all that, an epitome of all things, a small world, a particle divided into parts, being united. Horace called man, An image of all superior gifts. Pedro Gregio (by the authority of Hesiod, who spoke under the name of Pandora) said: God breathed an immortal soul into man, with which he participates, and understands with the Angels, feels with the animals, vegetates with the plants, lives common to all, and has being with the others.

The Philosopher, giving a reason for the upright stature of man, said: Only man is erect, and elevated, because his nature, and substance is divine, and his Office Divine, to understand, and know that it would not be appropriate if the composition of the body became heavy, because the weight would make the mind, and common sense slow: for this reason to the heavy disposition, grave, oppressive in the bodies, working urgently, they need to lower themselves to the earth, as seen in irrational brutes. Cicero recognized that God constituted men as exalted, and raised above the earth, so that they would contemplate Heaven. By this doctrine, Macrobius (it seems) said that the Mind of man has to be common with the Stars. Protagoras said that man is the measure of all things by his proportion, and measures: as is demonstrated in Architecture, as seen in Vitruvius, and Pomponius Gaurico.

The man was called Ab humo, which is earth, from where he was formed; thus Plato confessed, and not as Marco Varron was persuaded, that the term Humus came from Homo. The Hebrews explain the man with the name, or term Adam, because his corporeal matter is the earth, which in Hebrew is pronounced Adama. The Greeks signified them by the term Andras Epictonions, which is the same as terrestrial man. Man is, in short, a rational animal (as Pedro Gregorio says) consisting of soul, and body, conveniently constituted (according to the Hebrews) of a double nature; one part incorporeal immortal, which is the image, and likeness of God: not as the Gentiles wrongly thought, made by chance, or fortune, but by God himself created, to praise, and recognize the Divine Majesty: the lower terrestrial, and corporeal part, is also the work of God, who formed it from earth, to return to earth, as Eusebius Pamphilius wrote, with whom St. Ambrose, St. Bernard, St. Basil, St. Athanasius, and other very grave Authors concur, where curiosity can be satisfied, and widely in the work of Father Pereyra, with which we excuse the many that erudition offers us, without dwelling on the various opinions of Philosophers, and Pagan Poets. As for the fabric of man, consisting of soul, and body, I only say, that in it fits the speculative, and practical science, reduced in the speculative to the ratiocination; and in the practical to art, and work, and everything together is in the Science of the Sword, from whose understanding, and exercise results the consummate Skill; whose subject, and object is man known in the Predicate of the Substance; with which one can proceed to its knowledge by its parts, according to what pertains to this Science, without the anatomy, which is more proper to the physical sciences.

Understood that man, in his entirety, is an animal participating in reason, derived, according to his Predicament, from created, animated, corporeal substance, etc., acquires knowledge that he is capable of speculative and practical science: and being so, as it is, and is pointed out; it is also essential to know the three requirements that are necessary for the Science of the Sword in man.

In the first one, it is necessary to investigate, what kind of Science is the Sword? If it is practical, or if it is speculative? Or if it admits both species? Demonstrating how it works as science, in what we broadly call Dexterity. In the second, it is necessary to declare what essence and existence are, and if they are distinct. In the third, it is considered and recognized in man what is potential and act for this Science. And if armed with the Sword, and other weapons with which he adorns himself, do the warlike instruments provide potential or act, by intention or extension. These principles (perhaps not pleasing to everyone, nor for everyone, because they require other not common ones for those who have some scientific light, or want to take it from the one that is given in this Book) are so precise, and compelling, that without them, the deficiency that will result will be great, leaving diminished in essence so much work, as it costs to understand, and make this Science understood, as Science; but whoever does not wish to enter through the true doors, we do not force him to get entangled in more; since he may be content with the common precepts of art and experience, seeking a scientific voice that explains and exercises him in the speculative and practical aspects of the Tricks, which are achieved by science, with which he can take advantage; but he will not be able to say that he knows the Science of the Sword as Science, because it consists of method and precepts of Science, just as in Philosophy, and Metaphysics, and the others that are sciences, cannot be entered or known as such, if their method and principles are not studied, which are acquired through Definitions, Divisions, Predicables, and Predicaments, causes, arguments, and demonstrations.

It is assumed out of necessity the Logic and Dialectics for the acquisition of all Sciences, as taught by Boethius and explained by St. Thomas; by whose doctrines, Ancient and Modern establish this principle as maximum, with which it is inexcusable not to follow such precepts, to understand and make this Science of the Sword understood; and more compelling, when its species is investigated, being the object, and subject the man, forewarned, prepared, disposed, and according to pure Castilian, ready for the operation of soul, and body, which all these synonyms signify the term Parasceue in Greek, as can be gathered from Ancient and Modern Dictionaries, and Pedro Gregorio, with which we can discuss in our commitment, and question.

Aristotle says as a maxim, or rule, that that of which is predicated, as of subject, and predicate, is reduced to the subject; and he gives the example in man, who is the essential subject of this Science, considered in his entirety and in his parts, is capable of the Science of that common instrument, dedicated to offense, and defense. It is therefore necessary to know how man perceives it. This question can be shown with various arguments, whose subtlety is not for all temperaments, nor for all tastes, so I will try to omit what is excusable and limit myself to the most compelling.

Science in common, is a Term, or Voice, which broadly taken, signifies the knowledge of any proposition; but this is not perfect science in the definition given by the Philosopher, saying: Science is certain and evident knowledge of a necessary thing through its causes. It follows that this knowledge by causes is discursive, from which arises discursive or speculative science. This (as Dr. Torrejon puts it) is that which, by force of rational discourse, knows some proposition, and in this respect it applies to the Science of the Sword, which, as a real entity, by force of discourse, knows the truth of the proposition of the Trick, which the scientist premeditates, and perfects in the understanding, either by means of syllogisms or by other discursive means, which compels reason to the knowledge of truth by premises, optimal dispositions, from which originate the two terms Opinion, and Arrogance.

Opinion is caused by probable premises, although these have fallacy, as is experienced in what they call vulgar Dexterity, whose major foundations are opinion, either already received by many, or assented to by those who are guided by it.

Arrogance, is that which is deduced by certain and evident principles, and this is properly called Science, because the discourse investigates and inquires the truth deduced by its causes, arguing it by syllogism and demonstration; and in this part there is no doubt that the Science of the Sword is speculative; and as such, it assumes the logical and dialectical principles, for being, as they are, forceful, and necessary to all sciences, as has been demonstrated in its place, and it is conclusively concluded by Cardinal Toledo, and many others.

Another type of Science is what they call experimental, or practical in common terms: this is acquired through the senses, according to their operation, whose knowledge can be without discourse due to principles already posited in the understanding, which they call axioms, or common notions: for example, that The whole is greater than the part: that Two and two make four: that From equal parts, if equal parts are taken away, equal parts remain, etc. From these common notions, or pronouncements, without other discourse, with the terms accepted as evident, knowledge is judged; and of this kind are the Mathematical disciplines in their operative and experimental aspect, and this also applies to the Science of the Sword, insofar as it is a habit acquired by demonstration, to which cause the mathematical disciplines serve as subalterns: in the practical or experimental Science of the Sword. Noting that in the way of knowing, or acquiring Science by habits learned in understanding, a habit will be that which has left certain knowledge of that thing that comes to be known easily, and promptly to be exercised, both in understanding and in operation, just as in this Science, as far as experimental practice, that facility is acquired which is called habit, as Torrejon aptly defined, saying that thus in understanding by comparison habits are given, by whose means, with their frequency, the same understanding is facilitated.

The same Author, convinced by reason, admits that it comes from the memory of past events, which quicken understanding and operation, because what is already known about the same Science facilitates knowledge; because what is already known of one proposition, making the antecedent, one passes to another, and the consequence is acquired.

But this mode, which is the experimental in the intelligence and exercise of the Sword, is more properly called habit than science, because it results from repeated natural acts, which pass to the understanding more by memory than by rational discourse: and in this part, what is written and taught is what is most exercised with the Sword; but that is not therefore the pure science of it, which is not acquired without Logic and Dialectics, which are the common doors through which all Sciences are entered: from which it is concluded for our purpose, that man acquires true science, when he speculatively discursively knows the true Skill scientifically, perfecting it in practical experimental, not by Opinion, but by Arrogance; and this is to be the man subject, and object of this Science, as an animal participant of reason, ascending to the highest Genus by the straight line of the Predicament of Substance, leaving, by all the above, the proposed question understood.

Man is not well known in his formality, which comes from the soul, a physical and organic instrument, which informs the living individual, and gives him aptitude to wield the Sword in his defense, and in the offense of his contrary object, unless it is investigated, what is in man Essence, and Existence, and where does the power, and act in this Science come from?

Understood, then, that being is divided into its inferiors, which the Philosopher called Categories, the same as Predicaments, we enter into this question, omitting the many that Logicians and Metaphysicians move, and we follow Saint Thomas, Cardinal Cayetano, current of the Thomists, and Boethius, who says: That in creatures, being is one thing, and what it is, is another, because they have a participated being, and in this it is impossible for the participating and what is participated to be the same. It is proved by the reason of the essential compared with existence, which is like the power for the act, because the essential in the creature, by itself alone, does not have being, but truly exists by existence; and thus it is like its actuality: then the essence and existence in man are really distinguished, because a true act and potency cannot be understood without real distinction, as also in the essential and existence a real distinction is admitted: this affirmative conclusion is taken by Saint Thomas, and the Authors cited here, and it is to our intent.

Upon this foundation of Boethius, and opinion received from Saint Thomas, a multitude of arguments are formed that conclude the real distinction of essence and existence: just as also in potency and act; although the Masters, Durand, Enriquez, Gregory, Gabriel, and others, choose other theses, or hypotheses to prove by other means the distinction that is given between essence and existence, power, and act.

It is confirmed: from the essence flow and result all the passions of the same living compound; and thus also the mode of existence, if it is formally distinct, flows and is derived from the essence; because what is real comes from and flows from a real being; and in the same way, first it is supposed (according to nature) the essence antecedent to existence.

This metaphysical conclusion is proven with many arguments, some of which Father Oña compiled. For the curious, I direct them to him and to the other authors cited in this part. For my purpose, in the Science of the Sword, it must be considered that in man there are two apprehensions in understanding, both being primitive. One is in the essence of understanding itself, ingrained in the soul by the very essence of rationality; and this is a certain being that in essence precedes the first concepts, and from this flows the second apprehension, which, although also intellectual, moves to become existence in rational understanding. For this doctrine, one can refer to Aristotle, Saint Thomas, and the disciples of both.

From here also comes what is known in schools as ‘being of reason’, and ‘real being’ by first and second intention. The first attention in the understanding of man is for things, or concepts, that are put forth, as the first objects in the intellectual essence of man; and this is properly the first intention in the essence of understanding, signifying things or concepts according to their entities, and this is pure ‘being of reason’.

In existence, the intellectual term will be the one that truly declares the affections of things that are shared with the knowing understanding, and this is the ‘real being’, or second intention; which, although it flows from the first, is distinct from it, as are essence and existence, to which potentiality and actuality have analogy; and in such terms it is first perceived in the Science of the Sword: and whoever does not accumulate such knowledge, will poorly presume that they are skilled by Science.

Aristotle treats ‘potentiality and actuality’ ex professo in Metaphysics, where his expositors extensively dispute what is in man Potentiality, and Act, whose affections are divided into active and passive: and these, not only are considered in animate species, but in inanimate ones; in which also their powers are found by principles of operation, or action, like the heat in fire, the cold in water, the virtues in stones, in metals, etc. In animate species, if one considers the vegetal ones, trees, plants, etc. or sensibles, like beasts, birds, fish, etc. one finds in ones and others powers, and natural acts, proper to the same animate species: and in all there is a certain ordering to their own defense, and to the offense of their adversaries, as we touched on, treating of offense, and defense in general.

To this end: in man (as noted by Pedro Gregio) active and passive powers are considered, which we will discuss in the Predicament of Action and Passion, where it is their proper place, as from here, that Act and Potentiality have a relationship in such a way, That the act is that which is not in potentiality: and potentiality is that which is not in the act.

These definitions are essential, from which it follows that nature is reduced to act through potentiality; but if the potentiality is remote, it occurs after many intermediate transformations; e.g. the earth in remote potentiality is a tree, is a plant, is grass, is a flower, is fruit; but before the earthly potentiality is reduced to act, it requires a multitude of means. Likewise in man, the food that in potentiality is blood, is flesh, is bones; before it is reduced from remote potentiality to act, it passes through a multitude of means, as also in Fencing, the Cut, Thrust, etc., before it is reduced from remote potentiality to act, it requires a multitude of means, positions, compasses, movements, etc.

From here it follows (as noted by the same Pedro Gregorio) that what is worked in another by remote potentiality does not have the name of that which is acted upon, because the matter is remote: and on the contrary, passing from close potentiality, it comes to the act; e.g. the Trick in the understanding and knowledge of the Fencer is in potentiality, either remote or near; if remote, it does not have the name of that which is in the understanding by rational entity, or by real entity until it is acted upon, requiring a multitude of means to reduce it to act in operation, where it receives the name, which it lacked in remote potentiality, due to the remoteness of the matter; on the contrary, if the potentiality is close, and is immediately reduced to act, due to the immediacy, it acquires the name due to the immediacy of the matter and operation. From here it is understood what is first intention, and what is second essence, and existence by rational entity, or by real entity, that in the Science of the Sword, as far as understanding is concerned, the potentiality is always first for reason, and knowledge, and this is properly called active potentiality. But in the passive (as noted by the same Pedro Gregorio) the act can be first or subsequent: first, in terms of number: subsequent, in terms of species; because passive potentiality in one way or another can be considered in relation to the act, because the being of some act in species necessarily precedes what is in potentiality to be reduced to act.

From here stems the use of the terms ‘First Intention’ and ‘Second Intention’ in this science when applying it to actual infliction of wounds, considering the passive potentiality by number or species: When it acts by number, it refers to that wound which the fencer executes by immediate potentiality to the act; that is, without admitting or depending on the opponent’s movement: so the act, as a primitive numerical immediate to the potentiality, acquires the name of ‘first intention’ wound; and the potentiality, as a numerical impulsive cause, takes precedence over the act in any kind of wound. When it goes to the species from the remote potentiality, converting the wound into a type, such as a Vertical Cut, or a Diagonal Reverse, or a Fourth Circle Thrust, etc., as the species has consideration or relation to the opponent’s movements, they are called ‘second intention’ wounds, and from passive potentiality, which can be prior and subsequent to the act, according to its accidents and way of acting.

For this reason, it is considered that the active potentiality can be innate, and can be acquired: innate, by understanding and feeling; acquired, by pure practice; both of which concur in the Science of the Sword, which is composed of intelligence and practice, where the active potentiality can be innate in understanding with respect to intelligence, and this produces ‘first intention’ wounds, as it follows from the preceding principles, which can be applied to the senses. The reason is that, being acquired from one of the powers of the soul, the potentiality can be innate active; and so, before the act, as it comes from innate potentiality, with respect to understanding, which perceives with the senses; and in such ways, the active potentiality acts in this science, with the potentiality preceding the act, e.g., the fencer, through the means of innate active potentiality, scientifically anticipates the reduction to the act, reasoning from Universals to the lowest intimate species, defining, and distinguishing by topical arguments the truth of the Tricks, to pass them from potentiality to act: also through the senses (supplying the powers of the soul with the scientific species of the Tricks the active potentiality) can reduce them to the act by appropriate means, according to the proximity or distance, mediate or immediate, according to the potentiality is with the operation.

Active or passive potentiality, acquired by exercise, can be considered subsequent to the act (as taught by Pedro Gregorio) because in the acquired, the frequented acts are generative of potentiality, and then it will not be said to be innate, but born from frequented acts; e.g., the practiced organist, the keys; and other musicians of instruments, harp, lyre, vihuela, etc., by the frequent practiced acts, generate the potentiality to know how to play the organ, harp, lyre, vihuela, etc., making the effect a cause.

In this Science, the Fencer can generate potentiality acquired by exercise, and this will be subsequent to the act, because the frequented acts are generative of the potentiality acquired by pure practicing habits; and the cause comes before the effect: then the act comes before the potentiality in this mode of consideration.

But note from the doctrine of the same Pedro Gregorio, that the Organist, the instrumental Musician of the harp, lyre, etc., and the same in Fencing: through exercises and frequent habits, those who practice can be called Fencers in terms of the art, but not scientists, because the acts remain imperfect without the Science, and are not due to innate potentiality, but causative to the potentiality acquired by exercise; being so strictly speaking, it paves the way for the potentiality acquired in the Fencer, which in this way will be due to frequent acts, but not due to science: he will have acquired art through precepts and rules, frequenting acts, which converted into habits, pave the way for the potentiality; and in this way it is seen that there are acts that precede the potentiality, and that this can be subsequent, thus being understood by the preceding in this Category, that it is the man as a whole, for what he does to this Science of the Sword, with which it is better given to know in its parts for the same purpose.

The anatomy of man is not of this endeavor, according to his interior composition, which is more suited to Medicine and Surgery than to the Science of the Sword, which, in terms of the parts of man, considers the external ones, as it suits to the Dexterity acquired by science and art, with which it proceeds by discourse and demonstration, avoiding as much as possible, the arguable, referring the curious to Andrés Laurencio, regarding the parts of man, which the Philosopher and his Commentators also discussed.

The Greeks called man Antropos, which means an inverted tree, or upside-down, because he has his head with hair, like roots: his arms and legs, like branches: the rest of the body, almost a trunk, elevated on two feet upright, for two reasons, given by the Wise; one in the natural sense, another in the moral: the natural reason is that in other animals the head abounds with earthly matter, which depresses them, lacking the erecting or elevating heat, which is the opposite in man.

For the moral reason, man consists of an upright stature, so that the body testifies to the uprightness of the mind, raised high, so that it contemplates the celestial perfections, to which it should adhere, considering that accidents of the soul are transmuted to the body, from where Avicena said that imagination makes things happen; so much so that he who vehemently fears leprosy becomes a leper. On the contrary, the passions of the body overflow into the soul, considering man as a small world, whose parts have proportion and correspondence to the larger World; the distance from the tips of the largest fingers of the hands, with the arms extended at right angles to the body, is as much as the length from the top of the head to the soles of the feet: as also in the larger World, the distance from the Zenith to the Nadir, points considered with respect to man, by correspondence to his head and feet, is as much as the distance to two other opposite points, one in the East, and one in the West. Also considering in man the circle when the arms are raised and the legs extended, in such a way, that if a compass foot is placed where nature marked the center, and with the other describing a circle, it will touch the Periphery at the ends of the feet and hands.

The human body is composed of four elements, just like the greater World, being earthly in the bones and flesh; and in the humors blood, phlegm, bile, and melancholy, including the four qualities.

Air is contained in the lungs, which is always in continuous movement, serving as the bellows of the heart, so that excessive heat does not dissolve it; because fire is contained in the heart, and throughout in the form of flame. Water is the blood that is diffused through channels, which they call veins.

There are three main organs in the human body: they are called radicals, which are the liver, heart, and brain, where the being of the individual is mainly placed, because in them resides the natural, vital, and animal spirit; others are servile organs, such as veins, arteries, hands, feet, and those in which agile movements are exercised, and all those that move, are called officials, like the hands, the feet, and those in which agile movements are exercised; and all those that have movements, are called artificial, because they mutually help each other, and some resort to others, the lower ones serving the superior ones, by whom they are governed, as demonstrated in the eyes, tongue, fingers, etc., and the rest, that make up the brief human world: supporting, sustaining, and moving the machinery of man are the feet, like the base, the legs, like columns, the shoulders, like architraves, the arms and hands dedicated to the execution of actions; and especially to the defense of the whole individual, and to the offense, and repulsion of its opposites, all respecting each other with reciprocal action, some parts sympathizing with others, as participants of pain, and delight, contributing to the preservation of their entire integrity, because of the connection and coalescence that some have depending on others, for which reason they supplement correlating defects, as can be elaborated in long discourses.

In humans, science, providence, and senses are placed in the head: the eyes apt and active for seeing, the ears and hearing for listening, the mouth for tasting, the nose for smelling, the whole body for touch: all senses serving the soul species, which are perceived, according to the sensitive organs admit them; some that have external objects, such as sight in objects, which through visual rays, perceives the forms, representing them to the soul with different perspectives; by whose arrangement in proportional distances they appear larger or smaller, with lights and shadows, distinguished by the lights, from which art learned painting, derived from perspective science in terms of speculation and practice.

The ear perceives the sense, and the formation of voices, and articles, by which means the word, the prayer, the concept, and the reason are ministered to the soul: when perceived, it is distinguished, and from all together agreeing, and reprobating, science results in opinion, and arrogance. These two senses, which are the noblest, are the organs through which the Science of the Sword is acquired, as far as it is speculative; and as far as practice, it is exercised by the parts of the body, and as main ones, arms, hands, legs, and feet, serving the lower to the superior of the other senses, such as touch, which not only spreads intensively in the human body, but is extended extensively to the Sword, in which strength and weakness are admitted, recognized by the extension of touch, communicated by the arm, and hand to the armed instrument, which in power is ruled by the understanding, and in act by the operation, subjecting everything to free will, which as the first mover, carries after it all the other lower movements.

The parts of the human body are the radical measures, from which art and experience took and measured for human operations, composing from four grains of barley the common width of a finger, and four fingers what the common people call a palm, and from four palms a foot is composed, which they call Geometric, which differs in nations as to the larger or smaller; just as the visual span, received by distance, or extension, from the ends of the first and last fingers, from where the Spanish visual span is a quarter of the Toledan rod, and the foot is a third, and the cubit sesquipedal: the Mathematic step is five feet, and the common vulgar considers it to be two and a half, in which there are disputes. One hundred and twenty-five Mathematic steps make a stadium, omitting the other measures, because they are not of this Science, but the first ones, which result from palms, feet, and visual steps. And anyone who wants to see more, consult Philippe of Burgundy, Pomponio, Gaurico, Vitruvius, and others, and of our Spaniards, Juan Perez de Moya.

As for the proportional parts, which correspond to each other in the human body, a multitude of authors deal with them, from whose proportions those of Architecture are drawn, as can be seen in Vitruvius, Viñola, and others, in which the curious will find an expanded field. Contenting ourselves here with what is most precise to this Science, reserving for the second Book the lines, sections, planes, and angles, in which man is considered divided, for the understanding, and exercise of what the common people call Skill.

EIGHTH DISCOURSE.

SECOND PREDICATE,

Quantity, or How much

Having explained the first Predicate Substance, which produces man (the subject of the Science of the Sword) by a straight line, we properly move on to the second category, the first accidental part, where the division of the real being is admitted, according to the common doctrine of Philosophers and commentators of Aristotle, Ancient and Modern: although there are those among these who, by specifying the term, want it to be considered, not the real being, but the knowable being, because this admits more latitude, intending to apply to the being of reason, with certain circumstances, that are not so common to Logicians, who understood the division of the real being, according to the ten Predicaments, in which the Philosopher distributes it, whom we follow in the most received, and most of our intention.

Quantity, or How much, is placed, as Aristotle taught, in the second place, or Category, where it is admitted as a supreme Genus, for two reasons: the first, because Quantity (whose term we use as more common) is the most proper and similar to the substance, as it does not admit contraries, nor more, nor less in its species: the second, because Quantity is the subject of other accidents, as they cannot subsist without it, because it is first, that there is an interceding or middle subject, so that other accidents subsist in the substance, or in the same accidents: these, as the Metaphysicists and Theologians debate, can be without the same essential substance, but not without Quantity, which is the interceding subject for the substance, with respect to other accidents.

We define, then, Quantity, or How much, saying: It is that which is divided into parts of Succession, Extension, and Description: in parts of Succession, like time, which is divided into parts that are causes of continuous movement, or are causes of discrete movement. Of continuous movement, like the cause in past, present, and future time: of discrete movement, as we will explain in its place, following the Philosopher: As far as the same time is considered successive, although it is divided by the past, present, and future, it does not cease to continue in the succession, because its parts are conjunctive, and what is conjunctive is successive: then, time is successive, and a proper species of continuous Quantity, which is understood to mean, that they are parts of the succession.

In parts of Extension, it is understood, as in the line, which admits extension in conjunctive lines, produced by the first petition of Mathematicians; since, although the line lacks breadth, which is not given in it, because it lacks wide (or width, as the common people say) extension, at least extension is given in the production of length without breadth.

As with the line A.B., which is considered to be 4 and produced to 8, it will be extended by another 4, and its common extreme terms will be points that end at 8, and consequently the conjunction of 4 on the line extended by another 4, if given movement, will be in the extension of 8, as shown in Figure 1, which is in the Diagram of Quantity, or How much.

Thus, a man with a sword in his hand, whose arm is considered as two units in conjunction with the sword, considered as 4 units, will have an extension of 6 units. Consequently, he will be able to perform an extended length motion or movement of 6 units. In this consideration, the Quantity will extend from 2 to 6 units because the arm is considered as 2 units and the sword as 4 units, and the entire movement of the arm and sword has an extension of 6 units. This is demonstrated in Figure 2 of the said Diagram.

En Deſcripcion conſideraſe la Quantidad, como numeral, donde el Todo ſe divide en partes diſcretas, y diſiuntas, como el binario en dos vnidades, el quaternario en dos binarios, &c. eſto baſte quanto à la primera difinicion. Otros, coligiendola de las palabras del Philoſopho, dizen: Quantidad es aquello, que mira à la coſa en quanto; para cuya explicacion, los Modernos ſe valen, ſuponiendo, que qualquiera corporea entidad, padece en sì afecciones, que no miran à la miſma inmediata entidad, ni ſe producen de ſu effencia.

The common opinion of logicians and metaphysicists asserts that all bodies have accidents of some coeval of the primary matter, although really distinct, yet so considered that all affections arise from it, and this accident is called Quantity.

Aristotle explicitly defines it as follows: How much is divisible in that in which it subsists. According to this definition, which is relevant to our intention, it can be said that How much, or Quantity, is that which admits division into parts, of which it is composed, in such a way that any of them can persist on its own and be a something, or How much, whose division is considered in potentiality in terms of continuous Quantity, and in act in terms of the discrete.

Hence results the most common opinion, which grants, Quantity is a certain accident of actual extension of formal measurability, from which its affections arise, not by essence, but by effects that declare, that assign the essence in the mode that they can.

From everything, following the Philosopher, it can be deduced that Quantity is the numerosity of parts of the same substance, from which arises (in terms of the physical) diverse extension in the position of the subject, such as in the impenetrable figure, hardness; in the light one, lightness; in the linear, length without breadth; in the surface, width without depth; and in the Body, all dimensions combined, etc. All these attributes are attributed to Quantity.

Everyone admits Quantity as the supreme Genre in its Category, although it can be challenging to understand how essence applies to our intent; thus, we grant the most general Genre, Quantity, in its Predicament. And it will be said that in the distribution into predicates; since these, being Species of the supreme Genre, will be genres of those species that are its predicates. For example: Line is a species of the supreme Genre Quantity, and is the Genre of its predicates, like straight, curved, spiral, etc.

Thus, we notice that the Philosopher in this Predicament does not define Quantity by explicit words, but How Much, and he divides this into: A part that is continuous, and a part that is discrete.

From the aforementioned, it can be understood for this Science, what the predicates of this Category are; to whose demonstration it could be said:
Quantity is the supreme Genre, to which entities compete for the reason of measurability, from whose affections, or passions, the predicates that are species result, according to the knowledge with which we investigate the affections of the same things, which we call accidents.

This description can be a thesis of this Predicament, whose terms in abstract are measurability in potentiality; and in concrete, it is measurable in act; because just as the essence, if perceived quidditatively, in it questions are resolved by the term What: so too in this Predicament, questions made by Quantity, or How Much, are satisfied by measurability, or measurable, divided into continuous, and discrete, as Aristotle taught, and from the affection of these terms results the equality, the inequality, the majority, the minority, etc. and for our intent we consider, That Quantity is nothing else but the number of parts understood by extension, to perceive their measures and ranges by continuous Quantity, or by discrete Quantity, in which following the Philosopher, the Category, or Schema, is formed as it is at the end of the explanation of discrete Quantity. Thus, without a doubt, it will be recognized by the table, or Schema, that the term Quantity, or How Much; is the supreme Genre in this Predicament, and is distributed into continuous and discrete Quantity.

Five main species belong to the continuous, which are, Line, Surface, Body, Place, and Time: and these are considered as Genres of their lowest Species: the Number, and the Speech belong to the discrete Quantity, which are also considered Genera, in relation to their Species, up to the most inferior, as will be explained, and reduced to the most proper of the Science of the Sword. The principles for the demonstration in all Sciences are definitions, distinctions, and immediate propositions, these in Science, as in Mathematics (which it uses as subalterns) are reduced to problems, or theorems: those that demonstrate on a given principle, that can be formed: and these, which investigate and recognize the qualities, and passions of the proposition already formed.

From the immediate propositions, other proper principles result in this Science, as in others, which as Bradwardine noted, can be called Maxims. From these and other principles, the common ones are produced, which the Philosophers call Suppositions, and the Mathematicians Petitions, to whom Bradwardine gave the name of Complex Principles, and we need all of these in this Predicament, because it includes the species of continuous and discrete Quantity.

The geometric terms that serve this Science, are either practical or speculative: if practical, they define the Species by Genus and Difference, which looks at the demonstration, as is seen in Euclid’s Elements, thus it will be said: Point is that which has no parts, line, length without width, etc.

If in the speculative, Bradwardine notes well, that the Definitions are not so much by Genus and Difference, but in another way, that looks primarily at the essence, like I assume Genus; e.g. The Point is the beginning of magnitude, or Quantity; the Line is the trace that limits the clear and obscure, constituting a single dimension. Surface is that which admits two dimensions; Body is that which admits three.

In this Science, in terms of definitions, sometimes they are formed as speculative, other times as practical, always trying to ensure they are essential, as noted in their proper place, where we discussed the precepts, with which we enter more clearly into the explanation of this Predicament, whose first species of continuous Quantity is the Line, considered as the Genus of its Species.

Understood that the Point lacks parts, and that without them, although it is the beginning of Quantity, it does not constitute it (from which it follows that it is the end of that species, which can be terminated in points, as will be any dimension, or Quantity, that does not admit width), we will come to know the first dimension, and this is commonly called Line, which we consider with Mathematicians As length, which does not have width, whose ends are points, leaving to Philosophers the dispute, whether the line is composed of points and parts; and how does it consist, or can it consist of indivisibles? and the other questions in which they are vigilant.

We carry, then, that the Line is caused, and understood by the trace of the movement of some physical or metaphysical point, ending in points, and this dimension is the one that is considered as the first species of continuous quantity, and is Genus of its species, which are relevant to this Science are the Straight, the Curve, the Circular, and the Sinuous, and the others, that will be noted in their proper places. Note that because in the following Book we put all the geometric definitions that pertain to this Science, with the application that is made of them for the practicality of Dexterity, we omit here to demonstrate the figures of this continuous Quantity.

A straight line is the shortest extension between two points at which it ends. A curved line is one that forms an arc, terminating at two points, not following the shortest extension, but rather a more deviated one; thus it can be more or less curved, depending on how much it expands in the deviation of its ends.